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ABSTRACT 
 
HUMAN FREEDOM IN A WORLD FULL OF PROVIDENCE: 
AN OCKHAMIST—MOLINIST ACCOUNT OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF 
DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND CREATURELY FREE WILL 
 
FEBRUARY 2010 
 
CHRISTOPHER J. KOSCIUK, B.A., ST. BONAVENTURE UNIVERSITY 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Lynne R. Baker 
 
 
 
I defend the compatibility of the classical theistic doctrine of divine providence, 
which includes infallible foreknowledge of all future events, with a libertarian 
understanding of creaturely free will. After setting out the argument for 
theological determinism, which purports to show the inconsistency of 
foreknowledge and freedom, I reject several responses as inadequate and then 
defend the ‚Ockhamist‛ response as successful. I further argue that the theory of 
middle knowledge or ‚Molinism‛ is crucial to the viability of the Ockhamist 
response, and proceed to defend Molinism against the most pressing objections. 
Finally, I argue that a proper understanding of the Creator-creature relationship 
accounts for why no explanation can be given for how God’s middle knowledge 
comes about. 
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1 
PREFACE 
Almighty God, whose never-failing providence governeth all things both in heaven and 
earth, hath so wisely and mercifully ordered the course of this world (Book of Common 
Prayer).1 
 
When God, in the beginning, created man, he made him subject to his own free choice 
(Sirach 15.14).2 
 
 One of the beliefs that must certainly be considered essential, indeed central, 
to the major traditions of Western theistic religion3 is the conviction that God has 
an ultimate plan for creation4 and, further, is in some mysterious way in control 
of things as that plan unfolds toward full realization. All too often the events in a 
person’s life as well as in the world at large appear either utterly chaotic and 
purposeless on the one hand, or on the other hand seem wholly determined by 
the self-interests of the privileged and powerful. Yet faith in the notion that these 
same events have been foreordained by and remain in the hands of God, the one 
true Power, whose justice is perfect and whose love is inexhaustible, is without 
doubt a supreme motivating factor in the decision of believers to press onward in 
the hope that truth and goodness will ultimately prevail over falsehood and evil.5 
 In addition to the belief that ‘the work of the gods is full of Providence’ 
(Marcus Aurelius, 1989, p. 10), Western religion has also maintained that not 
everything is entirely ‚the work of the gods.‛ Put in terms of our prevailing 
monotheism, God is not the only one responsible for what takes place in our 
world. Instead, God has ordained that human beings, made in the imago Dei and 
2 
thus endowed with rational intellect and freedom of choice, are to be cooperators 
and co-creators with the Deity.6 Rather than being mere instruments for God’s 
use in bringing creation to fulfillment, humans have been blessed (and perhaps 
cursed; cf. Deuteronomy 11.26) with the responsibility of bringing about genuine 
novelty in the world through their own freely chosen actions, whether for good 
or ill.7 Providence is thus not an all-embracing Fate, but rather allows for a 
genuinely contingent future, a ‚garden of forking paths‛ through which humans 
may choose among alternative courses of action, for which choices they may be 
held morally praiseworthy or blameworthy. Paradoxically, while the theistic 
religious believer must hold that the divine plan will in the end be fulfilled, since 
its author is the almighty, all-knowing and benevolent God, who has already 
‘overcome the world’ (cf. John 16.33), its being so fulfilled is, in some real sense, 
also up to the decisions and actions of God’s free creatures, namely us. This 
apparent paradox is nicely captured in the oft-quoted maxim: Pray as though 
everything depended on God. Work as though everything depended on you. 
 The question that has exercised philosophers, theologians, and even ordinary 
believers through the ages is whether this apparent paradox is symptomatic of a 
deeper incoherence in the classical theistic scheme. How can the world be ‚full of 
providence,‛ that is, known to the divine mind and subject to the divine will in 
even its smallest details,8 while yet having a contingent future, being an arena in 
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which humans may freely and responsibly decide among alternative courses of 
action.9 How can humans freely contribute to the course of history if that very 
history is subject to the comprehensive providence of an absolutely sovereign 
Deity, whose intentions cannot possibly be frustrated? Likewise, how could God, 
in creating the world, have known that his designs would prevail if the free, 
undetermined choices of human beings were to play a part (indeed a crucial 
part) in their fulfillment? 
 I will argue in this essay that the classical theistic scheme, at least in the 
foregoing respects, is not incoherent, so that the theistic believer is not irrational 
in maintaining that the world is both full of providence while yet having a 
contingent future, one in which humans can freely decide among genuine 
alternatives. A very quick argument towards establishing this conclusion might 
go something like this: 
[A]  (1)  God is fully provident. 
   (2)  Humans are able to act freely. 
       
   (3)  God is fully provident and humans are able to act freely. 
The justification for each premise is the same: the authority of classical theism, as 
indicated by the quotes given at the outset.10 Wherefore, if one wants to count 
oneself a classical theist, one had better accept these two premises. 
 Of course, from the standpoint of rational reflection, argument [A] counts for  
nothing, and so the way of philosophy will involve the much longer route of 
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looking at various arguments for why (1) and (2) are not compatible and showing 
that such arguments are unsuccessful. Central to my endeavor will be the 
defense of a particular theory of divine providence first proposed in the 16th 
century by the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, known as the theory of scientia 
media (‚middle knowledge‛), or Molinism, in honor of its initial proponent. 
However, my task will not involve merely a defense of Molinism, for I will argue 
that Molina’s own efforts are to some extent vitiated. Instead, using Alfred 
Freddoso’s helpful distinction between two questions within the problem of 
God’s providential knowledge—viz. the question of how that knowledge comes 
about (the ‚source question‛) and the question of reconciling that knowledge with 
human freedom (the ‚reconciliation question‛) (Freddoso, 1988, p. 1)—I will 
argue that Molinism is indeed the best answer to the source question, while 
Ockhamism (so-called after the 14th century Franciscan William of Ockham) 
represents an adequate answer to the reconciliation question. In addition to 
defending these two theories against the most powerful criticisms, I will also 
offer my own approach to dealing with a question that I believe has not been 
adequately answered by the advocates of Molinism, viz. if God has middle 
knowledge, how does such knowledge come about? What, in other words, is the 
source of God’s middle knowledge? 
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 The order of this essay will be to tackle the reconciliation question first, since 
it seems to be the most natural starting point for reflection upon this issue. I will 
then go on to argue that an answer to the reconciliation question is not sufficient 
and that the source question must be answered as well. The end result, it is 
hoped, will be to show that reason, unaided by faith, if it cannot go so far as to 
affirm (1) and (2) of argument [A], can at least go as far as maintaining that there 
is no rationally compelling argument against affirming them both. 
 By way of arriving at such arguments against the compatibility of (1) and (2), 
we need in the first chapter to look at the two key notions involved, namely 
providence and freedom, in order to see how conceptual conflicts seem to arise. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE PROBLEM OF THEOLOGICAL DETERMINISM 
1.1. Providence and Foreknowledge 
 As mentioned at the outset, the classical theist believes that we exist in a 
world created and sustained by an intelligent and free Creator (as opposed to, 
say, a world that emanates necessarily from an impersonal metaphysical 
principle) in accordance with a universal plan or purpose or economy. God’s 
directing the world toward the realization of this plan is called providence (quite 
literally ‚looking out for‛). The classical understanding of God’s providence has 
been described by Alfred Freddoso as follows: 
As traditionally expounded, the doctrine of divine providence involves 
the thesis that God, the divine artisan, freely and knowingly plans, orders, 
and provides for all the effects that constitute His artifact, the created 
universe with its entire history, and executes His chosen plan by playing 
an active causal role sufficient to ensure its exact realization. Since God is 
the perfect artisan, not even the most trivial details escape His 
providential decrees. Thus, whatever occurs is properly said to be 
specifically decreed by God; more precisely, each effect produced in the 
created universe is either specifically and knowingly intended by Him 
(providentia approbationis) or, in concession to creaturely defectiveness, 
specifically and knowingly permitted by Him, only to then be ordered 
toward some appropriate good (providentia concessionis) (Freddoso, 1988, 
pp. 2-3). 
 
Freddoso here describes what I will call the thesis of maximal divine providence: 
   (MDP) For any state of affairs p, if p obtains, then p’s obtaining is either 
        intended by God or permitted by God.1 
7 
For example, Abraham’s act of faith (cf. Genesis 15.6), being a virtuous act, was 
something the occurrence of which God intended, while David’s murder of 
Uriah (cf. ii Samuel 11), being a vicious act, while not something intended by God, 
was at least permitted by God, presumably because God knew a greater good 
would come of it (say, David’s marriage to Bathsheba and the birth of Solomon). 
 One consequence of this maximal view that I want to focus on presently is 
that it entails that God have complete knowledge of each and every event that 
occurs in creation prior to its occurrence, which is to say that God must have 
comprehensive foreknowledge.2 If God either intends or permits a certain state of 
affairs to obtain, then he must as a result know that it will obtain before it 
actually obtains. This, it seems to me, belongs to the very concepts of intention 
and permission. It seems true in general that if S intends that p obtain or S 
permits p to obtain, then S must have some epistemic attitude toward p’s 
obtaining prior to its actually doing so. One cannot be presented with a fait 
accompli and then intend that it happen or allow it to happen. One may intend, 
perhaps, that it continue, or permit it to continue, but then its continuance is again 
subsequent to one’s intention or permission.  But the only ‚epistemic attitude‛ 
that may be appropriately ascribed to God is knowledge. Therefore, since (MDP) 
holds that whatever happens is either intended or permitted by God, and since 
God’s intending or permitting something to happen entails God’s knowing that it 
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will happen before it actually does so, it follows that the thesis of maximal divine 
providence also involves the thesis of maximal divine foreknowledge: 
   (MDF) For any state of affairs p and any time t, if p obtains at t, then God  
        knows at all times before t that p will obtain at t.3 
 
 Divine foreknowledge, therefore, is a consequence of the maximal view of 
divine providence. If one wants to hold a traditional view of God’s governance of 
the world, then one must also hold that God has complete foreknowledge of 
what will happen in the world. If for some reason God’s knowledge cannot be 
seen to extend to such futurabilia, then one’s understanding of God’s providence 
must be modified and correspondingly weakened. Freddoso is thus surely right 
to emphasize the close connection between divine foreknowledge and the 
doctrine of divine providence.4 
 I must add a caveat to the foregoing conclusion. Notice that (MDF) refers to 
God’s knowing something at all times. An important viewpoint to be found 
among traditional theists, most notably St. Thomas Aquinas, holds that God 
exists not in time but in timeless eternity, and so temporal predicates such as 
knowing something at this or that time, or even at all times, may not be ascribed 
to God. Instead, such theists will insist that (MDF) be reformulated along the 
following lines: 
   (MDF*) For any state of affairs p and any time t, if p obtains at t, then  
        God eternally knows that p obtains at t. 
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Notice that in (MDF*), any allusion to something’s being true of God at a time has 
been removed and the tensed ‘p will obtain at t’ in (MDF) has been replaced with 
the tenseless ‘p obtains at t’ in (MDF*), in accordance with the view that God 
does not exist in time but in timeless eternity. I will have a great deal more to say 
about this view in the next chapter, so let me just posit at this point that, with 
respect to the problem of reconciling God’s providence and human freedom, it 
matters not whether one favors (MDF) or (MDF*): the same problem arises for 
both formulations. 
 
1.2. Perfect Being Theology and Foreknowledge 
 Yet another consideration which points us toward the view that God has 
comprehensive foreknowledge comes from the Anselmian idea that God is that 
than which nothing greater can be conceived. A theology which takes this Anselmian 
conception of the divine as its starting point is often called Perfect Being Theology, 
and begins from the axiom that God is a supremely perfect being, a being who 
possesses a maximal (and consistent) configuration of  ‚great-making properties‛ 
(what in former times were often called ‚pure perfections‛). As Thomas Morris 
tells us, ‘A great-making property is any property, or attribute, or characteristic, or 
quality which it is intrinsically good to have, any property which endows its  
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bearer with some measure of value, or greatness, or metaphysical stature, 
regardless of external circumstances’ (Morris, 1991, p. 35). 
 Perfect Being Theology first stipulates that God has every such property: 
   (PBT)  If F is a great-making property, then God has F. 
Of course, should it turn out that two great-making properties, say F and G, are 
inconsistent, so that no one entity may possess both F and G, then the perfect 
being theologian will have some work to do in sorting out whether God has F 
and lacks G or vice versa. But taking (PBT) as a heuristic starting point, I think it 
plausibly entails that God has comprehensive foreknowledge. For certainly 
having complete foreknowledge gives one a certain ‚greatness‛ or ‚metaphysical 
stature‛ that one would lack were one ignorant, either wholly or in part, of what 
the future holds. So even apart from considerations of God’s providence, we 
have good reason to think that God has maximal foreknowledge based simply 
upon God’s maximal greatness. 
 Indeed, God’s maximal greatness seems to entail not only that he has 
complete foreknowledge, but furthermore that he is completely and perfectly 
omniscient. The theistic tradition is unanimous in maintaining God’s absolute and 
essential cognitive perfection, so that there can be no truth of which God is not 
aware. In the language of the tradition, ‚God is Truth,‛ which may be plausibly  
interpreted as saying that for any proposition p, if p is true, then God knows that 
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p is true. Since the converse obviously holds as well, we may say that p’s being 
true is strictly equivalent to God’s knowing that p is true.5 Thus, if there are truths 
about what will happen in the future, then the doctrine of divine omniscience 
would require that God again be credited with foreknowledge. 
 
1.3. The Libertarian Conception of Creaturely Freedom 
 As previously mentioned, the theistic tradition (along with almost everyone 
else) maintains that humans are, in some sense or other, free creatures.6 But in 
what sense? What does human freedom amount to? The sort of freedom we are 
here concerned with is a rather narrow but nonetheless profound one, which St. 
Augustine called liberum arbitrium or, as it is often translated, ‚free choice of the 
will.‛ In other words, we want to know the conditions under which a particular 
human choice or decision amounts to a free choice or decision, one for which the 
person may be rightly considered morally responsible. For it is by his choices 
that a person shows himself to be a genuine cooperator with God (or, perhaps, a 
genuine adversary against God) in the work of creation as a whole and in the 
work of his own personal destiny. So if one’s alignment with God or against God 
is established by one’s choices,7 and if one is ultimately to be judged on the basis 
of one’s alignment with or against God, then at least some of our choices must be 
free choices, for which we may be rightly held morally accountable. 
12 
 The philosophical terrain concerning free will has been well-plowed indeed, 
and it is well-known that there are alternative conceptions of human freedom 
(Alston, 1985) in the above mentioned sense of free choice of the will. It will not 
be my endeavor in this essay to adjudicate among them. Rather, it will be to 
argue that the robust or ‚maximal‛ conception of divine providence previously 
outlined is consistent with the most robust and ‚maximal‛ conception of human 
freedom, that being the libertarian or incompatiblist conception. If maximal divine 
providence is consistent with the libertarian understanding of human freedom, 
then it is consistent with any understanding of human freedom, but not vice 
versa. Why this is so becomes apparent when we observe with Lynne Rudder 
Baker the difference between the libertarian and the contrary compatibilist 
understandings of human freedom: 
Let us say that an account of free will is libertarian if and only if it entails 
that a condition of a person S’s having free will with respect to an action 
(or choice) A is that A is not ultimately caused by factors outside of S’s 
control. Let us say that an account of free will is compatibilist if and only if 
it entails that a person S’s having free will with respect to an action (or 
choice) A is compatible with A’s being caused ultimately by factors 
outside of S’s control (Baker, 2003, p. 460). 
 
Assume, therefore, that God providentially knows that S will choose to do A and,  
furthermore, that S’s choice to do A is free in the libertarian sense. It then follows 
that God’s foreknowledge of S’s choice to do A either (a) does not causally 
contribute to S’s choice to do A or (b) is not a causal factor over which S has no 
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control (which is to say that it is a causal factor over which S has control). In 
either case, God’s foreknowledge of S’s choice to do A is consistent with S’s 
choice being free in the compatibilist sense. For according to the latter sense, an 
action (or choice), if it is caused ultimately by factors outside of the agent’s 
control, can still be free, and so in this case we would have the following true 
conditional: if S’s choice to do A is caused ultimately by God’s providential 
knowledge that S would choose to do A, with such knowledge being outside of 
S’s control, then S’s choice can still be free. The conditional would be true because 
(again, assuming libertarianism) the antecedent would be false: S’s choice is 
either not caused by God’s providential knowledge or such knowledge is a 
causal factor over which S has control. In short, the libertarian account of human 
freedom places more conditions on free choice than does the compatibilist 
account. It thus follows that if an action or choice that is foreknown by God can 
still be free in the libertarian sense, then a fortiori it can still be free in the 
compatibilist sense. That the converse—viz. that God’s providential 
foreknowledge is consistent with human freedom in the libertarian sense if it is 
consistent with human freedom in the compatibilist sense—does not hold 
should, I think, be evident. 
 So it seems worth the theologian’s while to attempt a reconciliation between 
the maximal views both of divine providence and of human freedom before 
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resorting to a weakening of one’s position on either front. It so happens that I 
think the maximal view of human freedom, viz. the libertarian conception, is the 
correct one, and so aside from being an interesting academic exercise in trying to 
reconcile to apparently conflicting beliefs, I think it is incumbent upon the theist 
to do so. But before we discuss this reconciliation, we must first discuss in 
greater depth the libertarian conception and then see why it appears to conflict 
with divine providence. 
 Luis de Molina, to whose work we shall be referring a great deal more and 
who will indeed emerge as the hero of this essay, describes the libertarian notion 
of freedom in this way: 
But freedom can be understood in another way, insofar as it is opposed to 
necessity. In this sense that agent is called free which, with all the 
prerequisites for acting posited, is able to act and is able not to act, or is 
able to do one thing in such a way that it is also able to do some contrary 
thing (Freddoso, 1988, pp. 24-25). 
 
The notion of freedom that Molina here gives expression to is closely allied to the 
so-called ‚Principle of Alternative Possibilities‛ (PAP), a principle with which, as 
the passage just quoted indicates, he would surely agree: 
   (PAP)  An agent S does an action A at time t freely only if S could have 
done something other than A at t. 
 
What is more, Molina thinks that S’s ability to do A at t or not do A at t must both 
be present in identical causal circumstances. He remarks: 
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< a given future state of affairs is called contingent in a second sense, 
because it rules out not only the necessity that has its source in the natures 
of the terms, but also the fatalistic and extrinsic necessity that results from 
the arrangement of causes. So given this universe of things which we see 
around us and given that all the causes are arranged in just the way that 
they are now in fact arranged, such a state of affairs is still indifferent as to 
whether it is or is not going to obtain by virtue of the same causes through 
which it ordinarily obtains (Molina, 1988, pp. 86-87). 
 
According to Molina, the causes through which such contingent states of affairs 
ordinarily obtain are the free choices of human agents. It is human freedom that 
introduces into the created order these sorts of radically contingent states of 
affairs which, given the very same ‚arrangement of causes,‛ can still either 
obtain or fail to obtain. A free human action, in other words, is one for which 
there are no antecedent causal circumstances (involving causes other than the 
agent himself) sufficient for the action’s being performed. Hence the label 
incompatibilist, as such a view has it that an action’s being performed freely is 
incompatible with its being causally determined. In other words, there can be no 
such thing as a free action the occurrence of which logically follows from the 
prior state of the world together with the laws of nature, which is to say that 
freedom and determinism are incompatible. 
 Although Molina’s own formulation of libertarian freedom is quite 
perspicuous as it stands, we might, for the sake of fixing ideas, employ the 
apparatus of possible worlds to understand it as follows: 
 
16 
   (LF)  An agent S freely does A at t in w only if (i) S does A at t in w, and 
(ii) for some world w*, w* shares the same causal history as w up to 
t, and (iii) S refrains from doing A at t in w*. 
 
It will be convenient for my purposes to introduce the concept of an ‚accessible‛ 
world. I owe this notion to Fred Feldman, who says the following: 
Although others have used the term to express other relations, I use 
‘accessible’ to express a relation that holds among a person, a time, and 
two possible worlds. That is, a world, w', will be said to be accessible to an 
agent, s, at a time, t, from a world, w.< Roughly, a world is accessible to a 
person at a time if and only if it is still possible, at that time, for the person 
so see to it that the world occurs, or is actual. 
  In a most simple case, accessibility is relatively easy to understand. 
Suppose s is the only person in the world, and suppose his only remaining 
interesting choice as of some time, t, is a choice between some state of 
affairs, p, and its negation. Suppose all the other facts are already settled, 
as far as possible. Now we can consider two possible worlds, quite alike 
up to t, and pretty much alike after t. They differ in that in one of them, p 
occurs, whereas in the other, p occurs.< 
  Since it is still up to s to determine whether p will occur or not, we can 
say that at least one possible world in which p occurs is accessible to s at t, 
and at least one possible world in which p occurs is also accessible to s at 
t.< If some state of affairs, q, is impossible for s as of t, then no q-world is 
accessible to s at t (Feldman, 1986, pp. 16-17). 
 
So a world w is accessible to an agent S at a time t iff S can ‚see to it‛ or can 
intentionally bring it about at t that w is actual. Not all possible worlds are 
accessible, of course. The set of accessible worlds is a proper subset of the set of 
all possible worlds. I have no access to a world in which I move faster than the 
speed of light, even though such a world is logically possible. In other words, it’s 
true in all accessible worlds that I move slower than the speed of light. Thus with  
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the concept of accessibility we can define a certain restricted kind of necessity, 
that of truth in all accessible worlds. I will make heavy use of this notion later on. 
 We can therefore restate (LF) by talking about freedom in terms of accessible 
worlds and then giving a libertarian criterion on which worlds are accessible, as 
follows: 
   (FA)  An agent S freely does A at t in w only if (i) S does A at t in w, and 
(ii) for some world w*, S has access from w to w* at t, and (iii) S 
refrains from doing A at t in w*. 
 
   (LA)  S has access from w to w* at t only if w* shares the same causal 
history as w up to t. 
 
This is a robust, ‚maximal‛ conception of freedom indeed. It has it that a 
necessary condition for one’s doing something freely is that the world could 
have been exactly the way it actually was in all causal respects up to the very 
moment of one’s action, and yet one could have done something else instead. 
That is to say, the antecedent causal circumstances do not determine that an 
agent perform one action as opposed to another. One has alternative possibilities 
that branch off from the same past history of the world. This sense of freedom 
certainly seems sufficient to account for moral responsibility, for if I perform 
some action A freely, then there is no cause other than myself which accounts for 
the fact that I did A, as the activity of all causes other than myself is consistent 
both with my doing A and with my not doing A. 
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1.4. Formulating the Argument for Theological Determinism 
 Having come to some preliminary understanding of the notions of divine 
providence (as involving divine foreknowledge) and human freedom, it remains 
to see how putting these two notions together seems to lead to a problem, 
namely that of theological determinism. Determinism in general is the view 
according to which everything that happens must happen or is determined to 
happen. Underneath the umbrella of determinism we may distinguish between 
three kinds, depending on the reason given for why everything that happens 
must happen, or in what way things are determined to occur as they do. 
 According to logical determinism, it’s merely being true that something will 
happen is sufficient for it’s being necessary that it will happen. In other words, if 
it is true that some event will occur, then that event is thereby determined to 
occur, for it’s impossible for it to be true that an event will occur and yet that event 
not occur. So for the logical determinist, an event is determined to occur if it is 
true that it will occur. 
 According to causal determinism, if we take a complete description of the 
world at a given time (what is often called a ‚time slice‛ of the world or a state of 
the world at a time), that state of the world together with the laws of nature entail 
the state of the world at any other time. Thus, any event that occurs is causally  
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necessitated; that event must occur, given the way the world was at a given time 
and given the way the laws of nature ‚connect‛ one event with another. 
 According to theological determinism, any event the occurrence of which is 
foreknown by God is determined to occur. Given that every event is foreknown by 
God, it follows that every event is determined to occur. I will have more to say 
about logical and causal determinism later on, so for now I will concentrate on 
laying out the case for theological determinism. That there is a genuine problem 
here was noted at least as far back as the time of St. Augustine who, writing in 
book III of his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, expressed the problem through 
the mouth of his interlocutor Evodius: 
EVODIUS: I very much wonder how God can have foreknowledge of 
everything in the future, and yet we do not sin by necessity. It would be 
an irreligious and completely insane attack on God’s foreknowledge to 
say that some thing could happen otherwise than as God foreknew. So 
suppose that God foreknew that the first human being was going to sin.< 
[S]ince God foreknew that he was going to sin, his sin necessarily had to 
happen. How, then, is the will free when such inescapable necessity is 
found in it? 
AUGUSTINE: You have knocked powerfully on the door of God’s mercy; 
may it be present and open the door to those who knock (Augustine, 1993, 
p. 73). 
 
The argument as Evodius states it demands careful and pious scrutiny. It may, I 
think, be seen as beginning with the following enthymeme: 
[A]  (1)  God foreknew Adam’s sin. 
       
   (2)  Adam’s sin necessarily happened, 
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wherein the conclusion predicates an absolute de re necessity of Adam’s sin;8 
Adam’s sin, in other words, was an event that neither Adam nor anyone else 
could have avoided. Every possible world is a world in which Adam sins, in 
which case Adam’s sin could not have been a free action. For according to LF, an 
action is free only if there is at least one possible world that is causally identical 
to the actual world up to the time of the action and in which the action is not 
performed. If there simply is no possible world in which Adam does not sin, then 
Adam cannot be held to have sinned freely (and so cannot really be said to have 
sinned at all). 
 Being enthymematic, the suppressed major premise must be the universal  
claim that whatever God foreknows necessarily happens, yielding the following 
argument: 
[B]   (3)  Whatever God foreknows necessarily happens. 
   (1)  God foreknew Adam’s sin. 
       
   (2)  Adam’s sin necessarily happened. 
 
On its face it seems to be a valid argument, but is it sound? 
 The minor premise (1) seems unproblematic, at least on the assumption that 
God is fully omniscient and that the future is something that can be known as 
future.9 If, therefore, (3) can be justified, we then end up with the unpalatable 
deterministic conclusion that all events that occur do so necessarily, as Adam’s 
sin is a thoroughly arbitrary event for which any actual event whatsoever may be 
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substituted. The world could not have gone otherwise than how it has in fact 
gone, for there are no possible worlds in which an event that occurs in the actual 
world does not occur. 
 Although Augustine took a different approach in his reply to Evodius, I will 
note with St. Thomas Aquinas that (3) is in fact ambiguous, and depending on 
how we resolve the ambiguity we end up with an argument that is either invalid 
or unsound. As St. Thomas points out, 
Hence also this proposition, Everything known by God must necessarily be, is 
usually distinguished, for it may refer to the thing or to the saying [quia 
potest esse de re vel de dicto]. If it refers to the thing it is divided and false; 
for the sense is, Everything which God knows is necessary. If understood of 
the saying, it is composite and true, for the sense is, This proposition, ‘that 
which is known by God is’ is necessary (Summa Theologiae [=ST] IaIæ, 14, 13, 
ad. 3).10 
 
In other words, on the de re reading, the ‚scope‛ of the necessity operator is 
restricted to the predicate-term, and so we may parse (3) in the de re mode as 
   (3.1)  Whatever God foreknows necessarily-happens. 
But there’s no good reason to think that (3.1) is true, as it makes the implausible 
claim that events that fall within the purview of God’s foreknowledge are in and 
of themselves characterized by a kind of necessity. It’s to say that because, as a 
matter of fact (in the actual world), God knows that something will be the case, it 
therefore will, as a matter of necessity (in all possible worlds), be the case. But this 
doesn’t seem true. To use an example from Christian theology, God knows as a 
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matter of fact (in the actual world) that Christ will return. Does it therefore 
follow that Christ returns in all possible worlds, even in those worlds in which 
God chooses not to create a cosmos at all? So if (3) is understood in the sense of 
(3.1) it is false and so argument [B] is unsound. 
 On the other hand, parsed in the de dicto mode, (3) reads as 
   (3.2)  Necessarily, whatever God foreknows happens, 
wherein the necessity operator governs the entire dictum or proposition. This is 
clearly the correct reading of (3), expressing as it does the necessary connection 
between God’s foreknowing something and that thing’s happening. In other 
words, there’s no possible world in which God foreknows something and yet 
that thing fails to happen. However, if (3) is understood in the sense of (3.2), 
giving us a true premise, the resulting argument, 
[C]   (3.2)  Necessarily, whatever God foreknows happens. 
    (1)  God foreknew Adam’s sin. 
        
    (2)  Adam’s sin necessarily happened. 
is easily shown to be invalid, to wit: 
   Necessarily, whatever is square is four-sided. 
   This table is square. 
    
   This table is necessarily four-sided. 
 The fallacy in Evodius’s argument is perhaps brought out even more clearly if 
we move from the categorical mode to the hypothetical mode. (3) is equivalent to 
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the conditional 
   (4)  If God foreknows event e, then e necessarily happens, 
where the necessity expressed therein is the necessity of the consequent. (4) says 
that God’s having foreknown that e was going to happen is, in and of itself, 
sufficient for the necessity of the consequent, that it, for e’s necessary occurrence. 
But this is clearly implausible. Just because God knew in the actual world that e 
was going to happen, that alone gives us no reason to think that e must therefore 
occur in all possible worlds. The more plausible claim would be 
   (5)  Necessarily, if God foreknows event e, then e happens, 
where the necessity is this time the necessity of the consequence or of the 
conditional as a whole, instead of just the consequent of the conditional. With 
only (5) at our disposal, we are unable to validly infer e’s necessary occurrence, for 
God’s having foreknown that e was going to occur does not, prima facie, seem 
necessary; God could have known the opposite. A necessary conclusion cannot 
be validly inferred on the basis of a conditional, even a necessary conditional, 
with a contingent antecedent; that is to say, the following inference is invalid: 
[D]  (5)  Necessarily, if God foreknows event e, then e happens. 
   (1)  God foreknew Adam’s sin. 
       
   (2)  Adam’s sin necessarily happened. 
 
Thus, we see that Evodius’s argument fails to establish the necessary occurrence 
of an event on the basis of God’s foreknowledge of that event. 
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1.5. Theological Determinism and the Fixity of the Past 
 As Linda Zagzebski has remarked (Zagzebski, 1991, p. 9), if the problem of 
theological determinism could be resolved in terms of the simple distinctions 
between de re and de dicto necessity or between necessity of the consequent and 
necessity of the consequence discussed above, then there would hardly be an issue 
worth mentioning. Furthermore, I don’t believe that Evodius’s argument, in 
either form, really gets at the heart of the foreknowledge problem. Evodius 
seems to see God’s infallibility as the main concern: because God cannot possibly 
be mistaken, what he knows will happen, must happen. But the real issue would 
instead seem to be the fact that God’s infallible knowledge is secured before the 
events themselves happen. It is precisely because it is infallible foreknowledge 
that the issue of fatalism arises. How could Adam have had the ability not to sin 
given that God already knew from all eternity that he was going to sin? That, in a 
nutshell, is the problem. Let's crack open the nutshell and examine its contents. 
 This stronger argument that will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter 
was discussed by St. Thomas Aquinas as the second objection to the thesis that 
God has knowledge of future contingents and was in like manner taken up again 
by Molina in the Concordia. Here is Molina’s formulation of the argument: 
[I]f a conditional is true and its antecedent is absolutely necessary, then its 
consequent is likewise absolutely necessary; otherwise, in a valid 
consequence the antecedent would be true and the consequent false—
which is in no way to be admitted. But the conditional ‘If God knew that 
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this was going to be, then it will so happen’ is true, or else God’s 
knowledge would be false; and the antecedent is absolutely necessary, 
both because it is eternal and because it is past-tense and there is no 
power over the past. Therefore, the consequent will be absolutely 
necessary as well, and hence no future thing foreknown by God will be 
contingent (Molina, 1988, pp. 164-65). 
 
What Molina means here by ‘conditional’ is not the material conditional 
symbolized by the ‘ ’ of modern logic, but rather what we would call a strict 
conditional or a necessary implication:  (   ). Now if the antecedent  is itself 
‚absolutely necessary‛ (as opposed to being necessary ex suppositione or merely a 
necessary consequence of a given hypothesis), so that we have ˹ ˺, then the 
consequent  is itself absolutely necessary, so that we have ˹ ˺ as well. Thus 
far we have nothing more remarkable than the axiom of the weakest system of 
modal logic, the so-called ‚system K‛ (Hughes & Cresswell, 1996, pp. 24f.). 
 But let us return to the second formulation (albeit slightly revised) of 
Evodius’s argument against the compatibility of God’s foreknowledge and 
future contingency. There we have the strict conditional 
   (6)   (God foreknew that Adam was going to sin  Adam was going to 
      sin). 
 
What is claimed in the argument under consideration is that the antecedent of 
(6), that God foreknew that Adam was going to sin, is itself necessary in some 
sense. Not, to be sure, in the same sense in which (6) itself is necessary, for (6) is 
metaphysically necessary: there is no metaphysically possible world in which the 
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antecedent of (6) is true and the consequent of (6) is false. Rather, 
   (7)  God foreknew that Adam was going to sin 
is understood to be necessary ‘because it is past-tense and there is no power over 
the past.’ The notion of not having power over the past is absolutely crucial here. 
The insight, expressed in terms of our ‚accessible worlds‛ idiom, is that no one 
has access, as of a given time t, to a world that has a past different from the actual 
past. For example, given that Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC, no one 
thereafter has access to a world in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon in 49 
BC. Granted that it’s not metaphysically necessary that Caesar cross the Rubicon in 
49 BC, insofar as there are worlds in which he does not do so (say, those worlds 
in which he doesn’t exist), but those worlds cease to be accessible as soon as he 
actually does so.   
 So the kind of necessity were talking about here is necessity as of a time, which 
we may symbolize by ˹t ˺ which says that  is true in all possible worlds that 
are accessible as of t (as distinguished from ˹ ˺, which says that  is true in all 
possible worlds tout court). Medieval philosophers called this ‚necessity per 
accidens‛ or ‚accidental necessity‛ since it is a kind of necessity that characterizes 
a proposition as a result of the passage of time. The proposition in a sense 
‚becomes‛ necessary after a certain time, in as much as a certain set of possible 
worlds becomes inaccessible after that time. So again, prior to 49 BC, the 
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proposition Caesar crosses the Rubicon in 49 BC is not necessary per accidens 
because Caesar may or may not do so; there are worlds in which he does not 
cross the Rubicon that are, as of then, still accessible to him. But if t is any time 
after 49 BC, then 
   (8)  t (Caesar crosses the Rubicon in 49 BC) 
is true, because no agent (including God) has access as of t to any world in which 
Caesar does not cross the Rubicon in 49 BC, which is before t. We can enshrine all 
this in the form of a principle, that of the Fixity of the Past: 
   (FP)  If p obtains at t, then for any time t* after t, t* p, 
which in effect says that there is no accessible world having a past that differs 
from the actual past. Any world accessible to you now will have a past history 
identical to that of the actual world. 
 Returning to our argument, since the state of affairs God foreknows that Adam 
will sin obtains at all times prior to Adam’s sin. So if t is any such time, it follows 
from (FP) that 
   (7.1)  t (God foreknew that Adam was going to sin), 
again because God is eternal (understood here in the sense of ‘existing at all 
times’) and omniscient: since Adam sinned, it was always true beforehand that 
he was going to sin, and hence God always knew beforehand that he was going 
to sin. We can think of (7.1) as saying that (7) is true in all worlds that are 
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accessible (to anyone) as of t. No one can, as of t, ‚see to it‛ that a world obtains 
in which (7) is not true. Putting (6) and (7.1) together yields the following 
argument: 
[E]    (6)   (God foreknew that Adam was going to sin  Adam was going  
       to sin). 
   (7.1)  t (God foreknew that Adam was going to sin). 
        
    (9)  t (Adam was going to sin). 
The conclusion has it that the same sort of necessity that attaches to God’s 
knowledge by virtue of its being past also attaches to Adam’s sin by virtue of its 
being a necessary consequence of God’s knowledge. In the language of accessible 
worlds, (9) tells us that ‘Adam was going to sin’ is true in all worlds that are 
accessible (to anyone) as of t, and so no one (including Adam) can, as of t, see to 
it that a world obtains in which ‘Adam was going to sin’ is not true. But as 
already stipulated, t is any time up to and including the time of Adam’s sin. So at 
the time of Adam’s sin, Adam could not have seen to it that a world obtains in 
which ‘Adam was going to sin’ was not true, which is to say that Adam could 
not have not sinned. It then follows from (LF) that Adam was not free in sinning. 
 
1.6. The Saga of Smith the Sniper 
 I want to put all the foregoing together into a simple story in order to have a 
fixed reference point for the remainder of this essay. I will then formulate the 
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argument for theological determinism in such a way as to make each step of the 
argument explicit. Let’s say that Smith is a hit-man who’s been hired out to 
knock off some pesky town councilman, Jones, who constantly votes against 
awarding contracts to a certain family-owned sanitation company. So Smith sets 
himself up in an empty third-floor apartment across the street from Jones’s office, 
sniper rifle at the ready for when Jones leaves his office at 5pm and walks to his 
car parked down the street. The clock strikes 5pm, Jones walks out, Smith pulls 
the trigger, and soon enough the bosses have their new contract. 
 We assume that Smith is morally responsible for the murder he committed. 
But let’s say that, for whatever reason, Smith couldn’t have done anything but 
pull the trigger and kill Jones. There was just nothing else he could have done, 
not if he wanted to get paid for the job, not if he wanted to move up the hit-man ranks, 
not because of any condition whatsoever.  Smith simply had no other options; his 
only ‚choice,‛ if you can call it such, was to shoot Jones. For some reason, that 
was the only ‚option‛ available to him. There was no possible world ‚accessible‛ 
to Jones at 5pm in which he doesn’t kill Jones. I should think that if this 
admittedly bizarre situation were to obtain, then we would have to say that 
Smith wasn’t really responsible for what he did. He simply had no other choice. 
Having a choice, after all, seems to imply that there are other alternative courses of 
action that can be taken. If Smith could have sat on his hands, intentionally 
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missed, shot himself instead, or whatever, then we could rightly hold him 
morally responsible for the murder, because he had the ability to do something 
other than what he actually did; he had alternative possible courses of action, 
other than the murderous one he actually took. As Bertrand Russell once wrote 
(Russell, 1957, p. 40), we don’t hold a car responsible for not running when its 
gas tank is empty; it just can’t run when its tank is empty. It has no ‚choice‛ but 
to sit there and do nothing. Likewise, we can’t hold someone morally responsible 
for doing something if they weren’t free to do anything else, if what they did was 
the only possible thing they could have done. 
 All of this is simply an intuitive re-presentation of what was earlier stated in 
our discussion of freedom in terms of accessible worlds. Moral responsibility 
requires freedom of choice, and freedom of choice requires that we have genuine 
alternatives open to us; that is to say, accessible worlds in which we do otherwise 
than what we actually do. But it seems that God’s being omniscient, and hence 
prescient (i.e., possessed of foreknowledge) rules out our ever having such 
alternative possibilities open to us. For if Smith murdered Jones and God is 
omniscient, then it seems that Smith had to kill Jones, that he had no real choice 
in the matter. Likewise, if Smith is going to kill Jones and God is omniscient, then 
it seems that Smith must kill Jones. He can’t do anything else, according to the 
following argument. 
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 Suppose Smith will kill Jones at 5pm tomorrow. Then there’s a true 
proposition to that effect, viz. ‘Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm.’ But God, 
being omniscient, knows all true propositions, so it follows that God knows that 
Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm. Furthermore, God isn’t just omniscient 
today; he was omniscient yesterday, yesteryear, yester-millennium, and so on. In 
fact, since God is eternal (understood here in the sense of existing at all times) 
he’s eternally omniscient, so whatever he knows now, he has always known, as 
far back into the past as you care to go. So God has always known that Smith will 
kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm, but let’s pick an arbitrary time and say that 1,000 
years ago, God knew that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow. In other words, there’s 
a certain attribute, knowing that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm, that God had 
1,000 years ago. 
 But what God was like 1,000 years ago is not something that anyone, even 
God, can now do anything about. The past is over and done with; it’s fixed, 
immutable, and outside of anyone’s control. There are no ‚accessible worlds‛ 
with past histories that differ from the actual past. So the fact that God knew 
1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow is a fact that’s fixed, 
immutable, and outside of anyone’s control. There’s nothing that anyone, 
including Smith, can ever do about it. There’s no world accessible to Smith in  
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which God didn’t already know 1,000 years ago that he (Smith) will kill Jones 
tomorrow at 5pm. 
 Moreover, God’s having known 1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones 
tomorrow at 5pm entails that Smith will indeed kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm. So 
there’s no accessible world (and, a fortiori, no world accessible to Smith) in which 
Smith does not kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm. Therefore, in not having any genuine 
alternatives Smith is not free, according to (LF) and hence he is not morally 
responsible, in killing Jones tomorrow at 5pm.   
 Set out schematically, the argument for theological determinism (hereafter 
‚ATD‛) goes something like this: 
[ATD]  (1)  Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm [assumption]. 
 
    (2)  God knew 1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 
5pm [from (1) and God’s omniscience+. 
 
    (3)  No one can do anything about what things were like 1,000 years 
ago [Fixity of the Past]. 
 
    (4)  No one can do anything about the fact that God knew 1,000 years 
ago that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm [from (3) and (2)]. 
 
    (5)  God’s having known 1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones 
       tomorrow at 5pm entails that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm 
       [from the definition of knowledge]. 
 
    (6)  No one can do anything about the fact that Smith will kill Jones 
       tomorrow at 5pm [from (5) and (4)]. 
 
    (7)  Smith can do nothing about the fact that he will kill Jones 
tomorrow at 5pm [from (6)]. 
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    (8)  Therefore, Smith is not free in killing Jones tomorrow at 5pm [from 
(7)  and (LF)]. 
 
To bring out the underlying formal structure: let ‘p’ be ‘Smith will kill Jones 
tomorrow at 5pm’, ‘Gt*p’ be ‘God knew at t* that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow 
at 5pm’, where t* is 1,000 years ago, let t be any time after t*, and let ‘t p’ be 
read ‘p is true in all worlds accessible at t ’: 
[ATD*] (1.1)  p     [Assumption] 
    (2.1)  :. Gt*p  *From (10.1) and God’s omniscience] 
    (4.1)  :. t Gt*p  [From (11.1) and (FP)] 
    (5.1)   (Gt*p  p)  [From the definition of knowledge] 
    (6.1)  :. t p  [From (13.1) and (14.1)] 
From (6.1) it follows that Smith has no access at t (which, being any time after 
1,000 years ago, includes tomorrow at 5pm) to a world in which he doesn’t kill 
Jones, and hence he is not free in doing so.   
 Here we can clearly see that there is no straightforward modal fallacy as in 
the first two arguments discussed earlier. Furthermore, I think the argument as 
I’ve presented it avoids any entanglements concerning the so-called ‚Transfer 
Principle‛ which has been much discussed since its use by Peter Van Inwagen in 
his An Essay on Free Will (Van Inwagen, 1983, pp. 93-94). There he what he calls 
the ‚Consequence Argument‛ against the compatibility of human freedom, not 
with divine foreknowledge, but with causal determinism, wherein he invokes the 
following rule of inference: Given that (a) p is the case and no one has, or ever had, a 
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choice about whether p is the case, and (b) p entails q, one may infer that q is the case and 
no one has, or ever had, a choice about whether q is the case.11  
 Looking at (4.1)-(6.1), one can see that something like Van Inwagen’s Transfer 
Principle is at work. However, the questions that have been raised about whether 
Van Inwagen’s principle is valid should find no purchase against the inference 
involved in ATD, framed as it is in terms of accessible worlds.12 (4.1) has it that a 
certain proposition, Gt*p, is true in a subset of possible worlds, those that are 
accessible as of t. (5.1) has it that any possible world whatsoever in which Gt*p is 
true is one in which p is true. Hence, we infer (6.1), which has it that p also is true 
in the set of all worlds accessible as of t. Whether this is a sound inference is what 
will be discussed henceforth, but that it is a valid inference should, I think, be 
without question. 
 Now, we can of course replace Smith and his killing Jones tomorrow at 5pm 
with anyone else and with any other action done at any other time and we will 
get a similar conclusion. So it seems that nothing that anyone does is done freely if 
God is omniscient. Since God’s being omniscient, and therefore possessed of 
foreknowledge, is a necessary condition of his being maximally provident, then it 
seems, on the basis of this argument, that the traditional understanding of divine 
providence is inconsistent with our belief that we are morally responsible agents. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HOW NOT TO RESPOND TO ATD 
2.1. Open Theism 
 Numerous rejoinders have been offered to the Argument for Theological 
Determinism (ATD) presented in the previous chapter. I will go through several 
of them in turn, showing why I think each is inadequate, and in the next chapter 
I will discuss the one I think is adequate and defend it against objections. 
 To begin with, one may simply grant that ATD is sound and therefore give 
up either on libertarianism or on divine foreknowledge. The former alternative 
actually has an impressive pedigree and is characteristic of the Augustinian 
tradition within Christian theism. Lynne Rudder Baker has argued (2003) that 
this tradition has been under-represented in the recent literature on the 
foreknowledge problem, wherein most discussants have tended to assume that 
libertarianism is the default conception of human freedom for theists (Baker, 
2003, p. 460). Since I have already mentioned the compatibilist alternative in the 
previous chapter, I will say no more about it other than to repeat that the project 
of this essay is to attempt a reconciliation of libertarian freedom with 
comprehensive divine providence. Should that project fail, then the compatibilist 
view may warrant reconsideration. 
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 The second reply to ATD, that of giving up on divine foreknowledge, was 
simply unheard of until relatively recently in the discussion, but it has been 
proposed on the basis of both biblical as well as philosophical reflection by the 
school of Open Theism. The name seems a bit paradoxical, for according to the 
open theist, the future is actually closed to God’s (or anyone else’s) knowledge, 
but the open theist sees this as a necessary condition for the future to remain 
open to alternative possibilities. One of the foremost exponents of Open Theism, 
William Hasker, says, 
< we would affirm God’s comprehensive and exact knowledge of the 
possibilities of the future—and < of the gradually changing likelihood of 
each of the possibilities’ being realized. And as the probability of a 
choice’s being made in a certain way gradually increases toward certainty, 
God knows that also; often, no doubt, before the agent herself is aware of 
it (Hasker, 1989, p. 189). 
 
But when it comes to definite and infallible knowledge of future contingent events, 
in particular human choices and actions that are free in the libertarian sense 
(Hasker is himself a libertarian), Hasker denies that God can have any such 
knowledge. As a result, God is to be seen as a ‚risk-taking‛ God (Hasker, 1989, p. 
197) who, in creating the world with free creatures, cannot be certain that history 
will proceed exactly in accordance with the divine plan. Events may occur that 
God did not foresee precisely because he cannot foresee them. He can only know 
that such events might or might not occur and with what probability they are 
likely to occur or not occur. 
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 The classical theist will instinctively recoil at this apparent repudiation of the 
doctrine of divine omniscience. However, on this point Hasker has a viable reply. 
Just as the doctrine of divine omnipotence cannot be understood to imply that God 
can do anything whatsoever, but instead that God can do anything that it is 
logically possible for him to do,1 so too, Hasker argues, the doctrine of divine 
omniscience ought to be similarly qualified. He proposes the following definition 
of omniscience: 
God is omniscient =df It is impossible that God should at any time believe 
what is false, or fail to know any true proposition such that his knowing 
that proposition at that time is logically possible (Hasker, 1989, p. 187). 
 
Now, according to Hasker, it is logically impossible for God to know the future 
actions of his creatures on the assumption (which, again, Hasker accepts) that 
those actions are free in the libertarian sense. Interestingly enough, Hasker’s 
argument for the logical impossibility of God’s knowing future contingents is 
nothing other than ATD, coupled with his purported refutation of the various 
responses that have been put forward to ATD. 
 At this point, I can only emphasize that Hasker’s Open Theism represents a 
radical break from traditional philosophical theology. As already mentioned, I 
know of no one among the classical or medieval auctoritates who seriously 
considered the view that God may lack infallible and comprehensive knowledge 
of the contingent future. This, of course, is not a knock-down argument but it 
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does suggest that Open Theism ought to be only a last, desperate move that 
should be embraced only if it is conclusively shown that the traditional view of 
providence is untenable. The main effort of this essay, of course, is to defend the 
traditional view as a quite tenable one, and will partly involve showing that 
Hasker has failed to demonstrate the inadequacy of all responses to ATD, 
namely the Ockhamist and Molinist responses. 
 Furthermore, the extent to which Open Theism parts ways with Classical 
Theism does, I think, count against it, for not only does it weaken the doctrine of 
divine providence but also strikes at the traditional conception of the divine 
nature itself. Open Theism effectively abandons the divine attributes of 
eternality, immutability and aseity, and instead immerses God within the 
temporal flux of the created order, so that God is constantly coming to know 
what he previously did not know and therefore constantly undergoing change as 
the world changes. It seems to me that we would no longer be talking about the 
One God but instead simply one god, not all that different, metaphysically 
speaking, from the gods of Olympus. Such a God is a far cry from the God of 
Classical Theism, who is understood to be completely sovereign, thoroughly 
perfect and hence changeless (because requiring no change and having no 
potentiality thereto) and dependent upon nothing outside of the divine nature 
itself, not even for knowledge of things other than himself. 
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 Now, one may think, ‘So much the worse for the God of Classical Theism. 
Why bother with such a God anyway?’ Well, there are many reasons, most of 
which I can’t go into at present. But suffice it to say, again, that the main 
motivation behind Open Theism is the claim that genuine human freedom and a 
contingent future are incompatible with the existence of God as conceived by 
classical theism; the very argument, that is, that we’re grappling with. So if one 
can show that such incompatibility is more apparent than real, then a major 
thesis upholding the open theist’s doctrine will have been undercut. 
 
2.2. The Frankfurtian Objection to (PAP) 
 Let us now move on to consider some proposed rebuttals of ATD. One reply 
has it that the inferences from (1) through (7) are just fine, but that the last step 
from (7) to (8) is where the argument breaks down. The inference from (7) to (8) 
is, of course, enthymematic, involving as it does the assumption that 
   (9)  No agent S is free in doing A at t who can do nothing about the fact 
that S does A at t. 
 
This notion of being able to do nothing about a given state of affairs is fairly vague, 
so we’ll need to get a bit clearer about it before we can appreciate the force of the 
reply we’re currently considering. Fortunately, we already went a good distance 
toward doing so in the foregoing discussion, where it was mentioned several 
times over that freedom requires other possible choices or alternative possible courses 
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of action. So when I say that Smith can do nothing about the fact that he will do A, 
I mean that Smith has no course of action open to him other than doing A; he 
can’t do anything else but A; his options are limited to one: doing A. What (9) 
says is that no agent who finds himself in such a situation is free. It is, in other 
words, simply a re-statement of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) 
which was mentioned in the previous chapter:  
   (PAP)  An agent S does an action A at time t freely only if S could have 
done something other than A at t. 
 
I think (PAP) is true, and intuitively so, but it has not gone unchallenged. Harry 
Frankfurt has offered a well-known and impressive purported counterexample to 
(PAP) (Frankfurt, 1969), arguing that the ‚ability to do otherwise‛ or having 
alternative possibilities is not a necessary condition for an action’s being 
performed freely. One may do something freely even though one could have 
done nothing else, or so Frankfurt claims. Furthermore, and apropos of our topic, 
Linda Zagzebski has claimed that Frankfurt’s counterexample to (PAP) offers a 
way around the problem of theological determinism. She says, 
If [Frankfurt] is right, it has some interesting implications for the 
foreknowledge problem. First, it shows that even if God’s foreknowledge 
is a condition obtaining at the time of my choice that is incompatible with 
my choosing otherwise, this fact is not sufficient to show that I do not 
have free will in a sense that is incompatible with determinism 
(Zagzebski, 1991, p. 156). 
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 The last point is crucial. Frankfurt’s case is not any kind of argument for 
compatibilism (again, the view that an action can be free despite being 
necessitated by antecedent causal conditions). Rather, it purports to show that an 
action can be free in a very robust sense, such that the agent alone is the primary 
cause of his or her action, despite the fact that she can do nothing other than that 
action. So even if God’s knowing that Smith will kill Jones rules out the 
possibility of Smith doing otherwise, Smith may still be free in doing so, if 
Frankfurt is correct. 
 What follows is in all essentials Frankfurt’s case, albeit adapted to our current 
story of Smith and Jones. Imagine that the bosses that hired Smith are far more 
sinister than your garden variety, small-time mobsters. They actually comprise a 
circle of evil geniuses who have massive amounts of complex and powerful 
technology at their disposal (why they’re so concerned with getting contracts for 
local garbage collection routes is anyone’s guess). Instead of risking that Smith 
might have a crisis of conscience at the moment he’s supposed to eliminate Jones 
and thus failing to do what they hired him to do, they’ve had a device implanted 
in Smith’s brain that will allow them a certain degree of control over the 
situation.  It functions as follows: if Smith goes about his business as he’s 
supposed to and successfully kills Jones, then things are fine as far as the bosses 
are concerned. The device does nothing, and it’s as if it isn’t even there. 
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However, if Smith at any point shows the slightest inclination that he may drop 
the ball and let Jones live, if at the last moment he pulls his finger off the trigger, 
then the device in Smith’s brain kicks into operation, manipulates his brain in the 
appropriate ways and makes him pull the trigger and kill Jones. 
 Now let us suppose that things go exactly as described previously. Smith sets 
up his gear in the empty third floor apartment, waits patiently, cold as ice with 
ne’er a pang of guilt in sight, for Jones to leave his office at 5pm, and finally does 
what the bosses hired him to do. Is there anything to make us think that Smith 
wasn’t free, and hence morally responsible, in committing this murder, even 
though he couldn’t have done otherwise? After all, every move that Smith made, 
from taking the job to finishing it, was initiated by him. He was acting under no 
external compulsion. There were no causal factors other than Smith himself that 
brought about his murdering Jones. It seems that he was entirely responsible for 
his action, and so entirely free, even though he couldn’t have acted otherwise. 
Had he shown the slightest inclination to do so, the device would have forced 
him to finish the job. Certainly, had the device been activated, then Smith would 
not have acted freely in killing Jones.  Something exterior to Smith’s own 
decision-making faculty would have made Smith kill Jones. But in the actual 
course of events, nothing caused or made Smith do it. He seems to have done it ‚of 
his own free will,‛ as we say. But if that’s so, then alternative possibilities aren’t 
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necessary for free action; having the power to do otherwise than what we 
actually do isn’t required for our being genuinely free in doing what we do. All 
of which is to say that (PAP) is false. An agent S may do A freely even though S 
couldn’t have done anything but A. So goes Frankfurt’s argument. 
 If Frankfurt is correct, then the inference from (7) to (8) in ATD is unsound. It 
assumes that alternative possibilities are indeed a necessary condition for free 
action. Failing that assumption, there’s no reason why we can’t say that Smith 
can do nothing about the fact that he will kill Jones at 5pm tomorrow, à la (7), 
and yet still deny (8), the claim that he will not have done so freely. In which 
case, there’s no reason why we can’t say that Smith is free in killing Jones 
tomorrow at 5pm even though he can’t do otherwise as a result of God’s 
foreknowing that that’s what he will do. God may already know what Smith is going 
to do, and he may not be able to do anything else as a result, but he may still be 
perfectly free in doing what he does, if Frankfurt’s argument holds water. But 
does it? 
 Yes and no. Frankfurt’s scenario does, it seems to me, show that in one sense 
alternative possibilities are not necessary for free, morally responsible action. 
However, in another sense Frankfurt’s counterexample fails, and this second 
sense is sufficient to generate an argument against the compatibility of God’s 
omniscience and human freedom that is as compelling as our original argument.7  
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 I think it’s fairly clear, at least upon reflection, that not everything we do 
counts as a genuine action. Consider the last time you blinked. That was certainly 
something you did, but it was hardly an action that you performed, unlike, say, 
the last time you picked up a good book to read. The latter involved an intention 
to do something (namely, to read a book) and then the overt behavior of actually 
picking up the book and reading it. The ‚act‛ of blinking, on the other hand, 
involved no such intention. We don’t intend to blink each time we actually do so; 
it just happens (most of the time, for we could, of course, blink intentionally on a 
given occasion, and in such a case we would be performing a genuine action). 
Medieval philosophers talked about this as the distinction between a ‚human 
action‛ (actus humanus) and a mere ‚act of a human‛ (actus hominis).2 The former 
involves both a decision (an ‚elicited act‛) of the will to do such-and-such as well 
as an attempt (not always successful) to carry out what the will has elected or 
decided upon (a ‚commanded act‛). The latter, however, involves no decision of 
the will, neither an elicited act nor a commanded act, but simply some kind of 
exterior behavior (like blinking or sneezing or digesting) that happens apart from 
any intention to engage in such behavior. 
 In the case of genuine human action, the actus humanus, both the elicited act 
and the commanded act are generally found together. I decide to read a good 
book and then I attempt to carry out my decision by selecting a book from the 
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bookshelf. In fact, it seems that if the elicited act is to do A, then the commanded 
act must also be to do A. Whatever I attempt to do necessarily follows upon what I 
have decided to do. How can I decide to read a good book and then go about 
getting drunk? I could, of course, change my mind, but that only means that I 
elicited a new act of will, namely, to get drunk instead of reading a book, and the 
commanded act of going about getting drunk follows in due course. 
 Two further points are worth mentioning. First, the commanded act does not 
always succeed in carrying out the elicited act. I may decide to do A, try to do A, 
but utterly fail in doing anything like A. Take, for example, the case of Smith and 
Jones that we’ve been considering. Imagine that, at the very moment that Smith 
is to pull the trigger and shoot Jones, the device implanted in his brain 
malfunctions and causes Smith to become totally paralyzed from the neck down. 
When Smith tries to pull the trigger, he finds himself completely frozen and 
unable to do so. Nevertheless, Smith’s decision, his elicited act, was to shoot 
Jones, and his commanded act, his attempt, was also to shoot Jones. So, ceteris 
paribus, we wouldn’t hesitate to say that Smith is just as morally guilty as he 
would have been had he actually succeeded in killing Jones. But for unforeseen 
external circumstances, that’s exactly what he would have done and exactly what 
he intended to do. 
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 The second point worth mentioning has to do with where Smith’s moral 
responsibility is to be located. It obviously can’t be in his overt behavior because 
he didn’t engage in any overt behavior; he was paralyzed. So it was either in his 
elicited act or in his commanded act. But as was said above, the commanded act 
necessarily accords with the elicited act. It’s not possible to decide to do A and 
then try to do not-A (not, at least, without a subsequent elicited act to do not-A). 
So it seems that Smith’s moral responsibility in the above scenario resides in the 
fact that he elected (or decided or formed the intention) to shoot Jones. It’s over 
his own decisions that Smith has direct and autonomous control, and so it’s in 
what he decides to do, not in what he actually does in terms of overt behavior, that 
Smith’s (or any agent’s) moral responsibility is grounded. 
 Returning now to the original Frankfurt scenario, what I want to argue is that, 
as it has been described, either Smith really isn’t free, or if he is free, then he 
actually does have alternative possibilities open to him, viz. alternative possible 
decisions. Here’s how the scenario was described: if Smith goes about his business 
as he’s supposed to and kills Jones, then the device does nothing. But if Smith at 
any point shows the slightest inclination to refrain from shooting Jones, then the 
device intervenes and makes Smith shoot Jones. Once again, in the actual course 
of events, the device is never activated as Smith actually goes ahead and shoots 
Jones, and given the presence of the device he couldn’t have done otherwise. But 
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could he have decided otherwise? There’s no good reason not to think so. The implant 
is programmed to intervene only if Smith shows some inclination toward 
deciding not to shoot Jones, but on a libertarian view of freedom such as was 
described several sections ago, inclinations are not causally sufficient for 
decisions. As David Widerker says, the Frankfurtian strategy 
   is sound only if we assume that 
 
     (2) *Smith’s+ showing an inclination to decide to [refrain from shooting 
Jones] is (in the circumstances) a causally necessary condition for 
his deciding to [refrain from shooting Jones]. 
 
Otherwise, there is the distinct possibility of *Smith’s+ deciding to *refrain 
from shooting Jones], even if he previously was inclined to [shoot Jones]. 
After all, as libertarians emphasize, free agents can sometimes choose or 
decide contrary to their inclinations. And in such a case the mechanism 
would not operate. But (2) implies that 
 
     (3) *Smith’s+ not showing an inclination to decide to [refrain from 
shooting Jones] is (in the circumstances) causally sufficient for his 
not deciding to [refrain from shooting Jones. 
 
Moreover, since [Smith] in fact did not show an inclination to decide to 
[refrain from shooting Jones+, we are led to the conclusion that *Smith’s+ 
not deciding to [refrain from shooting Jones] was causally determined 
(Widerker, 1995, pp. 114-15). 
 
Furthermore, since a decision not to refrain from doing X is equivalent to a 
decision to do X, it follows that Smith’s decision to shoot Jones was causally 
determined. Therefore, if the Frankfurtian objector grants that Smith has the 
power to decide otherwise, even though he does not have the power to do  
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otherwise, then we may hold that Smith is free precisely because he has such 
alternative possible decisions open to him.  
 On the other hand, if the Frankfurtian objector denies that Smith can decide to 
do otherwise, on the grounds that he must show a prior inclination toward that 
very decision, then that is tantamount to begging the question against the 
libertarian, for whom there are no antecedent conditions that are causally 
sufficient for free decisions. Of course, Smith’s being inclined to shoot Jones may 
make it more probable that he will do so, but it does not (according to the 
libertarian) guarantee it. It’s therefore possible both that the device may detect no 
inclination on Smith’s part to refrain from shooting Jones and that Smith may 
nevertheless make that very decision, contrary to his previous inclinations. 
Perhaps at the last instant Smith has a brief memory of his mother praying for 
him to grow up and be a good boy, and he decides to honor his mother’s 
memory by letting Jones live. In which case, Smith really does have alternative 
possibilities, namely the possibility of deciding to refrain from shooting Jones, 
even though he doesn’t have the power to actually not shoot Jones, since once 
the device detects his decision to refrain, it intervenes and makes him shoot 
Jones. But by then it’s too late and the proverbial damage has been done. A 
genuine alternative possibility would have been realized, one that is sufficient to  
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ground our judgment that Smith is indeed free in deciding to shoot Jones, and 
hence he is morally responsible for doing so. 
 Now if Frankfurt’s scenario is modified so that the implant functions not only 
when Smith shows an actual inclination to refrain from shooting Jones but also 
intervenes in such a way that it actually prevents any intention to do so from ever 
forming in the first place, then it seems to me that Smith can no longer be 
considered free in such a situation. The device has gone from being a 
counterfactual intervener, which would function only if Smith were to indicate 
that he may fail to shoot Jones, to an actual controller of Smith’s decisions, 
actively manipulating his mental states in such a way as to prevent any contrary 
inclination from even beginning to form. But in that case the causal activity of the 
mechanism becomes a causally sufficient condition for Smith’s deciding to shoot 
Jones, in which case Smith cannot be considered free in the libertarian sense. 
 Consequently, the Frankfurtian scenario ends up not being a genuine 
counterexample to the (PAP); it’s not a scenario in which Smith is both free and 
yet lacking in alternative possibilities. For either Smith really does have 
alternative possibilities open to him, insofar as he has the power to decide 
otherwise, or he isn’t really free, but is actually controlled by the implant. 
 The upshot of all this is that (PAP) emerges unscathed, and so the inference 
from (7) to (8) in the original argument against the compatibility of God’s 
50 
omniscience and libertarian freedom, ATD, remains secure, so long as we recast 
the argument in terms of Smith’s deciding to kill Jones at 5pm tomorrow instead 
of his actually killing Jones at that time. If Smith cannot but decide to kill Jones, 
then he cannot be considered free in actually deciding to do so. Although I will, 
for the sake of ease of expression, continue to talk in terms of what Smith does 
instead of what he decides to do, the reader should keep in mind, apropos of the 
foregoing discussion, that the locus of Smith’s (or any agent’s) responsibility, and 
hence freedom, lies in his having alternative possible choices or decisions, not 
necessarily in his having alternative possible actions. In any case, another 
response to ATD needs to be sought out. 
 
2.3. Considerations on Logical Determinism 
 Since starting at the end of ATD didn’t lead us out of the problem, perhaps 
beginning at the beginning and trying to find a misstep there will produce better 
results. As a matter of fact, no less a philosopher than Aristotle himself would 
have had us stop with the very first premise.  Although there is some scholarly 
debate concerning the Stagirite’s views here, my reading of his discussion of 
future contingent propositions (such as premise (1) of ATD) in chapter 9 of his De 
Interpretatione considers Aristotle as denying any truth value to such 
propositions.  For he says,  
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With regard to what is and what has been it is necessary for the 
affirmation or the negation to be true or false.< But with particulars that 
are going to be it is different. For if every affirmation or negation is true or 
false it is necessary for everything either to be the case or not be the case 
(De Interpretatione [=DI] 9, 18a28-35).3 
 
It is beyond my purposes to go into a detailed exegesis of Aristotle here, but I 
take him to be saying that even though past- and present-tensed propositions 
must have a truth-value (‘X happened’ is either true or false; ‘X is happening’ is 
either true or false), the same does not hold for future-tensed propositions, at 
least for those dealing with contingent matters (‘X will happen’ is neither true 
nor false, where ‘X’ concerns what Aristotle calls ‚particulars‛ or matters of 
contingent fact). According to Richard Gaskin, Molina himself interprets 
Aristotle in this way. Gaskin says, 
Molina first states that the teaching of Aristotle in DI 9 is that in the case of 
a disjunction of contradictory FDSs [i.e., future contingent statements+ < 
neither disjunct is determinately true or false, but one disjunct is 
indeterminately true and the other indeterminately false; whereas in the 
case of antiphases whose subject matter is the present or the past, one 
disjunct is determinately true and the other determinately false. 
According to the antirealist interpretation of Aristotle, his point in DI 9 is 
that while the Law of Excluded Middle obtains unrestrictedly (i.e., we 
have, utterly generally,  v ¬ ), the disjuncts of a [future contingent 
disjunction] do not themselves have (simple) truth-values (Gaskin, 1994b, 
p. 558). 
 
Aristotle’s motive for adopting this view (if indeed it is his view) seems to be the 
worry that if a future-tensed proposition such as There will be a sea battle tomorrow 
(Aristotle’s example) or Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm (our example) is 
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taken to be either true or false, then it seems to follow that it is necessarily true or 
necessarily false that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or that Smith will kill 
Jones tomorrow at 5pm. 
 That, at least, seems to be Aristotle’s claim, and if it is correct then ATD never 
gets off the ground. The very first premise, that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 
5pm, is neither true nor false but indeterminate. There are actually two arguments 
that this is the correct view of things, Aristotle’s own from De Interpretatione 9 
and the so-called ‚Master Argument‛ of Diodorus Cronus. Let’s take Aristotle’s 
first. He says, 
If [something] is white now it was true to say earlier that it would be 
white; so that it was always true to say of anything that has happened that 
it would be so. But if it was always true to say that it was so, or would be 
so, it could not not be so, or not going to be so. But if something cannot 
not happen it is impossible for it not to happen; and if it is impossible for 
something not to happen it is necessary for it to happen. Everything that 
will be, therefore, happens necessarily (DI 9, 18b10-15). 
 
Using Aristotle’s own example of the sea battle, I take him to be arguing along 
the following lines: 
[ALD]  (10) It’s true that there will be a sea battle tomorrow. 
 
(11) Therefore, it was always true in the past that there will be a sea 
battle tomorrow. 
 
    (12) Therefore, it is necessary that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow. 
 
(13) Therefore, no one can do anything about the fact that there will be a 
sea battle tomorrow. 
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The questionable step is the one from (11) to (12), but given Aristotle’s views 
about modal logic, it’s actually a valid inference. Briefly, where a modern modal 
logician would interpret modal talk as being about possible worlds, the domain of 
discourse in Aristotle’s modal semantics is the set of times. So while modern 
modal logic interprets ‘Necessarily p’ as ‘p is true at all possible worlds,’ Aristotle 
interprets it as ‘p is true at all times’ or ‘p is always true.’ Again, ‘Possibly p’ on 
the modern view means ‘p is true at some possible world,’ while for Aristotle it 
means ‘p is true at some time’ or ‘p is sometimes true.’ Finally, to say that p is 
contingent is, for us, to say that it is true at some worlds and false at others, 
whereas for Aristotle it is to say that p is sometimes true and sometimes false. 
Therefore, to say that There will be a sea-battle tomorrow was always true in the 
past, or true at all past times, is virtually equivalent to saying that it is necessarily 
true, especially given the eternally existing universe that Aristotle understood 
himself to be dwelling in. 
 The forgoing is an argument for logical determinism, as it proceeds from the 
mere truth of a statement about what will be the case to the necessity that it will 
be the case. Of course, (13) is a conclusion Aristotle rejects. He was no fatalist, 
holding as he did that we indeed have real power over what the future holds. 
Otherwise, he argues, ‘There would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble,’ 
for what’s the point of deliberating about things if we can’t really do anything 
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about what’s going to happen?4 But as we recently noted, (12) follows from (11) 
on Aristotle’s temporal interpretation of modal logic, and (11) certainly seems to 
follow from (10). If it’s true today that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow, then 
the same was true yesterday and the day before and so on, ad infinitum.  
 So, Aristotle concludes, the problem must lie with premise (10). We have no 
choice but to deny that there are any truths about what will happen in regard to 
contingent matters.  Likewise, we have no choice but to deny that there are any 
falsehoods about what will happen as well, for if we say that it’s now false that 
there will be a sea battle tomorrow, we seem, by the same process of reasoning, 
to end up with the conclusion that no one can do anything about the fact that 
there will not be a sea battle tomorrow. So try as they might, the naval captains 
just won’t be able to pick a fight. Therefore, says Aristotle, (10) is neither true nor 
false. It simply has no truth-value, or its truth-value is indeterminate. There may be 
a sea battle tomorrow, and there may not be one, but as of now it’s neither true 
nor false simpliciter that there will be one. 
 In regard to matters of natural necessity, like the sun rising tomorrow or 
Mount Vesuvius erupting tomorrow, it’s a different story. Of course it’s true now 
that the sun will rise tomorrow, and of course no one can do anything about that 
fact, since it’s a necessity of nature. So there are some propositions about the 
future that have truth-values, namely the ones that correspond to states of affairs 
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that are causal consequences of present or past states of affairs. But given the 
indeterministic or libertarian picture of human freedom that we have assumed, 
future states of affairs involving free human actions cannot be causal 
consequences of present or past states of affairs. Since Smith’s killing Jones is not 
now ‚present in its causes,‛ i.e., since there is no presently obtaining state of 
affairs that is causally sufficient for, say, Smith’s killing Jones tomorrow at 5pm, 
the proposition Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm is not true. Nor is it false, as 
there is no presently obtaining state of affairs that is a causally sufficient for 
Smith’s refraining from killing Jones. If Aristotle is correct, then the so-called 
‚Principle of Bivalence,‛ the semantic principle according to which, for every 
proposition p, either p is true or p is false (as distinguished from the syntactic 
Principle of Excluded Middle mentioned earlier, viz. for every proposition p, 
either p or ~p) must be restricted in such a way as to exclude future contingent 
propositions. 
 If I am correct in seeing Aristotle’s argument for logical determinism as 
depending on his temporal interpretation of modality, then Aristotle’s seemingly 
desperate response, that of restricting the principle of bivalence and denying 
truth-values to future contingent statements, appears wholly unnecessary. Why 
not instead simply reject his modal theory, allowing that some statement may 
always be true and yet be so contingently, and thereby preclude the inference from 
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(11) to (12)? Indeed, I would concur with this response. However, there is yet 
another argument for logical determinism that does not depend on a 
questionable interpretation of modal logic. Instead, it relies upon the principle of 
the Fixity of the Past and as such it is quite similar to the argument from the 
previous chapter, ATD. This is the so-called Master Argument of Diodorus 
Cronus, and comes to us in its most complete form by way of Epictetus: 
The Master Argument seems to have been formulated with some such 
starting points as these. There is an incompatibility between the three 
following propositions, ‚Everything that is past and true is necessary‛, 
‚The impossible does not follow from the possible‛, and ‚What neither is 
nor will be is possible‛. Seeing this incompatibility, Diodorus used the 
convincingness of the first two propositions to establish the thesis that 
nothing is possible which neither is nor will be true (Kneale & Kneale, 
1962, p. 118). 
 
Diodorus’s thesis, contraposed, is the deterministic one that whatever is or will 
be true is necessary. As the passage indicates, this is supposed to follow from the 
Fixity of the Past (‘everything that is past is true and necessary’) and from what 
could plausibly be interpreted as the Transfer Principle (‘the impossible does not 
follow from the possible’ = ‘if q is impossible and q follows from p, then p is 
impossible’). Thus, the Master Argument takes the following form: 
[MA] (10) It’s true that there will be a sea battle tomorrow. 
 
(11) Therefore, it was always true in the past that there will be a sea battle 
tomorrow. 
 
   (14) No one can do anything about what was true in the past. 
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(13) Therefore, no one can do anything about the fact that there will be a 
sea battle tomorrow. 
 
The similarities between MA and ATD are striking. Indeed, the first premise can 
be replaced with ‘God knows that there will be a sea battle tomorrow’ and the 
argument simply becomes ATD. This isomorphism between MA and ATD will 
prove immensely significant insofar as plausible replies to MA will lead to 
analogous (and arguably equally plausible) replies to ATD. But first let us note 
that an Aristotelian reply to MA would again be to reject the first premise, 
denying that future contingent propositions are either true or false but are 
instead indeterminate, and thereby avoid the fatalistic conclusion. As Richard 
Gaskin describes the Aristotelian solution, future contingents ‘lack as yet, but 
will in due course possess, one of the two standard truth-values.< [A] future 
contingent statement < is either-true-or-false, but not yet either true, or false’ 
(Gaskin, 1994a, p. 85). 
 Three considerations weigh against this Aristotelian solution. First of all, our 
ordinary linguistic practice concerning predictions seems to assume that future 
contingents can be true (or false). For instance, if I now predict that the Yankees 
will win the 2009 World Series, and if they do end up winning, then anyone who 
heard my prediction would say that I was correct; that when I said, ‘The Yankees 
will win the 2009 World Series,’ I said something true. But when? It certainly 
seems strange to say that the prediction will come to be true. Rather, it seems more 
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accurate to that it was true at the time I made it. When I boast about it (assuming 
I’ll be able to do so), I’ll say, ‘You see, I was right!’ 
 Gaskin (1994a) points out that such an argument was offered by Cicero in his 
De Fato, and I think it is sound. However, Gaskin has suggested a possible 
response. He retorts, ‘We can say that predictions become true or false, rather than 
that they are already true or false at the time the prediction is made’ (Gaskin, 
1994a, p. 86). But this reply doesn’t hold water, for the prediction in question is a 
token-utterance, a datable event that occurs in a specific context at a definite 
time. Such an event surely ceases to exist once it has occurred, and all that 
remains are its causal consequences. Let us say, therefore, that I utter the 
prediction ‘The Yankees will win the 2009 World Series,’ which utterance ceases 
to exist immediately upon its being made, say at time t. If it were to become true 
when the Yankees win, then we have the impossible situation of an entity that 
ceases to exist at t acquiring the property of being true at some time after t. If one 
finds the notion of an utterance being true or false objectionable, insisting that 
utterances express propositions, which are themselves true or false, a similar 
problem arises. If the utterance expresses a truth at all, it can only do so at the 
time it is made, for it no longer exists afterward. 
 Again, consider our conventions concerning promises. If I promise my friend 
that I will be at her birthday party, it seems highly counterintuitive to say that I 
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really can’t make such a promise because the promise that I will be at my friend’s 
birthday party is neither true nor false; that at most I can promise that I might be at 
her party. Again, if I fail to show up at the party, I can justly be accused of having 
made a false promise.  
 Finally, the Aristotelian solution is unacceptable from the standpoint of 
classical Christian belief as well. For example, the Nicene Creed of orthodox 
Christianity contains the assertion that Christ ‘will come again to judge the living 
and the dead.’ Is that dogma of faith something that is, as of now, of 
indeterminate truth-value? Are Christians asserting this merely as something 
that will come to be true instead of as something that is true?5 That seems, again, 
highly counterintuitive. 
 
2.4. Eternal Propositions and Eternal Knowledge 
 Aristotle’s own solution either to the argument for logical determinism that 
he considered in DI 9 or to the Master Argument seems, therefore, to be 
unconvincing. Consequently, the analogous Aristotelian response to ALD goes 
unsupported, for we have no good reason to think that future contingent 
statements cannot be true and thus subject to divine knowledge. 
 It will be instructive to consider another objection to the same arguments. Is 
Aristotle (as I have interpreted him) not guilty of a confusion in speaking of 
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propositions being true ‚in the past‛? Instead, ought we not to evaluate sentences 
as true or false relative to a context (which includes the time of utterance) by virtue 
of expressing propositions that are true or false simpliciter? William and Martha 
Kneale make the point as follows, 
< it is possible to show where Aristotle made his mistakes in the De 
Interpretatione. The argument in chapter 9 is faulty because he thinks of the 
predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’ as applicable to something (probably a 
sentence) at a certain time.< We mislead ourselves, however, when we 
speak, as Aristotle does, of its being true now that there will be a naval 
battle tomorrow, for we thereby induce ourselves to supposed that this 
will not be true tomorrow evening, when the battle is over, but something 
else will, i.e. ‘There has been a naval battle today’. Two different sentences 
are plainly involved here, but they both express the same proposition 
(Kneale & Kneale, 1962, p. 51). 
 
 On this view, a sentence of the form ˹It will be the case that x ’s˺ expresses a 
true proposition in a context C (where C includes the time of utterance t) iff for 
some time t* later than t, x ’s at t*. The proposition that x ’s at t* is considered 
to be timelessly true (or timelessly false) while it is expressed at certain times by 
this or that utterance of a sentence in a given context. Therefore, it would make 
no sense to speak of it as having always been true ‚in the past‛ that there will be 
a sea-battle tomorrow, anymore than it would make sense to speak of it as being 
true ‚everywhere‛ or as being true ‚in Greece.‛ Tense, in other words, is not a 
primitive feature of propositions but is a feature of the sentences which express 
them. Again, as the Kneales put it, 
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The system of tenses in a language is a device whereby we indicate the 
temporal relation of our spoken or written sentence (i.e. token-sentence) to 
the events of which we speak or write. A verb with tense is, therefore, like 
the demonstratives, a ‘token-reflexive’ word, i.e. on each occasion of use it 
indicates the object of discourse by relating it to the token of itself which is 
then uttered or written (Kneale & Kneale, 1962, p. 51). 
 
 Thus, the same timelessly true proposition that a sea-battle occurs on 2 Jan 2009 is 
expressed by an utterance on 1 January 2009 of the sentence ‚There will be a sea-
battle tomorrow‛ as well as by an utterance on 3 January 2009 of the sentence 
‚There was a sea-battle yesterday.‛ The response to ALD and MA, therefore, 
would be that premise (10) is ill-formed; it makes no sense to say that something 
(i.e., a proposition) is true ‚in the past,‛ and so our powerlessness over the past is 
simply not relevant to the truth or falsity of a given proposition. 
 This suggests an analogous response to ATD, where the corresponding 
premise would be (1), namely ‘Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm.’ A major 
strand of thought within the classical theistic tradition (perhaps the dominant 
strand), going back at least to Boethius and receiving its most complete 
expression in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, has it that God himself exists not 
in time but in eternity. Not eternity in the everyday sense that we might normally 
think of, like ‚everlasting‛ or ‚existing forever and ever‛ or ‚being always there 
infinitely into the past and infinitely into the future.‛ These are all temporal 
notions and therefore predicate of God a temporal mode of existence, albeit an 
everlasting temporal existence. According to St. Thomas, however, God is 
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timelessly eternal. God exists wholly apart from time, so that for him there is no 
past, present or future. God exists in an eternal, ever-present nunc stans or 
‚enduring now.‛ 
 Following Boethius, St. Thomas says that eternity in the strict sense is ‘the 
simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life’ (ST IaIæ, 10, 
1). In other words, God’s existence is not spread out along a temporal continuum 
the way yours and mine are. Our life is had over the course of a certain number 
of years. God’s life is had ‚all at once‛ in the ever-present now of eternity. God 
doesn’t remember what he ‚was‛ like in the past. He never ‚was‛ in the past. He 
simply ‚is‛ eternally. Likewise, God doesn’t anticipate what he ‚will be‛ like in 
the future. He never ‚will be‛ in the future. Again, he simply ‚is‛ eternally. 
Furthermore, nothing ever was or will be for God; everything that was, is or will 
be in this temporal flux that we experience simply is for God in the eternal nunc 
stans. 
 Therefore, since God exists eternally (i.e., timelessly), affirming any temporal 
predicate of God amounts to a kind of category mistake. It makes no more sense 
to say that such-and-such was true of God, or will be true of God, or even is now 
(in the temporal present) true of God, than it does to say that Tuesday was found 
loitering on the street corner. Tuesday is just not the sort of thing that can loiter, 
and God is just not the kind of thing of which anything can have been true, and so 
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on. Rather, if anything is true of God, it is eternally true of God. And so, instead 
of saying that God knew that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow, as does ATD’s 
second premise, we ought instead to say that God eternally knows, or knows in the 
eternal present, that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow. 
 But even that is not quite correct on this view. Crucially, Smith’s killing Jones 
tomorrow is not future with respect to God, for again, nothing is future with 
respect to God, for whom everything is eternally present. What for us is future, 
and hence asserted by means of a sentence in the future tense, is for God eternally 
present, and hence we ought to say that God eternally knows that Smith kills 
Jones on 2 January 2009 (assuming that today is 1 January 2009). Aquinas says, 
God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own 
being, as we do, but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge 
is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity, being 
simultaneously whole, comprises all time, as was said above. Hence all 
things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because 
He has the essences of things present within Him, as some say, but 
because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in 
their presentiality (ST IaIæ, 14, 13). 
 
He also borrows from Boethius a well-known metaphor in talking of the way in 
which God’s eternity ‚encompasses‛ the whole of the temporal continuum all at 
once: ‘Just as he who goes along the road does not see those who come after him; 
whereas he who sees the whole road from a height sees at once all those 
traveling on it’ (ST IaIæ, 14, 13, ad. 3). To expand a bit, imagine someone 
standing atop a mountain and looking down at a road running through the 
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valley, and imagine a caravan moving along that road. Our situation in time is 
like someone in the caravan. We know where we are, can remember the road 
we’ve been traveling along but can’t see it directly anymore, and we can sort of 
peer off into the distance and catch barely a glimpse of what’s coming, but right 
now it’s all pretty dim and indistinct. We really have no idea of what we’re 
heading into along this road. The person on top of the mountain, on the other 
hand, sees it all in one sweeping, comprehensive vision—where the caravan was 
along the road, where it is now, and where it will be—but from that perspective 
it’s all taken in at once. Now if we understand ‚where the caravan was‛ as an 
analogous to our temporal past, ‚where the caravan is‛ as our temporal present, 
and ‚where the caravan will be‛ as our temporal future, then the person atop the 
mountain takes it all in—past, present, and future—in one comprehensive vision. 
It’s all ‚present‛ before him in a single apprehension. Of course, the person’s 
situation atop the mountain is supposed to be analogous to God’s situation vis-à-
vis time. Since God is wholly ‚above‛ and ‚outside‛ the temporal continuum, all 
of time is as if present before him in the nunc stans of eternity. 
 I should add at this point that the theory just outlined is not simply an ad hoc 
maneuver to avoid theological determinism. Rather, it arises within a broader 
metaphysical framework and stems from the very first of St. Thomas’s proof for 
God’s existence, the via ex motu according to which God is shown to exist as the 
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first Unmoved Mover, or the ultimate and changeless principle that accounts for 
all change and becoming in the created world. St. Thomas follows Aristotle in 
thinking of time as the measure of change or becoming (the transition from 
potentiality to actuality). So if God is the utterly changeless source of all change, 
being himself fully actual and lacking any potentiality, then time, the measure of 
change, simply doesn’t measure God. God must be wholly outside of time, and 
hence timelessly eternal. 
 To reiterate the implications of this theory for our problem, St. Thomas would 
say that Smith's killing Jones tomorrow is not seen by God as something future, 
as something that will happen, but as something that (tenselessly) happens at a 
certain point along the temporal continuum, the whole of which God grasps all 
at once. Therefore, God's knowledge of Smith's killing Jones tomorrow is not 
situated in the past relative to Smith's killing Jones, and so the unalterability of 
the past does not apply to such knowledge. We can't say that God always knew or 
knew 1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow. We must say, rather, 
that God knows in the eternal present that Smith kills Jones on (say) 2 January 2009. 
God's knowledge of the fact is neither earlier than nor later than the fact itself; 
rather the fact of Smith's killing Jones tomorrow is eternally present before God 
in the timeless now of his existence.  God’s knowledge of Smith’s killing Jones is 
eternally simultaneous with that event. Since the relation between God's 
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knowledge and what he knows is one of eternal presentness and not of temporal 
precedence, then the issue of the fixity of the past becomes moot. Just as it was 
argued, with respect to the Master Argument for logical determinism, that the 
fixity of the past just does not apply to a proposition’s being true (because it’s 
true simpliciter and not true in the past), so too God's knowledge isn't in the 
temporal past, and hence the fixity of the past imposes no fatalistic necessity 
upon what God knows. 
 
2.5. Against Eternalism (Part 1) 
 Although I am quite sympathetic with St. Thomas’s eternalist view, especially 
insofar as it respects the classical theistic view of the divine nature as pure and 
immutable actuality, I think both it and the eternal propositions approach to 
dealing with the Master Argument are ultimately inadequate. Let us recall, as I 
mentioned at the outset, that there are two questions that need answering: 
whether God’s knowledge of the future is consistent with human freedom (the 
reconciliation question), and how God knows future contingent events such as 
freely performed human actions (the source question). I will argue in the next 
chapter that the eternalist’s way of dealing with the reconciliation question does 
not succeed. For the remainder of this chapter, I will try to show that the same 
approach is unsuccessful in regard to the source question as well. 
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 To risk a bit of anthropomorphism, the Boethian-Thomistic model is a 
perceptual one: God ‚sees‛ future events because God’s eternity encompasses 
the temporal continuum—past, present, and future—so that such events are 
present to him in the nunc stans of eternity.  Even though in the temporal 
‚reference frame‛ I have not yet eaten tomorrow’s breakfast, in the eternal 
‚reference frame‛ my eating breakfast tomorrow is present to the divine 
epistemic activity. God perceives future events in a way that is analogous to the 
way in which we perceive present events. So to the question, how does God 
know future contingent events, the Boethian-Thomistic answer is that he knows 
them because such events are present to him in eternity, event though they are 
not yet present in time. God does not have foreknowledge of such events, but 
instead has eternally present knowledge of them. 
 There are many things about the Boethian-Thomistic theory that I find very 
hard to understand. First of all, what is this relation of being present to that is 
constantly employed? Temporal events, such as Smith’s killing Jones tomorrow, 
are supposed to be present to God in eternity, but I’m not entirely sure as to what 
‚being present to‛ is supposed to amount. Aquinas’s illustration from the Summa 
Contra Gentiles (I, 66) is that of the points along the circumference of a circle being 
present to the center point.6 The analogy is supposed to be that as each point 
along the circumference is just as present to the midpoint (and vice versa) as any 
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other point along the circumference (i.e., as all the points along the circumference 
are equally present to the midpoint) so to are all points in time equally present to 
the eternal nunc stans. But again, this just doesn’t help me to understand the being 
present to relation. The relation between the midpoint of a circle and the 
circumferential points is one of spatial distance. The circumferential points are all 
‚equally present‛ to the midpoint insofar as they are all spatially equidistant 
from it. Are all times somehow ‚equidistant‛ from eternity? What can that 
possibly mean? 
 Let’s try another approach. I am currently sitting in a cafe, and the person 
sitting across the room from me is talking on her cell phone. I suppose we can 
say that the event of her talking on her cell phone is present to the event of my 
seeing her talking on her cell phone; the two events are simultaneous, and one 
involves a ‚being aware‛ of the other. A few minutes ago she was writing in her 
address book, but that event is not present to the event of my remembering that 
she wrote in her address book. There’s some temporal ‚distance‛ between her 
writing in her address book and my memory of her doing so. Likewise, I can 
imagine with a kind of ‚foresight‛ (fallible though it be) that she will get up from 
her seat and leave the cafe, but again, there’s some temporal distance between by 
anticipating her getting up and the actual event of her doing so. My memories 
and anticipations are not ‚present to‛ the events they are about, but my 
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‚seeings,‛ my direct epistemic contacts with this or that event, are present to 
those events, insofar as they are simultaneous with them. So perhaps the being 
present to relation is best understood as a kind of simultaneity. Not just 
simultaneity, of course. We wouldn’t want to say that the event of my typing 
these words is present to some event taking place right now in Kathmandu. So 
let’s stipulate a definition: event x is present to event y just in case x and y are 
simultaneous and x involves a direct epistemic contact with y. So, since I have no 
direct epistemic contact with any event now occurring in Kathmandu, nothing 
that I am now doing is present to anything now happening in Kathmandu. 
However, since I am now directly aware of the conversation taking place at the 
table across the cafe, my awareness of that conversation is not only simultaneous 
with but also present to that conversation, and vice versa. 
 So I think we can make some sense of the being present to relation, at least as it 
may hold between temporal events. But how is it to be understood as holding 
between a temporal event and the one and only eternal ‚event,‛ the divine 
epistemic activity? Since God, and hence God’s epistemic activity, does not exist 
in time, how can it occur at the same time as (or be simultaneous with) any 
temporal event? The relation between time and eternity is perplexing and is not 
one into which I can enter at any length, so let’s just agree that there can be some 
relation of simultaneity between events in time and the eternal nunc stans, albeit 
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a different sort of simultaneity from the one that holds between temporal events 
alone. 
 E. Stump and N. Kretzman (1981) have given what may be the most 
sophisticated definition of this sort of simultaneity, what they appropriately refer 
to as ‘eternal-temporal simultaneity’ or ‘ET-simultaneity’: 
   Let ‘x’ and ‘y’ range over entities and events. Then 
   (ET)   For every x and every y, x and y are ET-simultaneous iff 
        (i) either x is eternal and y is temporal, or vice versa; and  
         (ii) for some observer, A, in the unique eternal reference frame, x and 
y are both present—i.e., either x is eternally present and y is 
observed as temporally present, or vice versa; and 
        (iii) for some observer, B, in one of the infinitely many temporal 
reference frames, x and y are both present—i.e., either x is 
observed as eternally present and y is temporally present, or vice 
versa (Stump & Kretzman, 1981, p. 439). 
 
We can see how this definition avoids one of the more pressing objections to the 
Boethian-Thomistic theory, one raised by John Duns Scotus (cf. Langston, 1986, 
pp. 17f.), having to do with the ontological status of the objects of God’s eternal 
knowledge. Take Smith’s shooting Jones tomorrow. Is that event present to God 
with its own proper existence? In other words, is the event itself, the very one 
that you or I would witness were we at the scene of the crime tomorrow, 
eternally present to God? If so, then it’s hard to see how the future is not already 
actual, at least ‚for God‛ if not ‚for us.‛ If the event of Smith’s killing Jones 
tomorrow stands in the relation of being eternally present to God’s epistemic 
awareness, then it (along with every other actually occurring future event) must 
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exist, and so the future ends up being ontologically on a par with the present (as 
does the past, for that matter). The Boethian-Thomistic solution seems to end up 
reducing the prima facie ontological distinction between past, present and future 
(the present now exists, the past once existed but no longer does, the future does 
not yet exist but will) to a mere perspectival distinction. We experience the past, 
present and future as ontologically distinct, but from the divine perspective 
(which, of course, has to be considered the absolute perspective or ‚reference 
frame‛) they are all existent, as they are all eternally present to God. What we 
end up with is a B-theory of time (or, in current parlance, a four-dimensional 
ontology), according to which there are no ‚real‛ relations of past, present and 
future among temporal events, since there is no ‚privileged‛ point in time that 
can be considered ‚real‛ and hence present; all points are equally real.  The only 
real relations that exist among temporal events (or times) are those of before and 
after, holding among equally real times. 
 However, taking into account the Stump-Kretzman definition of ET-
simultaneity, we can see how they would point out the flaw in the foregoing 
reasoning. They would argue that we are conflating the temporal and eternal 
reference frames. We are led to the (absurd) conclusion that Smith’s killing Jones 
is temporally actual (or exists now in time, or occurs at a time that is simultaneous 
with the temporal present) because it is simultaneous with the eternal present, 
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which in turn is simultaneous with the temporal present. In other words, because 
the eternal nunc stans is simultaneous with both the temporal present and (say) 
the future time at which Smith kills Jones, it follows that the temporal present 
and the said future time are simultaneous with each other. But if the simultaneity 
relation that holds between the eternal nunc stans and temporal events is as the 
Stump-Kretzman definition describes it, then that inference is fallacious. 
Granted, the eternal nunc stans is ET-simultaneous with the temporal present, 
and it is also ET-simultaneous with the future time at which Smith kills Jones, it 
does not follow that the temporal present is ET-simultaneous with the future 
time at which Smith kills Jones because no two temporal points can be ET-
simultaneous with each other. That relation holds only between a temporal 
event/time and the eternal nunc stans. 
 So the Scotistic objection that the Boethian-Thomistic theory of how God 
knows the contingent future threatens the reality of temporal becoming is not 
conclusive. But the theory poses another threat to a different metaphysical 
doctrine, this one concerning the divine nature itself, and this problem I think 
proves fatal to the theory. The doctrine I am referring to is that of the divine 
aseity, that God can in no way be dependent upon anything outside of his own 
nature. The relation of dependence between God and creation is thoroughly 
‚one-way‛; the world is utterly dependent upon God, and God is utterly 
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independent of the world. Aquinas went so far as to maintain that any relations 
whatsoever between God and the world are one-way, that God is not really 
related to the world at all, even though the world is really related to God in all 
sorts of ways. Regardless of the intelligibility of this claim, the overarching point 
is hard to miss. God stands in need of nothing other than himself, even for his 
knowledge of things other than himself. A fortiori, since an effect depends upon 
its cause, God can in no way be acted upon causally by anything other than 
himself, and so nothing other than God can cause God to know what he knows. 
 This is quite the opposite of how things are for finite cognizers like human 
beings. We know things by and large because they causally affect us in the 
appropriate ways. If I know that p, it’s because the state of affairs that p presents 
itself to my properly functioning cognitive apparatus (whether through sense 
experience, ratiocination, testimony, or what have you) and I come to hold the 
belief that p, which belief (for whatever other reason) counts as knowledge. But 
through all this I am a patient, being acted upon in various ways, which is most 
clearly illustrated in the case of sense experience. When I come to see that the 
coffee mug is on the table, it’s because the visual information acts upon my 
passive receptors of such information (even those who postulate a cognitive a 
priori à la Kant will grant that such knowledge originates with passive sensory 
intuitions, even if it is not wholly constituted by them). 
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 By now the problems with the model of divine knowledge of the contingent 
future as a kind of perceptual ‚seeing‛ of future events should be apparent. 
Regardless of the fact that they are understood to be ‚seen‛ as present, God is 
thereby understood, to all appearances, to be a passive recipient of information 
regarding the contingent future, much in the same way as we are vis-à-vis objects 
that are present to our sensory apparatus. The Boethian-Thomistic story places 
God in the role of an eternal ‚observer,‛ passively surveying events within the 
temporal continuum, rather like that man atop the high mountain looking down 
upon the caravan as it passes through the valley. But God cannot be such an 
observer, as that implies that he is being acted upon by the things he observes. It 
implies that the source of his knowledge of things other than himself is not his 
own nature, as required by the doctrine of divine aseity, but the things 
themselves, making God causally dependent upon such things. So to summarize, 
if the Boethian-Thomistic theory of how God knows the contingent future is true, 
then God is not entirely causally independent of creation, as the perceptual 
model of divine knowledge implies that God is causally affected by his creatures. 
But God, classically conceived, is entirely causally independent of creation, and 
therefore the Boethian-Thomistic theory is untrue. 
 A further problem plagues the Boethian-Thomistic theory, one that arises 
even if we put the issue of divine aseity on the back burner. The problem is that 
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the knowledge God acquires via his eternal vantage point affords him no 
providential control over what happens in the world. God is presented with a fait 
accompli. If it is indeed Smith’s actually killing Jones tomorrow that is present to 
God in eternity, then there’s nothing God can do about it. It’s simply what will 
happen and God must simply adapt his plans accordingly. But to what extent 
can he adapt his plans at all? If everything that God sees from the standpoint of 
eternity is what actually happens, then the scope of his providence is reduced to 
the decision to create that world or not to create that world. In fact, it’s reduced 
to even less than that. If what God ‚sees‛ is what actually happens, then in effect 
his creative decisions have already been made and he must simply accept what 
will be. God can’t providentially intervene to change the course of history in a 
direction that better suits his purposes if the course of history is already eternally 
present to him. William Hasker has stated the objection forcefully: 
Whether or not there are creatures endowed with libertarian free will, it is 
impossible that God should use a foreknowledge derived from the actual 
occurrence of future events to determine his own prior actions in the providential 
governance of the world.   
 
If we replace ‚foreknowledge‛ in this statement with ‚timeless 
knowledge,‛ and understand ‚future‛ and ‚prior‛ to refer to temporal 
relations that hold between events in the world but do not apply to God, 
we have a precise statement of the situation as it results from the theory of 
divine timelessness.< The doctrine of divine timelessness affords us no help 
whatsoever in understanding God’s providential governance of the world 
(Hasker, 1989, p. 176). 
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On the other hand, what God ‚sees‛ can’t simply be what might happen, or what 
will possibly be the case, as that affords him no prescience whatsoever. The 
doctrine of eternal knowledge was supposed to explain how God knows what, 
from our standpoint in time, will actually happen, not just what might actually 
happen. 
 I’ve given so much attention to the Boethian-Thomistic theory for two 
reasons. First, because St. Thomas is one of the monumental figures in the history 
of philosophical theology and needs to be taken into account. Several of the most 
important treatments of the problem in the later middle ages (e.g., Molina and 
Bañez) were written as commentaries on St. Thomas’s discussion in Summa 
Theologiae IaIæ, 14, 13. Second, because in almost every conversation I’ve had 
with non-philosophers concerning the present topic, the response has been to 
invoke the idea that God is ‚outside‛ or ‚above‛ time, and that is supposed to 
take care of the issue. For whatever reason, there seems to be a kind of intuitive 
appeal to the eternalist solution, and so I think it needs to be emphasized that it 
ultimately offers no solution at all to the problems associated with divine 
providence and prescience. Even though I think that God must be conceived of 
as timelessly eternal, I do not think that such a conception provides any 
explanation whatsoever for how God knows the contingent future or how God 
exercises providential control over the created order. 
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CHAPTER 3 
OCKHAMISM AND THE RECONCILIATION QUESTION 
3.1. Against Eternalism (Part 2) 
 The previous chapter focused to a great degree on the parallel between logical 
determinism and theological determinism, discussing theories that exploit this 
parallel in order to generate a response to the Argument for Theological 
Determinism (ATD) based upon an analogous response to the Master Argument 
for Logical Determinism (MA). The Aristotelian theory, which we might call 
‚anti-realist‛ in regard to the future since it denies that future contingent 
statements have determinate truth-values, was argued to be both implausible in 
itself and inconsistent with Classical Theism. On the other hand, I argued that 
the theory of eternal propositions, which denies that propositions are true or false 
at a time, and the corresponding Boethian-Thomistic theory of eternal divine 
knowledge, which denies that God can be said to know at a time, does not offer a 
viable resolution of the source question concerning divine knowledge of the 
contingent future. I must now fulfill the promissory note I made in the previous 
chapter as to whether the eternalist approach represents an adequate solution to 
the reconciliation question. I will argue that it does not and then go on to discuss 
and defend what I consider to be a successful answer thereto. 
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 Alvin Plantinga has raised an interesting objection to St. Thomas’s move vis-à-
vis ATD, saying, 
Concede for the moment that it makes no sense to say of a proposition that 
it was true at a time; it nonetheless makes good sense, obviously, to say of 
a sentence that it expressed a certain proposition at a time. But it also 
makes good sense to say of a sentence that it expressed a truth at a time. 
Now eighty years ago the sentence 
 
     (5)  God knows (eternally) that Paul mows in 1995 
 
expressed the proposition that God knows eternally that Paul mows in 
1995.< But if in fact Paul will mow in 1995, then (5) also expressed a truth 
eighty years ago. So eighty years ago (5) expressed the proposition that 
Paul will mow in 1995 and expressed a truth; since what is past is now 
necessary, it is now necessary that eighty years ago (5) expressed that 
proposition and expressed a truth (Plantinga, 1989, pp. 183-184). 
 
In other words, even though the Fixity of the Past may not be applicable to God’s 
epistemic state, since (according to St. Thomas) it is an timelessly eternal state and 
not a temporal one and hence cannot be said to be situated at any point in time 
(including the past), why should this also hold of a sentence that expresses a truth 
about God’s epistemic state? There seems to be no good reason to think that a 
sentence’s expressing a true proposition should also be considered eternal. 
Therefore, that a sentence expressed a truth seems to be something that, once 
posited, cannot be undone. 
 To apply this to ATD, recall that St. Thomas would object to  
   (2)  God knew 1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm 
on the grounds that God is eternal and cannot be said to know things at this or  
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that point in time. He would instead replace (2) with 
   (2.1)  God eternally knows that Smith kills Jones at t, 
where t is tomorrow. Since (2.1) is not about something past, it is not subject to 
the Fixity of the Past principle, and so the deterministic conclusion is blocked. 
But Plantinga’s point is that (2.1) can be rewritten as 
   (2.2)  The sentence God eternally knows that Smith will kill Jones at t 
expressed a truth 1,000 years ago. 
 
Since (2.2) is both about something past and entails (indeed, is equivalent to) that 
Smith will kill Jones tomorrow, the temporal necessity that attaches to (2.2) also 
attaches to Smith’s killing Jones tomorrow. Hence, even granting the theory of 
eternal divine knowledge, ATD remains a problem. 
 However, Linda Zagzebski (1991) has offered an intriguing response to 
Plantinga’s argument. She objects to the notion that a sentence’s expressing a 
proposition is something to which temporal (‚accidental‛) necessity can apply. 
Rather, she reminds us that the notion of accidental necessity is one that 
developed out of the Aristotelian metaphysic of potency and act: 
< the concept of the necessity of the past originated in connection with 
the Aristotelian act/potency distinction. There is not now a potency in 
things for anything other than the actual past, even though there is a 
potency in things now for any number of different futures. This is said to 
give the past a kind of necessity lacked by the future. Accidental necessity 
is the necessity of lack of potency.< The concept of accidental necessity 
does not make it now necessary that 80 years ago a certain proposition 
was true, nor does it make it now necessary that 80 years ago a certain 
sentence expressed a true proposition (Zagzebski, 1991, pp. 45-46). 
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Zagzebski seems to be arguing that the act/potency distinction, which she takes  
to be essential to the concept of temporal necessity, is a distinction that applies 
only to concrete, primary substances, Aristotle’s ousiai. A substance x is in 
potency to becoming F, and when x becomes actually F it is thereafter 
accidentally necessary that x became F. For instance, a rose bud is in potency 
toward blooming into a rose flower and when it blooms (when its potency has 
been actualized) it is thereafter accidentally necessary that it has become a rose 
flower. However, a sentence is not a substance and therefore cannot be said 
(coherently) to be in potency toward expressing a proposition. There is never a 
point at which a sentence s potentially expresses a proposition p, and therefore 
there is never a point at which the actualization of such a potency becomes 
accidentally necessary. Therefore, it’s just not the kind of thing to which 
temporal necessity can apply, and so Plantinga’s (2.2) cannot be said to be 
necessary with the necessity of the past. 
 Unfortunately, I think Zagzebski has been misled by Plantinga’s somewhat 
inexact manner of making his point. Plantinga talks about a sentence expressing a 
proposition, and Zagzebski is clearly correct to point out that a sentence has no 
such potency toward doing so. However, a more perspicuous analysis would 
involve the recognition that it is a speaker who expresses a proposition by means of 
a sentence. In other words, a speaker uses a sentence to expresses a proposition, 
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but what does the expressing is the speaker, not the sentence. Furthermore, it 
makes perfect sense to talk about a speaker potentially expressing a proposition 
and actually doing so. 
 This way of looking at the issue was put forward by Richard Gaskin (1994a) 
in regard to the problem of logical determinism. Recall that the Master Argument 
went as follows: 
[MA] (10) It’s true that there will be a sea battle tomorrow. 
 
  (11) Therefore, it was always true in the past that there will be a sea battle 
tomorrow. 
 
   (14) No one can do anything about what was true in the past. 
 
(13) Therefore, no one can do anything about the fact that there will be a 
sea battle tomorrow. 
 
Once again, the theorist of Eternal Propositions denies (11), arguing that the 
notion of ‚true in the past‛ is incoherent. What is true simpliciter is the 
proposition that a sea battle occurs at t, which is expressed by a particular 
utterance (or inscription or even a gesture) of a sentence the verb tense of which 
indicates whether t is past, present or future relative to the context of utterance. 
But Gaskin has this to say: 
Some philosophers have thought that the fatalist could be stopped in his 
tracks by simply pointing out that truth attaches timelessly to 
propositions, so that the fatalist’s assertion that it is now true, or in 
advance, that I will go swimming is simply ill-formed. If it is true that I 
will go swimming on a particular day, then it is so timelessly.< [But] the 
attempt to block the fatalist fails for the simple reason that he can rephrase 
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his initial premiss from ‘It is true that I will go swimming tomorrow’ to 
‘Were anyone to utter the sentence ‘R. G. will go swimming tomorrow’, he 
would thereby express a truth.’ The expression of a truth, whether that 
truth be timeless or not, is undoubtedly in time; and that is enough for the 
fatalist (Gaskin, 1994a, p. 88). 
 
In other words, MA can be recast in the following way: 
[MA*]  (10) There will be a sea battle tomorrow. 
 
(15) Yesterday someone said, ‘There will be a sea battle two days 
hence.’ 
 
(16) Therefore, yesterday it was truly asserted that there will be a sea 
battle tomorrow. 
 
    (14) No one can do anything about what was true in the past. 
 
(17) It’s having been truly asserted yesterday that there will be a sea 
battle tomorrow entails that there will be a sea battle tomorrow. 
 
     (13) Therefore, no one can do anything about the fact that there will be a  
         sea battle tomorrow. 
 
Here it seems that the EP theorist’s response to MA does not count against MA*, 
for although an abstractly existing proposition may be a timeless entity, an 
assertion is certainly an event in time and can therefore be said to be, as in this 
case, in the past. Therefore, the problem re-emerges. If an event (say, someone’s 
having truly asserted, ‘There will be a sea battle two days hence’) occurred in the 
past, no one can thereafter do anything about that event’s having occurred. 
Therefore, no one can do anything about what necessarily follows from that 
event’s having occurred, and it necessarily follows from someone’s having truly 
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asserted, ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow’ that there will be a sea battle 
tomorrow. 
 Now this same reasoning applies mutatis mutandis to the Eternalist’s response 
to ATD. As Zagzebski herself says, ‘*T+he necessity of the past is primarily an 
intuition about past events’ (Zagzebski, 1991, p. 30). But surely a speaker’s 
having expressed 1,000 years ago the proposition that God eternally knows that 
Smith kills Jones at T is an event, and therefore something subject to the necessity 
of the past. Therefore, instead of Plantinga’s (2.2), we have 
   (2.3)  A token of the sentence God eternally knows that Smith will kill Jones 
at t was used by a speaker to express a truth 1,000 years ago. 
 
Since (2.3) refers to an event in the past, then such an event is accidentally 
necessary, and so too (the argument goes) is whatever follows from that event’s 
having occurred. 
 But what if there was no speaker who made such an assertion? As Zagzebski 
argued, the necessity of the past only applies where a potency has been 
actualized, and so if no speaker ever made an actual assertion concerning God’s 
eternal knowledge, then it seems there’s no actual event or state of affairs to be 
considered accidentally necessary. However, here we need to be aware of further 
distinctions within the Aristotelian doctrine of potency and act, for there is no 
such thing as potentiality simpliciter. Rather, there are first and second potentiality. 
Where F denotes an ability, then a being in first potentiality with respect to F has 
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the ability to acquire F, whereas a being in second potentiality with respect to F 
actually has F but is not using F. For example, someone who has learned French 
but is not now speaking French is in second potentiality with respect to speaking 
French; she can speak French but is not now actually doing so. But that ability 
(potency) is itself a kind of actuality, viz. an active potency. 
 Now, even if there was no speaker who actually asserted 1,000 years ago (or 
even yesterday) the proposition that God eternally knows that Smith will kill 
Jones tomorrow, surely there was a speaker who could have asserted it. In other 
words, the state of affairs Some speaker’s having been in second potentiality toward 
asserting the proposition that God eternally knows that Smith kills Jones at t obtained 
in the past. This seems to be a perfectly unremarkable state of affairs involving 
an Aristotelian primary substance (a speaker) having an active potency, and 
Zagzebski herself insists that it is to states of affairs such as these that the 
necessity of the past is supposed to apply. 
 
3.2. The Past Isn’t Quite So Fixed 
 Looking once again at the Master Argument for logical determinism, we 
notice that one premise has been thus far left unquestioned, namely the Fixity of 
the Past principle. This principle is supposed to enshrine our pre-analytic 
intuitions concerning our lack of power to affect the past. The past, unlike the 
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future, is supposed to be ‚fixed,‛ ‚unalterable,‛ ‚immutable,‛ and something 
that no agent whatsoever, even God, can do anything about. As Aristotle says, 
‘*N+o one deliberates about the past, but about what is future and contingent, 
while what is past is not capable of not having taken place; hence Agathon is 
right in saying, For this alone is lacking even to God/To make undone things that have 
once been done’ (Nicomachean Ethics IV, 2; 1139b6-10). 
 Recall how we formulated the principle: 
   (FP)  If p is true at t, then for any time t* after t, t* p, 
which we interpreted as saying that there is no accessible world having a past 
that differs from the actual past. Any world accessible to you now will have a 
past history identical to that of the actual world. To illustrate this intuition, 
consider a situation in which an agent S has three options open to her at t*: she 
can do either A, B or C. (FP) says that if p was true at t (where t is earlier than t*), 
which I will abbreviate as ‘*p, t+’, then no matter what S does at t*, it will still be 
the case that [p, t]. This gives us the following picture: 
      t        t* 
                 /---------- S does A & [p, t] 
                 /  
   ------- |------------------------- |------------- S does B & [p, t] 
      p            \ 
                   \---------- S does C & [p, t] 
Each ‚branch‛ can be interpreted as a possible world that is accessible to S as of 
t*, and by doing either A, B, or C at t*, S ‚sees to it‛ or ‚brings it about‛ that the 
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respective world is actual. But since p was true at t in the actual world, each 
world that branches off at t* must be one in which p was true at t. S, therefore, 
cannot bring it about that p was not true at t; no matter what S does, it will still be 
the case that p was true at t. 
 However, one of the more prominent schools of thought in the discussion of 
logical and theological determinism, taking its cue from William of Ockham  
(although he was not the first to put forward this solution1), has it that the past is 
not as closed or as fixed as it may at first appear. I won’t spend any time looking 
at what the historical Ockham had to say on the matter,2 but will instead focus on 
‚Ockhamism‛ as it has come to be discussed in the recent literature. So, as far as 
the Ockhamist is concerned, (FP) is simply too strong if it is understood to apply 
to any past-tense statement whatsoever. According to Ockhamism, not every 
true past-tense statement is ‚accidentally necessary.‛ In other words, even if p 
was in fact true at some past time t, it doesn’t follow straightaway that p is true at 
t in all worlds accessible thereafter. 
 By way of explicating this view, consider the following scenario. Imagine 
once again that Smith will in fact kill Jones at t (say, tomorrow at 5pm). Imagine 
also that at an earlier time t* (say, earlier today) the Boss expressed some doubts 
about whether Smith will carry out his orders, but Brown (the Boss’s consigliere) 
assured the Boss that Smith would go ahead and do the job. Brown, therefore, 
87 
correctly believed at t* that Smith will kill Jones at t. What, then, does Smith have 
it in his power to do at t?  Does he have it in his power to refrain from killing 
Jones, even though Brown correctly believed at t* that he would kill Jones? 
 In one sense no, but in another sense yes. William Lane Craig (1992) has 
pointed us to the medieval distinction between the ‚composite‛ sense (in sensu 
composito) and the ‚divided‛ sense (in sensu diviso) of a proposition like 
   (18)  Smith could refrain from killing Jones at t even though Brown  
       correctly believed at t* that he would kill Jones at t. 
 
In the composite sense, that statement says 
  (18.1) Possibly, Brown correctly believed at t* that Smith would kill Jones  
      at t and Smith does not kill Jones at t, 
 
which is obviously false. For S to correctly believe that p means that S believes p 
and that p is true, whereas (18.1) asserts that Brown could correctly believe 
something to be true which is in fact false, or that Smith could bring it about that 
Brown correctly holds a false belief. Hence, if (18) must be read à la (18.1) in sensu 
composito, then Smith does not have the power to refrain from killing Jones. 
 In the divided sense, on the other hand, the statement says 
   (18.2) Brown correctly believed at t* that Smith would kill Jones at t and,  
       possibly, Smith does not kill Jones at t. 
 
In this sense, even though Brown in fact (in the actual world) correctly believed  
that Smith would kill Jones, Smith could have (in another possible world) not 
done so. Of course, those possible worlds in which Smith refrains from killing 
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Jones are worlds in which Brown does not correctly believe that he would kill 
Jones (either he holds a false belief, suspends judgment or simply doesn’t 
consider the matter). 
 Now if, in order to maintain the possibility of Smith’s acting freely, we read 
(18) à la (18.2), in sensu diviso, then we are committed to the view that there are 
possible worlds accessible to Smith at t that in some way have pasts that differ 
from the actual past. For if Smith were to refrain from killing Jones at t, then it 
would be the case that Brown did not correctly believe at t* (before t) that Smith 
would kill Jones. Therefore (18.2) commits us to restricting (FP), for the 
proposition that Brown correctly believed at t* that Smith would kill Jones at t is both 
true and past-tense, and should, in light of FP, be accorded the necessary of the 
past. Yet there is at least one world, w, accessible to Smith at t (namely, the 
world(s) in which he refrains from killing Jones at t) such that, in w, Brown did 
not correctly believed at t* that Smith would kill Jones at t, whereas he did 
correctly believe so at t* in the actual world. 
 
3.3. Causal Power and Counterfactual Power 
 Is this problematic? Does this not ascribe to Smith the power to ‚bring about 
the past‛ and does this in turn not violate our intuitions concerning the 
inviolability of the past? That depends on what we mean by ‚bringing something 
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about‛. Recall from chapter 1 that we understood a world, w, to be accessible to 
an agent at a time if that agent can ‚bring it about‛ or ‚see to it‛ that w is actual, 
so now is the time to get clear on what it means to bring something about. 
 There seem to be at least two senses in which an agent can be said to bring 
something about. One is a causal sense, so that Smith can be said to bring about 
causally the death of Jones by pulling the trigger on his rifle and initiating a 
causal sequence that would eventuate in Jones’s death. In this sense of ‚bring 
about‛ it seems clear that no agent can bring about the past. If an event e1 
causally brings about an event e2, then by all accounts e1 must come before (or 
perhaps be simultaneous with) e2. We would all agree that an effect cannot 
temporally precede its cause. 
 But there is another, non-causal sense of bringing something about. To adapt 
an example from Jaegwon Kim and cited by Hasker (1989, p. 107) by causing 
Jones’s death Smith also brings it about that Jones’s wife becomes a widow. But 
does he cause her widowhood? That doesn’t so much as make sense. Causal 
relations hold between concrete entities, like Jones’s finger and the trigger of his 
gun, the trigger and the firing pin, the firing pin and the bullet primer, and so on. 
So how can there be a causal relation between anything Smith does and an 
abstract state like the widowhood of Jones’s wife? Rather, her widowhood is a 
logical consequence of what Smith does rather than a causal consequence. 
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 Ockhamists express this latter sense of ‚bringing something about‛ in the 
form of a counterfactual construction: Smith has the ability to bring about the 
widowhood of Jones’s wife because there’s something he can do (namely, kill 
Jones) such that, were he to do it, then Jones’s wife would be a widow. Therefore, 
we can call this sort of ability to bring something about counterfactual power as 
opposed to causal power. But it cannot be true in general that an agent S has 
counterfactual power over p just in case there’s something S can do such that 
were S to do it, then p would be true. For that would mean that S has 
counterfactual power, or can counterfactually ‚bring it about‛, that 2+2=4. But 
it’s counterintuitive in the extreme to say that we have any power whatsoever, 
counterfactual or otherwise, over necessary truths. 
 So let’s say that an agent S has counterfactual power over whether p is the 
case iff (i) if p is true, then S can do something such that, were S to do it, then p 
would be false and (ii) if p is false, then S can do something such that, were S to 
do it, then p would be true. So Smith has counterfactual power over whether 
Jones’s wife will be a widow tomorrow because (i) if she will in fact be a widow 
tomorrow as a result of Smith’s killing Jones, then there’s something Smith can 
do (namely refrain from killing Jones) such that, were he to do so, then Jones’s 
wife would not be a widow tomorrow as a result of Smith’s killing Jones, and (ii) 
if she will in fact not be a widow tomorrow as a result of Smith’s killing Jones, 
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then there’s something Smith can do (namely kill Jones) such that, were he to do 
so, then Jones’s wife would be a widow tomorrow as a result of Smith’s killing 
Jones. 
 Now clearly, causal power implies counterfactual power, for there’s 
something Smith can do (namely, pull the trigger) such that, were he to do it, 
then Jones would be killed. But it’s not the case that counterfactual power 
implies causal power, for (again) even though there’s something that Smith can 
do such that were he to do it, then Jones’s wife would be a widow, it doesn’t 
follow that Smith causes her widowhood. Her widowhood is a logical 
consequence of what Smith does, not a causal consequence. 
 Taking this back to our original point, we can see that ascribing to Smith 
counterfactual power at t over Brown’s correctly believing something at t* (before 
t) does not amount to ascribing to him any kind of causal power over the past. 
We are merely saying that if, contrary to fact, Smith does not kill Jones at t, then 
Brown would not have correctly believed at t* that he would. So we can see that 
Smith’s having such power is not any kind of power to affect the past, in the 
sense of making the past not to have been. It’s not as if, by refraining from killing 
Jones at t, Smith would somehow initiate a causal sequence that would result in 
Brown’s holding a false belief at t* instead of a true belief at t*. 
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 Suppose that, contrary to fact, Smith does refrain from killing Jones at t. In 
that case, Brown would not have correctly believed what he in fact correctly 
believed, namely that Smith would kill Jones at t. In other words, it seems 
perfectly coherent to say that at t, Smith had the unexercised power to do 
something such that were he to do it, then the past would have been different, 
insofar as Brown would have held a false belief instead of a true belief. But it’s 
not as if, by refraining, Smith would have rendered Brown’s belief mistaken; 
Brown’s belief would already have been mistaken. Thus we can say that Smith 
can ‚bring about the past,‛ not causally but counterfactually.  He can (although in 
fact he does not) do something at t (namely, refrain from killing Jones) such that 
were he to do it, then something that was the case at t* (namely, Brown’s 
correctly believing that Smith would kill Jones at t) would not have been the 
case. 
 Richard Taylor (1983) has expressed misgivings (even mystification) about 
such counterfactual power. What sort of power is it that has never, in the entire 
history of the world, been exercised? You say that Smith had the unexercised 
power to do something such that, if he had done it, then Brown’s belief would 
have been false. But there has never been a single instance of such power ever 
being exercised. In each and every case where it has been true that x will do  
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such-and-such, x has inevitably done such-and-such. What sort of mysterious 
power is this that never gets used? (Taylor, 1983, pp. 58-61.) 
 Taylor seems unaware of the fact that his demand for an instance of exercised 
counterfactual power is incoherent. Of course there are no examples to be found 
of counterfactual power that has been exercised, precisely because it is 
counterfactual! It’s logically impossible for any agent in fact to do something 
contrary to fact. Taking ‘in fact’ to mean ‘in the actual world,’ Taylor’s demand for 
an example of counterfactual power that has been exercised amounts to a 
demand for an example of somebody’s having done something in the actual 
world that they didn’t do in the actual world. Not being able to provide such an 
example hardly counts as a theoretical failure. 
 It seems to me that the foregoing points are intuitive and unproblematic. 
With the addition of a bit of technical language, they are just what an ordinary 
‚person on the street‛ would say: just because Brown ‚guessed right‛ concerning 
what Smith would do, that doesn’t mean that Smith had to do it. He could have 
done something else, in which case Brown would have guessed wrong. Now, 
these same points provide a way out of logical determinism as well, by allowing 
us to deny premise (14) of MA. Even though it was always true in the past that 
(let us say) there will be a sea battle tomorrow, that doesn’t mean that there has to 
be a sea battle tomorrow. The naval captains could (although in fact they will not) 
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refrain from going into battle, and were they to do so, then it would not have 
always been true that there will be a sea battle tomorrow. In terms of the 
foregoing distinctions, this is to say that, while the naval captains do not have 
causal power over the past truth of the proposition There will be a sea-battle at t 
(indeed, one wonders what such causal power could even amount to), they do 
nonetheless have counterfactual power over that proposition. 
 
3.4. The Bare Truth about the Future 
 The underlying motivation for the Master Argument for logical determinism 
seems to arise from a very strong notion of truth as correspondence. In other 
words, if it is true now that there will be a sea battle tomorrow, then that truth 
must correspond to or be ‚grounded‛ in some presently existing state of affairs. 
In other words, the world’s ‚furniture‛ or ontological constituents (whatever 
those may be) must now be arranged in such a way as to make tomorrow’s sea 
battle inevitable, in the same way that things are now arranged in such a way as 
to make (say) tomorrow’s weather inevitable, and so it is now true that 
tomorrow will be (say) a humid 85 degrees. Another way of putting it is to say 
that tomorrow’s sea battle must be ‚present in its causes‛ if it can truly be said 
that there will be a sea battle tomorrow. This is what gives rise to MA, for there’s  
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nothing that the naval captains will be able to do tomorrow that could possibly 
affect how the world was arranged today. 
 But such a view of truth is simply implausible. What is there about the 
arrangement of the world’s current ‚furniture‛ to which the proposition 
Brontosauri were herbivores could correspond? There are no currently existing 
brontosauri to ‚make‛ that proposition true, nor does it seem that there is 
anything else currently existing to which that proposition might ‚correspond,‛ 
and yet it is nonetheless true. Again, I have no idea whether Julius Caesar 
enjoyed his wine at room temperature, but he either did or he didn’t. But what is 
there about the way the world is now arranged that makes that proposition either 
true or false?  There doesn’t seem to be anything to which such a proposition 
‚corresponds,‛ other than the state of affairs Julius Caesar’s having enjoyed his wine 
at room temperature. But that state of affairs doesn’t involve the world’s presently 
existing stock of furniture.  
 Likewise, there’s no good reason to think that a proposition like There will be a 
sea battle tomorrow can be true now only by corresponding to the way the world’s 
furniture is now arranged. It’s sufficient that the world’s furniture will be 
arranged sea-battle-wise tomorrow for us to truly assert now, ‚There will be a sea 
battle tomorrow.‛ As Gaskin puts it, future-tense propositions ‘can be barely true 
(i.e., not true in virtue of anything)’ (Gaskin, 1993, p. 425). In other words, if the 
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proposition ˹x will ˺ is contingently true, there’s no reason to think that the 
world must now be arranged in such-and-such way in order for it to be ‚made‛ 
true; it’s true simply because of the bare fact that x will . 
 Therefore, the motivation behind premise (14) of MA is undercut. The reason 
why it may have seemed that nothing can ever be done about what was true in 
the past is that something’s having been true in the past was understood to be 
‚grounded‛ in the way the world’s furniture was arranged in the past. If it was 
true that p at some past time t, then things in the world must have been arranged 
in such-and-such a way at t. So ‚doing something about the fact that p‛ would 
seem to imply the power to do something about the way the world was arranged 
in the past. 
 It is precisely this sort of power over the past that our intuitions tell us we 
don’t possess. In this sense, nothing that I do now can ‚bring it about‛ that the 
world was arranged in such-and-such a way in the past. Indeed, nothing that I 
could have done at t, would have made it the case that the world was arranged 
in such-and-such a way before t. 
 However, given that It will be the case at t that p does not have to correspond to 
any arrangement of things before t in order to be true before t, then the ability at 
t to act in such a way that p is not true at t does not imply the ability as of t to 
bring it about that the world was not arranged in such-and-such a way before t. 
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It implies only the ability to bring it about that It will be the case at t that p was not 
true before t. 
 
3.5. How Would You Like Your Facts? 
 We’ve arrived at a distinction that contemporary Ockhamists are wont to call 
the ‚hard fact/soft fact‛ distinction. Hard facts are facts that are ‚really‛ about 
the past, and are the sort of facts that we have in mind when we talk about the 
past being fixed, immutable, ‚accidentally necessary,‛ or what have you. Soft 
facts are expressed by propositions that are only ‚verbally‛ or ‚grammatically‛ 
about the past, but the facts themselves are really about the future. As a result, 
soft facts are supposed to be the sort of facts over which we have counterfactual 
power, while hard facts are, so to speak, counterfactually inviolate. No one can 
act in such a way that, if he were so to act, then a hard fact would not have been 
a fact (e.g., there’s nothing I can do now such that, were I to do it, then Caesar 
would not have crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC). A soft fact is a fact over which 
counterfactual power can be exercised. There is something I can do now such 
that, were I to do it, then it would not have been true yesterday that I would 
thereafter not drink coffee, namely I can drink some coffee. 
 All sorts of criteria have been proposed for hard- and soft-facthood, an issue 
which I will soon address, but for now a suitable criterion is the one already 
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used. A soft fact is a fact over which some agent has counterfactual power; a 
hard fact is a fact over which no agent has counterfactual power. 
   (SF)  f is a soft fact as of t iff f is a fact and for some agent S, S can 
perform some action A at t such that, if S were to do A at t, then f 
would not have been a fact. 
 
(HF)  f is a hard fact as of t iff f is a fact and there is no agent S that can 
perform some action A at t such that, if S were to do A at t, then f 
would not have been a fact. 
 
An example of a soft fact would Brown’s correctly believing at t* < t that Smith 
was going to kill Jones at t, since it was (ex hypothesi) a fact and Smith could have 
done something at t, namely refrain from killing Jones, such that were he to do it, 
then Brown would not have correctly believed at t* that Smith was going to kill 
Jones at t. An example of a hard fact was given above. There’s nothing anyone 
can do now such that, were they to do it, Caesar would not have crossed the 
Rubicon in 49 BC. 
 With this distinction in hand, we can articulate the Ockhamist response to the 
Master Argument. The Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP), which functions as 
premise (14), to wit, 
   (14) No one can do anything about what was true in the past 
needs to be distinguished insofar as we can understand ‚what was true in the 
past‛ to be talking about hard facts or soft facts. If we understand (14) as talking 
about hard facts, then it is indeed true. However, since  
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   (11) It was true in the past that there will be a sea battle tomorrow 
arguably expresses a soft fact, then the hard fact reading of (14) results in an 
invalid argument, viz. an equivocation on ‚true in the past.‛ In (14) it means 
‚true in the hard past‛ while in (11) it means ‚true in the soft past.‛ 
 On the other hand, if we understand (14) as talking about soft facts, then it is 
false—as the foregoing discussion was intended to show—in which case MA is 
unsound. The naval captains can indeed do something about (11), namely refrain 
from engaging in a battle tomorrow, and were they to do so, then (11) will have 
been false. 
 
3.6. Ockhamism Applied to ATD 
 I have given a good deal of attention to the issue of logical determinism and 
the Ockhamist’s solution thereto because I think there is an exact analogy 
between the MA and ATD. I maintain that the Ockhamist response to the threat 
of logical determinism applies with equal success to that of theological 
determinism. The crucial inference in ATD is from (4) and (5) to (6): 
   (4)  No one can do anything about the fact that God knew 1,000 years ago 
that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm. 
 
   (5)  God’s having known 1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones 
tomorrow at 5pm entails that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm. 
 
   (6)  Therefore, no one can do anything about the fact that Smith will kill 
Jones tomorrow at 5pm. 
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Let’s make the parallel between logical and theological fatalism explicit: 
   (4*) No one can do anything about the fact that Brown correctly believed  
      yesterday that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow. 
 
 (5*) Brown’s having correctly believed yesterday that Smith will kill  
    Jones tomorrow entails that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow. 
 
   (6*) Therefore, no one can do anything about the fact that Smith will kill  
      Jones tomorrow. 
 
As we saw, the Ockhamist would deny (4*). Someone can do something about 
the fact that Brown correctly believed yesterday that Smith will kill Jones 
tomorrow. Smith, for one, can refrain from killing Jones, and were he to do so, 
then Brown would not have correctly believed that he will. The Ockhamist’s next 
move is simply to apply this reasoning, mutatis mutandis, to ATD, by denying 
premise (4). Someone can indeed do something about the fact that God knew 
1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow. Smith, for one, can refrain 
from killing Jones, and if he were to do so, then God would not have known 
1,000 years ago what he in fact knew. Given his omniscience, he would have 
known instead that Smith would not kill Jones. 
 In short, the Ockhamist’s strategy is to deny that we must keep God’s past 
knowledge fixed in our evaluation of what an agent has it in his power to do at a 
given time. The theological determinist insists that, e.g., it must be possible for 
Smith to refrain from shooting Jones tomorrow at 5pm holding fixed God’s 
foreknowledge that he will do so. Of course there is no such possibility, but as we 
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argued before, this is no more a threat to Smith’s acting freely than our holding 
fixed the bare truth that he will shoot Jones tomorrow at 5pm. Of course Smith 
can’t do anything but shoot Jones on the assumption (or as the medievals put it, 
ex suppositione) that he will shoot Jones. But the upshot of that isn’t that Smith 
can’t refrain simpliciter, but rather that if he were to do so, then it would not have 
been true that he was going to shoot Jones. Likewise, of course Smith can do 
anything but shoot Jones on the assumption that God knows he will, but again, 
this doesn’t mean that he can’t refrain simpliciter. It means only that should he 
refrain, then God would not have known what he in fact knows. 
 We might put the matter as follows. The determinist (whether theological or  
logical) insists that S freely does A at t in w only if there’s a w* absolutely 
identical with w up to t (i.e., in which everything true prior to t in w is true prior 
to t in w*) such that S refrains from A at t in w. In other words, for the determinist 
the only worlds accessible as of t are those that are exactly similar to the actual 
world up to t. But a world (call it w1) in which Smith refrains from shooting 
Jones at t is not exactly similar to the actual world ( ) up to t, for at all times prior 
to t it is true in  that Smith will shoot Jones at t while in w1 it is false at all times 
prior to t that Smith will shoot Jones at t. Again, at all times prior to t in  it is 
true that God knows that Smith will shoot Jones at t, while in w1 it is false at all 
times prior to t that God knows that Smith will shoot Jones at t. Therefore, w1 is 
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not exactly similar to  up to t and so is not accessible at t.  Smith, therefore, is 
not free in shooting Jones at t. 
 However, such a restriction on what worlds are accessible, and hence on what 
actions count as free, is impossibly strong, far stronger than the libertarian view 
of freedom discussed at the outset. There it was stipulated that only those worlds 
are accessible from  at t that are causally identical to  up to t. As Molina put it, 
an action is performed freely only if given the same arrangement of causes its 
contrary could have been performed. In other words, to rule out the possibility 
that a free action may be causally determined, the libertarian insists that an 
action is performed freely only if the actual sequence of causes up to its 
performance could also have been followed by its non-performance, which 
allows us to infer that the action was not ultimately the product of those causes. 
Now if one subscribed to the strong correspondence theory of truth discussed 
earlier, according to which It will be the case at t that p is true only by being 
grounded in present causal activity, then the absolute identity condition on 
accessibility makes sense from a libertarian perspective. But I have argued 
against such a view of truth, and hence I see no good reason to adopt such a 
restrictive view of accessibility. A world need not be absolutely indiscernible  
from α up to t in order to be accessible as of t; it need only be causally 
indiscernible up to t. 
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3.7. Are God’s Beliefs Hard or Soft Facts? 
 It may be objected that our assimilation of theological fatalism to logical 
fatalism is too quick. It seems that there is an important difference between 
Smith’s having counterfactual power over a proposition like Smith will kill Jones 
tomorrow at 5pm, which seems innocuous enough, and his having counterfactual 
power over a proposition like God has always known that Smith will kill Jones 
tomorrow at 5pm, which doesn’t seem quite so innocuous.  
 The problem may be illustrated by once again considering the case of 
Brown’s correctly believing that Smith would kill Jones and Smith’s having 
counterfactual power over Brown’s having correctly believed such. Granted, 
Smith has the power to do refrain from killing Jones, and if he were to do so, 
then Brown would not have correctly believed that he would kill Jones. But the 
fact remains that Brown would still have held that belief. In other words, there’s 
nothing Smith can do such that, were he to do it, then Brown would not have 
held the belief he in fact held. The mental state that Brown was in before Smith 
killed Jones just doesn’t seem to be the sort of thing over which Smith can be said 
to have counterfactual power. Brown’s correctly believing what Smith will do 
may be a ‚soft fact,‛ but Brown’s simply believing what Smith will do seems to be 
a ‚hard fact,‛ one over which there is no power after the fact, counterfactual or 
otherwise. 
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 But a similar point can be made, it seems, with respect to theological fatalism. 
Smith’s having the power to do something such that, were he to do it, then God 
would not have known what he in fact knows, seems to involve more than 
ordinary counterfactual power. For since God, classically conceived, is necessarily 
omniscient (i.e., omniscient in every possible world), then Smith’s having the 
above power implies his having the power also to act in such a way that, were he 
so to act, then God would not only not have known what he in fact knows, but 
also he would know what he does not in fact know. In other words, the 
Ockhamist is saying that Smith has the power to do something such that, were he 
to do it, then God would have been in a different epistemic state (viz. knowing 
that Smith will not kill Jones) from the one he was actually in (viz. knowing that 
Smith will kill Jones). 
 This same point is brought out more forcefully by the way the theological 
determinist’s case has been presented since Nelson Pike’s seminal paper, ‚Divine 
Omniscience and Voluntary Action‛ (Pike, 1989). Therein Pike formulates the 
problem in terms of what God believes rather than in terms of what God knows. 
Again, as classically conceived, God is necessarily omniscient, which, stated in 
terms of what God believes, means that, necessarily, God believes everything 
that is true (necessarily, if p, then God believes that p). But God must also be  
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viewed as necessarily infallible, so that, necessarily, anything that God believes, 
he correctly believes (necessarily, if God believes that p, then p). 
 So if it’s true that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm, then God has always 
believed that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm. If Smith has the power to 
refrain from killing Jones, then he has the power to do something such that, were 
he to do it, then God would not have held the belief he actually held. Why? 
Because God is necessarily infallible, so it’s impossible that God should have 
believed that Smith would kill Jones and yet Smith not actually do so. So unless 
we allow that God could hold a mistaken belief (which is impossible on the 
classical conception of God), the Smith’s having the power to refrain from killing 
Jones is the power to do something such that, were he to do it, then God would 
not have held the belief he actually held. But it’s precisely this power that we 
said Smith doesn’t have with regard to Brown’s belief. Whether or not Smith kills 
Jones, Brown will still have believed that he would kill Jones. Whether or not 
Brown correctly believes this is up to Smith, but Smith can do nothing about 
whether or not Brown believes it simpliciter. Why should it be any different with 
God’s belief? 
 I should at first say that I am not entirely at ease with talk about God’s 
‚beliefs.‛ As far as I am aware, every discussant in the theological fatalism 
debate prior to the 20th century spoke in terms of what God knows, never in terms 
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of what God believes. Belief just doesn’t seem to be the sort of epistemic state that 
God could ever be in. This point was well argued by William Alston (1986), who 
insists that God’s knowledge that p is more adequately construed as a direct, 
intuitive awareness of the fact that p, rather than some kind of state in which 
belief figures as a component à la the ‚traditional‛ (and now defunct) analysis of 
knowledge as ‚justified true belief‛ (Alston, 1986, pp. 294-95). I might add that 
the failure of this analysis, along with all of its sundry permutations, should cast 
at least some shadow of suspicion on the assumption that belief must be one of 
the components even of human knowledge, not to mention divine knowledge. 
 Second, putting aside these worries and allowing that it may be legitimate to 
talk about God’s having beliefs, we should still keep in mind the traditional 
doctrine of analogy. That is, even if we predicate having beliefs of God, it by no 
means follows that we do so in the same sense as we do of humans.  In fact, we 
ought not to if we are to avoid anthropomorphism. According to Aquinas, for 
one, any predicate that is said of both God and creatures is said only 
analogically. So just because we don’t consider Brown’s beliefs as the sort of 
thing over which an agent may have counterfactual power, we cannot 
immediately infer that the same is true of God’s beliefs, because ‚belief‛ is used 
in different (albeit related) senses. 
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 Now, one way of fleshing out the difference between Brown’s (or any 
creature’s) beliefs and God’s beliefs is to note both that God’s belief that p entails 
the truth of p and that the truth of p entails that God believes that p (which is to 
say, again, that God is both necessarily infallible and necessarily omniscient), 
whereas there is no necessary connection whatsoever between any creature’s 
beliefs and the truth of those beliefs. Indeed, perhaps the thesis that, necessarily, 
God believes that p if and only if it is true that p is one way of understanding the 
traditional religious dictum that God is Truth. In any event, the necessary 
equivalence between God’s believing that p and it’s being true that p has been 
used by some as a reason for classifying God’s past beliefs as ‚soft facts‛ rather 
than ‚hard facts.‛ 
 Now, I already put forward a provisional criterion for a fact’s being hard or 
soft depending upon whether or not some agent has counterfactual power over 
that fact. Unfortunately this will not help settle the issue of whether God’s past 
beliefs are soft facts or not because the very question we’re trying to answer is 
whether an agent has counterfactual power over God’s beliefs. So we need some 
other, non-question-begging criterion for determining whether a fact is hard or 
soft. 
 Apropos of what was just noted about God’s belief that p entailing that the 
truth of p, there has been discussed in the recent literature an ‚entailment 
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criterion‛ for a fact’s being soft (Fischer, 1989c, p. 35). If p, while true at t, entails 
that q is true at some time t* after t, then p expresses a soft fact with respect to t*. 
Since Brown’s correctly believing at t* < t that Smith will kill Jones at t entails that 
Smith will kill Jones at t, it follows that Brown’s correct belief is a soft fact 
relative to t. In like manner, since God’s belief 1,000 years ago that Smith will kill 
Jones tomorrow entails that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow (that is, because it 
entails that something will be the case), God’s belief is a soft fact relative to the 
time of Smith’s action.  However, since Brown’s mere belief does not entail that 
anything will be the case (in other words, since Brown’s merely believing at t that 
such-and-such will happen is consistent with the world’s being annihilated 
immediately after t), Brown’s belief itself counts as a hard fact. 
 J. M. Fischer has argued that this purported criterion ends up collapsing the 
distinction between hard and soft facts, since every fact entails something about 
the future. Fischer argues as follows: 
But there is another sort of problem which afflicts [the entailment 
criterion+. Suppose ‚Smith existed at t1‛ is true. It is a necessary condition 
of the truth of this statement < that it is not the case that Smith existed for 
the first time at t2. It is obvious that Smith’s existing at t1 entails that he 
does not exist for the first time at t2.< Thus [according to the entailment 
criterion] the statement fails to express a hard fact about t1 (Fischer, 1989b, 
p. 92). 
 
Some further examples to illustrate Fischer’s point: Brown’s belief that such-and-
such will be the case entails the future fact that Brown will have held a belief, 
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that Brown will have existed, that there will have been such things as beliefs, and 
so on. Since Brown’s belief at t entails all these things that will be true after t, 
Brown’s belief counts as a soft fact according to the entailment criterion. But, as 
Fischer concludes, ‘this is a disastrous result’ for that criterion. 
 By way of response, it may be countered that Brown’s belief entails no such 
things, since they can only be true given that there are times at which they can be 
true. So Brown’s belief is a hard fact because it is consistent with the destruction 
of time itself immediately upon his having that belief. God can immediately 
annihilate the entire created order, including space-time itself, upon Brown’s 
forming the belief that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow. Should God do so, then 
there would be no future time at which it would be true that Brown once existed, 
etc. However, it would be impossible for God to do so upon his having believed 
1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow, because (again) God’s 
believing this entails that it will happen. 
 William Hasker has argued, however, that it would be metaphysically 
impossible for God to annihilate the cosmos in this way because it would be 
inconsistent with God’s nature. Hasker says, 
I propose as a plausible opinion the view that, once God has undertaken 
to create a world of contingent beings and, in particular, a world 
containing rational spirits capable of communion with himself, it would 
be inconsistent with his nature for him to annihilate his creation and allow 
it to fall into nothingness. If this is so, then any proposition entailing the  
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existence of contingent beings (or, at least, of created rational spirits) will 
be non-future-indifferent (Hasker, 1989, pp. 86-87). 
 
So according to Hasker, if we accept the entailment criterion, then we end up 
with the result that Brown’s existence at t is a soft fact relative to all times after t, 
because it metaphysically entails his existence at all times after t. Why? Because 
God could not, given his essential goodness, annihilate Brown, who is a rational 
spirit capable of communion with God. 
 As a result, Hasker suggests that we explicate the hard fact/soft fact 
distinction, not in terms of metaphysical entailment but in terms of conceptual 
entailment (Hasker, 1989, p. 87). In other words, p expresses a soft fact iff p 
conceptually entails that there are times after the time at which p is true. But given 
this criterion, he argues that God’s past beliefs come out as hard facts after all, 
since God may be referred to by means of the non-connotative proper name 
‘Yahweh’. Then a proposition like ‘Yahweh believed 1,000 years ago that Smith 
will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm’ does not carry the conceptual baggage of 
necessary infallibility that it would were the term ‘God’ used, and so it does not 
conceptually entail that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow (even though it does 
metaphysically entail that fact, since it is metaphysically necessary that Yahweh is 
God). Finally, since ‘Yahweh believed such-and-such’ does not conceptually 
entail the truth of what Yahweh believes, it is a hard fact, one over which no 
agent has counterfactual power (Hasker, 1989, p. 92). 
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 Whether or not his argument concerning the non-connotative proper name 
‘Yahweh’ is sound, however, is moot, for Hasker has failed to show that the hard 
fact/soft fact distinction must be explicated in terms of conceptual necessity. For 
his ‚plausible opinion‛ concerning what God could or could not do given his 
essential goodness isn’t plausible at all. In fact, it’s arguably false. There doesn’t 
seem to be anything inconsistent with the divine nature for God to create 
something, even an angel or a human soul, and then annihilate it. God has 
perhaps willed that he shall not annihilate any created spirits, so considered de 
potentia Dei ordinata it is impossible that a created spirit cease to exist, but 
considered de potentia Dei absoluta (which is what is relevant to metaphysical 
necessity) God could very well have willed to create and then annihilate 
whatsoever he might choose. However the case may be, this is certainly a very 
tenuous and questionable claim upon which Hasker has based his argument. 
 Hasker puts forward a second argument against the metaphysical entailment 
criterion: 
If God is a metaphysically necessary being (i.e., exists in all possible 
worlds) and is also essentially everlasting (as compatibilists suppose), 
then we immediately get the result that no proposition whatsoever is 
future-indifferent [i.e., expresses a hard fact] for any proposition 
metaphysically entails ‚God exists,‛ which in turn entails the existence of 
times after the present.< Furthermore, any proposition describing any 
event of the past, present, or future entails that God will remember that 
event for all time to come—so no such proposition can be future-
indifferent (Hasker, 1989, p. 86). 
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This argument is doubly defective. For one thing, not all compatibilists suppose 
that God is everlasting (by ‚compatibilist‛ Hasker means someone who thinks 
God’s omniscience is compatible with libertarian freedom). St. Thomas Aquinas, 
for one, would insist that God is not only not essentially everlasting (i.e. existing 
at all times) but he’s not even possibly everlasting; rather, he’s essentially 
timelessly eternal. Now, although I previously argued that St. Thomas’s Eternalist 
view does not provide a way out of the foreknowledge problem, I never argued 
that the view itself is mistaken. In fact, I’m inclined to think that a theist ought to 
hold that God is timelessly eternal. Be that as it may, for St. Thomas at least, the 
proposition that God exists does not entail the existence of any time whatsoever. 
 Secondly, it simply doesn’t follow from God’s being essentially everlasting 
that there exists any times at which he exists nor any future times at which he 
will exist. To say that God is essentially everlasting is to say: necessarily, for any 
time t, if t exists, then God exists at t. But one cannot validly infer from this that 
time exists. William Lane Craig has extensively argued that God exists timelessly 
sans creation but temporally with creation (Craig, 2001a), so that even if God 
would exist at all times if there were times, it doesn’t follow that there are in fact 
times. We might say that God is essentially everlasting (there’s no possible world 
in which God exists at some times but not at others) but only contingently in 
time (there are worlds in which God does not create and hence in which he exists 
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timelessly). Therefore, God’s existence as an essentially everlasting being does 
not entail that there will be times after the present. As a result, I conclude that 
Hasker has given no good reason to think that the hard fact/soft fact distinction 
cannot be explicated in terms of metaphysical entailment.  
 Unfortunately, in trying to defend the entailment criterion, I have had to 
delve into metaphysical issues concerning truth, time and eternity that scream 
for further analysis and resolution, issues that I cannot adequately address at 
present. Even if I were to do so, anything I say would be so speculative as to call 
into question whatever follows, and I would prefer that the success of this essay 
not hang on my views concerning the nature of truth and time. I will therefore 
try to tack a new course in defending the view that God’s past beliefs are 
plausibly construed as soft facts. 
 First, I think we do have an intuitive grasp of the distinction between hard 
and soft facts, even if we lack a definite criterion. I think a fairly uncontroversial 
example of a soft fact is Brown’s correctly believing at t* < t that Smith will kill 
Jones at t. Second, since God is understood to be infallible, I think it’s plausible to 
say that there’s a closer analogy between God’s believing that p and Brown’s 
correctly believing that p than between God’s believing that p and Brown’s merely 
believing that p. Ergo, since Brown’s correctly believing that p is a soft fact, we 
have good reason to construe God’s believing that p as a soft fact. 
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 J. M. Fischer (1994) is impressed neither by this argument nor by a similar one 
put forward by Alvin Plantinga (1986). Whereas I’ve suggested that God’s 
believing that p is relevantly similar to Brown’s correctly believing that p, 
Plantinga points out that God’s believing that p is, not relevantly similar to p itself 
(whatever that may mean,) but is necessarily equivalent to p. So if p expresses an 
uncontroversially soft fact, say, ‘It’s being the case at t1 that Smith will kill Jones 
at t2’, then ‘God’s believing at t1 that Smith will kill Jones at t2’ is equivalent to 
that soft fact. So on the assumption that if p is a soft fact and p is equivalent to q, 
then q is a soft fact, Plantinga concludes that God’s believing at t1 that Smith will 
kill Jones at t2 should likewise be construed as a soft fact (Plantinga, 1986, pp. 
193-94). 
 Fischer’s response to this argument is extremely difficult to make sense of. 
First, he says, 
I grant the conclusion of the equivalence argument. Any fact necessarily 
equivalent to a soft fact may well be a soft fact. But again I must point out 
that this does not entail that the facts are relevantly similar (Fischer, 1994, p. 
130). 
 
So, according to Fischer, if two facts are necessarily equivalent, then it doesn’t 
thereby follow that one is a soft fact if the other is. The two facts must be 
‚relevantly similar.‛ What, then, is the crucial dissimilarity between (say) it’s 
being the case at t1 that S will do X at t2 and God’s believing at t1 that S will do 
X at t2? According to Fischer, it’s that the latter, while being a soft fact, involves 
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what he calls a ‚hard property,‛ namely the property believing at t1 that S will do 
X at t2. He says, 
Suppose now that H merely believes at t1 that S will do X at t2. The state 
of H’s mind that counts as his belief would not count as a different belief 
(or no belief at all), if S were to refrain from doing X at t2 < one and the 
same state of H’s mind at t1 would count as believing that S will do X at 
t2, no matter what S (or anyone else) does at t2. The fact that the particular 
state of H’s mind at t1 counts as believing that S will do X at t2 is resilient 
to future states of the world.< 
  I can see no good reason to deny that the property of believing exhibits 
this sort of resilience when possessed by God.< Believing a proposition 
just is not counterfactually dependent on the future: it is not the case that 
one and the same state of mind would count as one belief given one 
future, and another belief (or no belief at all) given another future. Of 
course, if God believes at t1 that S will do X at t2, then it is (according to 
the assumptions adopted here) metaphysically impossible for God’s mind 
to be in the same state and S not do X at t2. But this does not show that 
‚believing that S will do X at t2‛ is not a hard property relative to t1; at 
most it helps to show that ‚God believes at t1 that S will do X at t2‛ is not 
a hard fact about t1 (Fischer, 1994, 119-20). 
 
The first paragraph of the quoted passage merely reiterates what I said earlier by 
way of introducing the problem we’ve been considering (cf. pp. 103f.). As far as 
good reasons go for denying that the property of believing that S will do X at t2 
exhibits resilience to future states of the world when possessed by God, there’s 
the one we’ve been talking about all along: God’s possessing that property 
entails—indeed, is equivalent to the fact—that S will do X at t2, unlike when a 
human being possesses that property. 
 Now Fischer’s response to this—that although God’s believing that S will do 
X at t2 may be a soft fact, the property ‘believing that S will do X at t2’ is 
116 
nonetheless what he calls a ‚hard property‛—is perplexing. What else is a fact 
but some being’s exemplifying some property? If the property exemplified is one 
the possession of which is ‚resilient to future states of the world‛ then how can 
the fact that some being exemplifies that property be anything other than a hard 
fact? 
 The answer seems to lie in Fischer’s idiosyncratic use of the terms ‘hard fact’ 
and ‘soft fact’. For Fischer, what makes a fact hard or soft is solely its ‚temporal 
nonrelationality or relationality‛ respectively (Fischer, 1994, p. 112). As a result, 
it need not be the case that if f is a fact, then some agent has counterfactual power 
over f, it need only be the case that f exhibit ‚temporal relationality.‛ As Fischer 
says, 
[N]ote that it does not follow from a fact’s being a soft fact about the past 
that one can so act that it would not be a fact. Suppose, for instance, that I 
am chained to my chair and thus intuitively it is quite clear that I cannot 
leave my office. It is a fact about yesterday that it was true then that I went 
to the store a day prior to being chained to a chair. Thus, if I were to leave 
my office, I would be falsifying this soft fact. Nevertheless, I cannot leave 
the office (Fischer, 1994, p. 115). 
 
Again, he says, 
It is evident from the above discussion that there are soft facts which are 
nevertheless fixed. They may be fixed for reasons other than the fixity of 
the past. Consider, for example, the fact that Judy sits at t1 prior to the 
sun’s rising at t2. This is a soft fact about t1 which is nevertheless fixed at 
t2: there is nothing any human agent can do about this fact at t2 (Fischer, 
1994, p. 115). 
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The upshot of this, according to Fischer, is that although God’s past belief may be 
a soft fact, it does not thereby follow that it isn’t fixed. Any fact that involves the 
exemplification of a ‚hard property,‛ even though it may be a temporally 
relational fact and therefore a soft fact, is still a fixed fact. And so, Fischer 
concludes, given God’s omniscience, ‘*I+t is plausible to say that an agent’s doing 
otherwise would require that some hard (temporally nonrelational) feature of the 
past be other than it actually was’ (Fischer, 1994, p. 130). 
 I agree with Fisher that the two facts he mentions are soft facts, but he is 
mistaken in claiming that they are nevertheless fixed at future times. We must 
keep in mind that whether a fact is hard or soft is not agent-relative. We’ve been 
focusing on an agent (Smith, for the most part) having or not having power over 
this or that fact because we’re interested in human freedom, but the hard fact/soft 
fact distinction goes beyond the issue of human agency. The distinction gets at 
those facts that are counterfactually dependent upon what happens in the future 
(soft facts) and those that are counterfactually independent of what happens in 
the future (hard facts). 
 Take Fisher’s first example. Granted, given that he is now chained to his 
office chair, he can’t now do anything such that, were he to do it, then he would 
not have gone to the store a day before he was chained to his office chair, but that 
doesn’t mean that the latter fact is fixed. For clearly, someone—namely his 
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captors—could have done something such that were they to do it, then Fischer 
would not have gone to the store a day before he was chained to his office 
chair—namely, they could have refrained from chaining him to his chair. 
However, there’s nothing anyone can now do such that, were they to do it, then 
Fischer would not have gone to the store yesterday. That fact about the past is 
fixed and therefore it is a hard fact about the past. 
 Nor is human agency in general key to the notion of whether something is 
fixed or not. Take Fischer’s second example. It’s not true that there’s nothing 
anyone can do at t2 such that, were they to do it, then Judy would not have sat at 
t1 prior to the sun’s rising at t2. God, at least, can do something at t2—namely, 
destroy the sun—such that, were he to do it, then Judy would not have sat at t1 
prior to the sun’s rising at t2. Indeed, even agency simpliciter is not essential to 
the notion of fixity. So for all we know, all the atoms in the sun could undergo a 
random quantum fluctuation at t2 so that the sun then blows itself apart. If that 
were to happen, then (again) Judy would not have sat at t1 prior to the sun’s 
rising at t2. However, nothing whatsoever can happen at t2 such that, were it to 
happen, then Judy would not have sat at t1. That fact about the past is fixed and 
therefore it is a hard fact about the past. 
 So when Fischer says, ‘Thus, it is very important to distinguish two sets of 
issues: first, temporal nonrelationality and relationality (i.e., hardness and 
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softness), and second, fixity and non-fixity (i.e., being out of one’s control and 
being in one’s control)’ (Fischer, 1994, p. 115), he is simply confused. It is 
precisely because some sorts of facts are temporally nonrelational that they are 
fixed (hard facts) while other sorts of facts are temporally relational, and 
therefore not fixed (soft facts). 
 Fischer seems to think that if f is not fixed, then any agent whatsoever must 
have counterfactual power over f. But as I’ve argued, this isn’t the case. What is 
the case is that if f is not fixed, then (assuming God exists) some agent has 
counterfactual power over f, while if f is fixed, then no agent whatsoever 
(including God) has counterfactual power over f. It’s important to keep in mind 
how all this relates to ATD. The Ockhamist isn’t trying to demonstrate that Smith 
is free in killing Jones, he’s merely trying to block the inference that says he can’t 
be free in killing Jones from the assumption that God already knew he was going 
to kill Jones. The Ockhamist does so by denying that God’s already having 
known (or believed) that Smith would kill Jones is fixed, insisting that it’s not 
true that no agent whatsoever has counterfactual power over God’s already 
having known that Smith would kill Jones. Hence, the theological determinist 
cannot go on to infer that Smith does not have counterfactual power over God’s 
past knowledge (or infallible belief). Smith may be unfree in killing Jones for all  
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sorts of reasons, but the Ockhamist need only show is that he is not unfree 
because of what God already knew. 
 So this brings us right back to the question, is God’s believing at t1 that Smith 
will kill Jones at t2 a hard fact or soft fact? Fischer thinks it must be a ‚hard-type 
soft-fact,‛ but in light of what I have argued, that amounts to nothing more than 
saying that it is a hard fact, for someone’s possessing the property believing that S 
will do X at t2 is not something over which anyone has counterfactual power. 
After all, no matter what Smith (or anyone else, including God) does at t2, Brown 
will still have believed at t1 that Smith would kill Jones at t2. So why should it be 
different for God? Once again, Fischer ‘can see no good reason to deny that the 
property of believing exhibits this sort of resilience [to the future] when 
possessed by God’. 
 Insofar as there is no distinction to be drawn between hard/soft facts and 
fixed/non-fixed facts, as I have argued, Fischer therefore cannot grant that 
Plantinga’s equivalence argument is sound. If he insists that God’s belief at t1 
that S will do X at t2 is a fixed fact, then he must (I maintain) grant that it is a 
hard fact. If, furthermore, he thinks that it’s simply being true at t1 that S will do 
X at t2 is not a fixed fact, then he must (as indeed he does) grant that it is also a 
soft fact. As a result, he must deny that fixity or non-fixity is transferred through 
necessary equivalence, for God’s believing that p is necessarily equivalent to p. 
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 Fischer could simply bite the bullet and deny that if p is a soft fact and p is 
necessarily equivalent to q, then q is a soft fact. Indeed, he could argue ad 
hominem that the Ockhamist must deny this Transfer through Necessary 
Equivalence Principle as well, as follows: that S does X at t2 is necessarily 
equivalent to God’s believing that S does X at t2. But while S has causal power 
over the former (S can causally bring it about that S doesn’t do X at t2), S has 
only counterfactual power over the latter (S cannot causally bring about God’s 
beliefs). Therefore, we have a counter-instance to the Transfer through Necessary 
Equivalence Principle. 
 I’m not sure this reply succeeds, but I won’t pursue it. Instead, I would argue 
that Fischer’s move from the hardness of H’s believing at t1 that S will do X at t2 
to the hardness of God’s believing at t1 that S will do X at t2, on the grounds that 
the property believing that S will do X at t2 is a ‚hard property‛, is fallacious. For 
the human being, H, and God do not really exemplify the same property. Once 
again, they are at best only analogous properties, and to follow up on the 
argument I started on earlier, God’s believing that p is more closely analogous to 
Brown’s correctly believing that p, which is a soft fact, than it is to Brown’s simply 
believing that p.  
 I would go even further and say that God’s believing that p is even more 
closely analogous to Brown’s infallibly believing that p. Now there aren’t very 
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many things that a human being can believe infallibly, if any. One possibility that 
comes to mind is the Cartesian cogito. I cannot, it seems, be mistaken in believing 
that I exist. But this is interesting, for if God’s belief that p is analogous to my 
belief in my own existence, at least in as much as both are infallible beliefs, then 
the ontological relationship between God and the state of affairs p is in some 
manner analogous to the relationship between myself and the fact of my own 
existence—a very close relationship indeed. So it seems that much more 
plausible to think that if p is a soft fact, then God’s belief that p must also be so. 
 Once again we’ve entered into some fairly speculative metaphysical territory, 
and to that extent my arguments are hardly of the ‚knock-down‛ variety. 
Nevertheless, I do think that what I’ve said is sufficient to transfer the burden of 
proof onto those who would insist that God’s past beliefs ought to be construed 
as hard facts over which there can be no counterfactual power. That burden, I 
think, has not yet been met. 
 
3.8. Just Another Kind of Compatibilism? 
 So then, does Ockhamism then give us a way of maintaining a libertarian 
view of freedom in the face of divine omniscience? Strictly speaking, the answer 
has to be, ‘Not necessarily.’ For the sorts of things I’ve said so far sound awfully 
reminiscent of what a compatibilist would say in regard to causal determinism, 
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according to which any event is entailed by the conjunction of some causal laws 
and the state of the world at a time. In other words, let L be a statement of all the 
laws of nature and let St describe the state of the world at t, where t is any 
arbitrary time. Causal determinism then has it that, if p is true, then (St & L) 
entails p. If p is ‘Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm’, then Smith’s action is 
entailed by the laws of nature together with the state of the world at a given 
time, say, a million years ago. But Smith has absolutely no power over what the 
world was like a million years ago or over the laws of nature, and so he should 
have no power whatsoever over his actions, if determinism is true. This, in 
summary form, is Peter Van Inwagen’s ‚Consequence Argument‛ against 
determinism (Van Inwagen, 1983, pp, 94-105). The libertarian, of course, rejects 
determinism while the hard determinist rejects the existence of human freedom, 
both on the basis of this or similar reasoning. 
 The compatibilist, however, might respond as follows. Granted, Smith has no 
causal power over past states of the world or the power to break the laws of 
nature, but he may nevertheless have counterfactual power over one or the other. 
In other words, if determinism is true, it doesn’t follow that Smith would cause 
the past to have been different or break a law of nature, if he were to refrain from 
killing Jones. It follows only that if he were to refrain, then either the past would 
have been different or some actual law of nature would not have been a law. 
124 
(David Lewis prefers the latter alternative since it doesn’t involve ‚backtracking‛ 
counterfactuals (Lewis, 1981). To me it makes no difference; I reject both forms of 
compatibilism.) 
 As I just sketched it, the compatibilist’s response to the Consequence 
Argument sounds only too similar to the Ockhamist’s response to ATD. Given 
that (St & L) entails a future contingent proposition, does ‘St & L’ express a soft 
fact? I should think than an incompatibilist would be loath to say so. But then the 
Ockhamist seems to face a dilemma. Either he sides with the compatibilist and 
holds that ‘St & L’ is, like God’s past beliefs, a soft fact and so gives up on being a 
libertarian, or he must come up with a plausible reason why ‘St & L’ should be 
considered a hard fact while God’s past beliefs should be considered soft facts. 
 The way out of this problem is to embrace the second horn of the dilemma. It 
can indeed be argued that there is a crucial difference between the sorts of facts 
over which the Ockhamist says we have counterfactual power, namely God’s 
beliefs, and the sorts of facts over which the compatibilist says we have 
counterfactual power, namely the laws of nature or past states of the world. The 
difference is that there is no causal connection between God’s believing that p is 
the case and p’s being the case, while there is, of course, a causal connection 
between (St & L) and events subsequent to t, given the truth of determinism. But 
simply stating that there is no causal connection between God’s believing that p 
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and p’s being the case is not enough; it must be shown how this can be. In the 
following chapters I will argue that Luis de Molina has successfully shown this 
by means of his theory of divine scientia media or ‚middle knowledge.‛ 
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CHAPTER 4 
MOLINISM AND THE SOURCE QUESTION 
4.1. The Source of God’s Foreknowledge 
 We ended the last chapter having raised a dilemma for the Ockhamist, one 
which can only be successfully navigated by denying that any causal connection 
need exist between God’s belief that p will obtain and the fact that p will obtain. 
But why should this be a problem? Why not just deny any such causal 
connection and be done with it? What reason do we have to think that there may 
be any such connection in the first place? After all, Brown’s believing, or even 
knowing, that p does not cause it to be the case that p, so why shouldn’t it be the 
same for God’s believing or knowing that p? 
 The issue arises when trying to answer what Freddoso calls the source 
question: how does God know (or infallibly believe) the contingent future. What 
‚epistemic resources,‛ to put it crudely, does God have by which he is able to 
know, in the apodeictic sense, what will contingently happen in the created 
order? What I think will become apparent is that there’s a very good case to be 
made for positing a causal connection between God’s epistemic states and what 
God knows as the only way by which God’s knowledge of contingent events 
could be secured, at least in a way that’s consistent with the divine nature. The 
challenge will then be to argue that such a causal connection need not exist in 
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order for God to be able to know infallibly the contingent future, a challenge that 
I will argue has been met by Luis de Molina with his theory of scientia media or 
‚middle knowledge.‛ But first, let us lay out the problem. 
 As an interesting historical note, Ockham himself did not think it possible to 
give a satisfactory answer to the source question. Or, at any rate, he did not 
attempt to give such an answer: ‘It has to be held without any doubt that God 
knows all future contingent facts evidently and with certainty. But to explain this 
evidently, and to express the manner in which He knows all future contingent 
facts, is impossible for any intellect in this life’ (Ockham, 1957, p. 133). In other 
words, it must be held as a matter of revealed faith (contra the Open Theism 
school) that God knows the contingent future, and it must remain a mystery as to 
how he knows it. 
 The problem with Ockham’s non-solution approach to the source question is 
that, it seems, any answer we might give is either inconsistent with the divine 
nature, classically conceived, or leads to some form of determinism. We’ve 
already met, in chapter two, with one possible answer to the source question, 
namely the eternity solution of St. Thomas Aquinas. There I argued that God 
cannot know the contingent future simply as a result of its being eternally 
present to his epistemic activity, as this theory impugns the doctrine of divine 
aseity. Furthermore, even putting that issue aside, such knowledge would afford 
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God no providential control over contingent events. Contrary to the doctrine of 
divine providence that we discussed at the outset, God’s immediate ‚perception‛ 
of a future contingent event in its real or actual existence, while it provides one 
sort of explanation as to how God knows what will happen, does not help to 
explain how God’s intends or permits that the event occur. In other words, 
whatever will happen depends in some way or other on the will of God, on God’s 
decision to allow it to happen or his actively causally contributing to its 
happening. Once again, a provident God is not an eternal observer but an eternal 
participant, who actively guides the course of history toward its divinely pre- 
established outcome. 
 The problem with the Thomistic approach, as was pointed out very early on 
by John Duns Scotus (Langston, 1986, pp. 19f.), is that it tries to explain God’s 
knowledge of the contingent future as a kind of purely intellectual knowledge, a 
speculative ‚knowledge of vision‛ (scientia visionis)—without, that is, making 
any mention of the functioning of the divine will. Future contingent events are 
understood to be directly present to the divine intellect which apprehends them 
in their real existence. However, the full explanation for any event that occurs in 
the created order must include some reference to the divine will, to the fact that 
this created order exists because God has willed it to exist. So one factor in the 
explanation of how God knows that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow must be the 
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fact that God has willed to create a world in which such an event occurs, 
presumably because it will be ordered toward the greater good and contribute 
somehow to the fulfillment of God’s purposes. Knowing that he has so willed 
accounts, at least in part, for the fact that he knows what will happen in it. Had 
God willed to create another world, one in which Jones or Smith never existed, 
then of course God would not know that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow. So we 
might say that the story told by St. Thomas Aquinas begins too late in the game. 
For God to have the kind of immediate intellectual apprehension of the 
progression of temporal events, whether as ‚present in eternity‛ or not, it must 
already be posited that God has in fact willed to create a world in which such 
events occur. 
 So any explanation of God’s foreknowledge (or eternal knowledge of the 
contingent order) must refer in some way or other to the divine will. God knows 
what will happen in the created order because he knows what he has willed to 
bring about in the created order. To be fair to St. Thomas, there are numerous 
passages where he suggests just such a role for the divine will in giving rise to 
God’s knowledge of vision. He says that the causal relationship between God’s 
knowledge and what he knows is the opposite of the causal relationship between 
human knowledge and what we know. As said earlier, we know things by being 
causally acted upon by them, while God, who is First Cause and purus actus 
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knows things because, in willing them to be, he causes them to be. Aquinas says, 
‘God’s knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it’ 
(ST IaIæ, 14, 8). Unfortunately, these two approaches to understanding the 
source of God’s knowledge—the one via God’s existence in eternity and the other 
via the role of the divine will—never seem to be integrated into a single, coherent 
theory in Aquinas’s writings, and when he treats explicitly of the issue of God’s 
knowledge of contingent things, he inevitably returns to the eternity solution as 
his preferred approach. 
 
4.2. The Role of the Divine Will 
 We can do no better than to turn to Duns Scotus for a fully articulated theory 
of how the divine will functions in giving rise to God’s knowledge of 
contingents.1 Scotus suggests that what the divine intellect knows can be divided 
into two (non-temporal) stages: what it knows before the divine will has willed 
something and what it knows after the divine will has willed something. Scotus 
speaks of this progression in terms of ‚instants of nature‛ as opposed to instants 
of time, since there are no times apart from creation. Therefore, the language of 
‚before‛ and ‚after‛ here should be understood to mean conceptually prior to and 
conceptually posterior to. Nevertheless, I find Scotus’s device of ‚instants of 
nature‛ to be congenial enough, so what does the divine intellect know in the 
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first ‚instant of nature‛? According to Scotus, it knows whatever is knowable as 
a result of its comprehension of the divine nature itself, which is ens infinitum or 
infinite being, and which is the primary (and at this instant of nature, the only) 
object of the divine intellect. To wit, it knows the logical and metaphysical 
structure of being, which is to say all logically and metaphysically necessary 
states of affairs, as well as the infinite array of possibilities in which being may be 
exemplified, which is to say, all contingent states of affairs insofar as they are 
possible. In other words, since the metaphysical modality of any state of affairs is 
essential to it, God knows in the first instant of nature the metaphysical 
modalities of all states of affairs. Since those states of affairs that necessarily 
obtain a fortiori actually obtain, God knows that those states actually obtain. But 
in the first instant of nature, the actuality of contingent states is not yet settled, 
and so, if p is possible but contingent, God does not, in the first instant of nature,  
know that p is the case, only that possibly p is the case. Again, since God knows all 
the infinite ways in which his essence can be imitated or ‚participated in‛ by 
finite creatures, he knows, for each finite creaturely essence E, that E can be 
exemplified. Let us call what God knows in the first instant of nature his ‚natural 
knowledge‛ (what Aquinas calls his knowledge of ‚simple intelligence‛). 
 It follows from what has been said that God knows through natural 
knowledge which are the maximally consistent sets of states of affairs, i.e., which 
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sets of states constitute entire possible worlds. What he does not yet know, in the 
first instant of nature, is which world is the actual world. That is settled in the 
second instant of nature, when the divine will selects from among the various 
compossible states which ones he will causally contribute to bringing about. 
Now, to what aspects of a possible world would God’s causal contribution 
extend? According to Scotus, it extends to any metaphysically contingent state of 
affairs whatsoever. Since contingent states ‘carry no mark of their actuality’ 
(Langston, 1986, p. 19) it is due solely to the extrinsic determination of the divine 
will that they either do or do not actually obtain. Thus we can see why, for 
Scotus, the divine will is the sole source of contingency in the created order. The 
ultimate reason why there are things that could have been otherwise is because 
God could have willed to create things otherwise. 
 Since a state of affairs like Smith’s killing Jones tomorrow at 5pm is contingent—
it neither has to happen nor has to not happen—the reason it does happen is 
because God wills it to happen. This is not to say that Scotus denies the reality of 
secondary causation (i.e., it is not to say that Smith himself is not a genuine cause 
of his action), but secondary causes do not operate independently of the First 
Cause. Indeed, according to Scotus, the activity of any cause is embedded within 
an ‚essentially ordered‛ hierarchy of causes, which terminates in the activity of 
the First Cause. So if the activity of a secondary cause is to be seen as contingent, 
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then the activity of the First Cause upon which it depends must also be 
contingent, and the source of contingency in the First Cause (i.e., God) is God’s 
will, which is absolutely free. 
 So in the first instant of nature, God knows what states of affairs are possible; 
in the second instant of nature God wills which contingent states of affairs will 
actually obtain; and in the third instant of nature God knows which contingent 
states he has willed to obtain, which explains his knowledge of the entire 
contingent order. God knows that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow because he has 
willed that that event should occur and he knows that he has willed it so. The 
event is contingent because God could have willed otherwise. If God were a 
necessarily acting cause, then the event of Smith’s killing Jones would also be 
necessary, but since God is a freely acting cause and would have willed to create 
a different world than the one he in fact created, then the effects of his creative 
will are also contingent. Thus, for Scotus, God knows future contingents because 
they are the effects of his own free, contingently willed creative choices. 
 All this, of course, sounds crassly deterministic and, as Eef Dekker has 
argued, does not adequately represent Scotus’s actual views, which are far more 
nuanced (Dekker, 1998). I shall discuss those nuances shortly, but for now, let us 
note that we have in the foregoing an answer to the source question, even if it is 
not actually Scotus’s answer (it is Scotistic in spirit, though, as it places primary 
134 
importance on the role of the divine will in accounting for God’s prescience). The 
source of God’s knowledge of the contingent future is (a) his natural knowledge 
by which he knows which states of affairs are possible, and (b) his so-called free 
knowledge of his own will, i.e., his being aware of his own choices as to which 
contingent states of affairs he, as First Cause, will bring about either directly (as 
sole cause) or by moving secondary causes (including human agents) toward 
producing this or that effect. 
 Before I begin to criticize this view, I want to get a little clearer picture of the 
causal efficacy of God’s will and how that gives rise to foreknowledge. So, for 
example, God knew that (let us say) the Red Sea would be parted because he 
knew that he, as sole cause, was going to bring that event about. In this case, God 
willed to bring about a state of affairs directly, and knowing that he has so willed, 
he knows that the state of affairs will come about. On the other hand, he knew 
that, e.g., galaxies would evolve because he created the various substances of 
such-and-such natural kinds and situated them in the appropriate initial 
conditions that would, given God’s will to sustain them in existence, eventuate in 
the formation of galaxies. In this case, God willed to bring about a contingent 
state of affairs, and thereby knew that it would obtain, by initiating a sequence of 
secondary causes that operate according to necessities of nature. 
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 But what about states of affairs involving the free decisions of rational 
beings? In what way might God’s will be causally efficacious in bringing about a 
state of affairs such as Smith’s deciding to kill Jones? Most thinkers, certainly those 
in the medieval and late-medieval debate, were agreed in thinking that human 
volitions could not be considered free if they were the effects of secondary 
causes. Smith’s volition cannot be the terminus ad quem of a causal chain 
involving natural kind substances and thus come about by a necessity of nature. 
In this regard, medieval thinkers cannot be classified as ‚compatibilists‛ in the 
modern sense. No such thinker would hold that a volition can be determined by 
natural causes and still be free (Freddoso, 1988, p. 24). So God’s will to bring 
about Smith’s volition to kill Jones, which would give rise to his knowledge that 
Smith will kill Jones, cannot be akin to his causal influence upon secondary 
causes that bring about effects by natural necessity. 
 Can God’s will concerning Smith’s volition be construed as primary cause of 
that volition? I think ultimately this is what Scotus ends up having to say, 
although he tries desperately to avoid saying it, and for good reason. Smith’s 
volition cannot, by almost any stretch of the imagination, be considered free if 
God is the ultimate cause of its coming to be. Certainly, no libertarian could 
countenance such a view. But it will be instructive to take a look at how Scotus 
himself sees the role of God’s will in regard to free volitions. 
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 Pace occasionalism, Scotus (along with most other medieval thinkers) thinks 
that the human will (or human agent) must be seen as making a genuine causal 
contribution to its own volitions, and therefore construes the role of God’s 
influence as one of co-causality with the human will in bringing about a 
particular volition. Eef Dekker tells us that 
Scotus distinguishes between three types of co-causality. The first is 
accidentally ordered, like two mules pulling a cart. That is to say, 
although neither mule is sufficient on its own to pull the cart, it is 
conceivable that an intensification of the power already present in the one 
mule would enable it to pull the whole load by itself. So it is about 
accidental differences of quantity. 
  The second type of co-causality is essentially ordered and 
participative, like a first cause moving a second cause without the second 
cause being able to move itself.  As, for example, the hand moves the stick 
to move the ball. The stick cannot move unless it is moved by the hand. 
  The third kind of ordering is the essentially ordered ‘autonomous’ 
causation. A well-known example is the causality of a husband and wife 
in bringing forth offspring. The difference between accidental and 
essential autonomous co-causation is brought clearly to the fore by the fact 
that a man (or a woman) will not be able by some kind of intensification, 
to bring forth offspring by him- or herself. Both are needed to bring about 
the effect. It is also clear that an autonomous co-cause is not a participative 
co-cause, for the man does not cause the causality of his wife in begetting 
offspring (Dekker, 1998, pp. 105-06). 
 
It seems clear that the relationship of co-causality involved in a particular human 
volition cannot be of the first kind, viz. accidentally ordered. Both God’s and the 
human will’s co-causal contribution are essential, first, because God cannot 
possibly produce a human volition by himself, and second, because a human will 
cannot do anything apart from God’s conservation. 
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 Nor, it should be pointed out, is God’s causal influence sufficiently accounted 
for just in terms of his conserving the human will in existence, so that the will is 
itself the sole and adequate cause of its volition. If the volition were to occur 
without God’s particular causal contribution, then God could not know that it 
would occur, for again, God knows that a state of affairs will obtain if and only if 
he wills it to obtain. Scotus himself argues as much: 
God does not foreknow that this will happen unless he knows the 
determination of his will, as has been said.< But if the created will were 
the complete cause of its volition and of contingent human acts, to 
whichever extent God knew the determination of his [own] will, he would 
not know that this would happen (Dekker, 1998, p. 106). 
 
But given this view of things, I think Scotus must conclude that the relationship 
of essentially ordered co-causality between the human will and the divine will in 
producing a particular human volition is of the second, participative kind, that of 
instrumental cause to first cause. In other words, God must be seen as causing 
the very act of causality by which the human will produces its volition.   
 The problem with this solution is that it renders impossible the libertarian 
view of human freedom the preservation of which has been a desideratum 
throughout this essay. Recall that according to that view, an action is free only if 
the agent could have done otherwise given the same causal history of the world up to 
the time of the action. Supposing that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow, he will do 
so freely only if his not doing so does not entail that some past causal event would 
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not have occurred; in other words, only if his not doing so does not require the 
past causal history of the world to have been different from what it actually was. 
 Scotus, however, is not without a reply to this objection. He could insist that 
it’s not the case that the past causal history of the world would have been 
different from what it actually was if Smith were to refrain from killing Jones, for 
God’s causality is not in the past relative to Smith’s volition but is simultaneous 
with it. The standard example used to illustrate essentially ordered causality—
that of a person moving her arm to move a stick to move a ball—shows this to be 
the case. The causality exercised by the person on her arm is simultaneous with 
her arm’s causing the stick to move, which in turn is simultaneous with the 
stick’s causing the ball to move. Likewise, the causality exercised by God on the 
individual will is simultaneous with the will’s eliciting a particular volition, 
which in turn brings about a particular commanded act. Therefore there is no 
question of Smith’s having counterfactual power over some past causal state of 
affairs, in which case it might seem that Smith maintains libertarian freedom 
despite the fact that there is a causally sufficient condition for that volition, 
namely God’s will, for the latter is a contemporaneous condition, not an antecedent 
one. 
 Nevertheless, despite getting around the issue of the fixity of the causal past, I 
think libertarians would still see Smith’s freedom as being compromised if his 
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volitions had causally sufficient conditions other than Smith himself, regardless 
of the fact that those conditions obtain at the time of his volition rather than prior 
to it. Molina, to be sure, rejected such a view. As Freddoso points out, 
Libertarians often assume that the indeterminism of free actions can be 
epitomized by the simple requirement that a free action be one that is not 
naturally determined by the causal history of the world, that is, one that is 
not naturally necessitated by causes operative at times before it takes 
place.< This condition is one that modern libertarians accept and that 
modern compatibilists repudiate. Nonetheless, it is too weak to capture 
the causal indeterminism that Molina attributes to free action.< Clearly, 
we need an additional clause that focuses on the activity of causes other 
than the agent in question at the very moment when the free action takes 
place. Consider this: 
 
At t P freely contributes causally to S only if (i) at t P contributes 
causally to S and (ii) P’s contributing causally to S does not obtain at t 
by a necessity of nature and (iii) the total causal activity at t of causes 
other than P is compossible with P’s not causally contributing at t to S 
(Freddoso, 1988, pp. 26-27). 
 
Therefore, we need to amend our originally stated necessary condition for 
libertarian freedom from the first chapter, (LF), to read as follows: 
   (LF*) An agent S freely does A at t in w only if (i) S does A at t in w, and 
(ii) for some world w*, w* shares the same causal history as w up to 
t, and (iii) the causal activity of everything other than S at t in w* is 
the same as the causal activity of everything other than S at t in w, 
and (iv) S refrains from doing A at t in w*. 
 
Given clause (iii), it is impossible for Smith’s volition to be free if it is the 
terminus of a series of essentially ordered causes with God’s willing activity 
being the first cause within that series.  
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 So the dilemma facing the classical theist regarding the source of God’s 
knowledge of the contingent future looks like this: if p is a true future contingent 
proposition, then God knows that p is true either by means of his natural 
knowledge or by means of his free knowledge. If it is by means of his natural 
knowledge, then p is not contingent after all but metaphysically necessary, for 
God’s natural knowledge is of all necessary truths, as was said above. But if, on 
the other hand, God knows p by means of his free knowledge, then again p, 
although metaphysically contingent (there are possible worlds in which p is 
false), turns out to be causally necessary (there are no possible worlds with the 
same causal history as the actual world in which p is false), because its truth 
results from God’s own causal contribution to the created order. God would 
know that p is true because he wills that p is true and causally contributes to p’s 
being true. Duns Scotus seems to ‚bite the bullet‛ and grasp the second horn of 
the dilemma. God knows that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow because he wills 
that Smith do so. Langston expresses the obvious difficulty with this approach as 
follows: 
According to Scotus, not only must God directly will the existence of the 
actions of agents who are not free, but he must also directly will the 
actions of free agents < God determines what acts of free agents are 
actual, and these actions are contingent because God could will other 
actions than those he in fact wills. Nevertheless, these actions would not 
seem to be free since no free agent can act otherwise than as God wills. 
Apparently, Scotus’ analysis of omniscience rescues contingency, but it  
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does so at the expense of the freedom of free agents—particularly human 
beings (Langston, 1986, p. 24). 
 
Langston goes on to argue that Scotus (contrary to the standard view) is  
ultimately a compatibilist when it comes to human freedom and so he isn’t being 
inconsistent in holding that God knows the future free actions of humans by 
causally bringing them about (Langston, 1986, pp. 39f.). Be that as it may, those 
classical theists who adhere to a libertarian view of human freedom clearly 
cannot embrace Scotus’s theory of divine knowledge. But then the problem 
becomes acute: how can God know the causally contingent future if he can know 
it only by means of knowing what he himself causally brings about? 
 
4.3. The Theory of Middle Knowledge 
 Since its ‚rediscovery‛ by Alvin Plantinga in his work The Nature of Necessity 
(before that it was hardly known outside of Catholic seminary lectures), Luis 
Molina’s theory of scientia media or ‚middle knowledge‛ has been one of the 
most discussed theories of divine knowledge in the contemporary literature. 
Molina’s insight was to suggest that God has more ‚epistemic resources‛ at his 
disposal than just his natural knowledge of metaphysically necessary truths and 
his free knowledge of metaphysically contingent truths resulting from his 
knowledge of his own causal contribution to the created order. God also has 
what Molina calls ‚middle knowledge‛, so-called because it is ‚midway‛ 
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between God’s natural and free knowledge, insofar as (a) like free knowledge it 
has as its objects metaphysically contingent truths, but (b) like natural 
knowledge it does not result from God’s awareness of what he himself wills to 
bring about in creation. The objects of God’s middle knowledge are true 
independently of God’s will, or ‚prevolitionally.‛ As Molina puts it, 
[S]uch knowledge should in no way be called free, both because it is prior 
to any free act of God’s will and also because it was not within God’s 
power to know through this type of knowledge anything other than what 
He in fact knew. Second, it should likewise not be said that this 
knowledge is natural in the sense of being so innate to God that he could 
not have known the opposite of that which He knows through it (Molina, 
1988, p. 168). 
 
So we can define middle knowledge as follows. Let us say that God middle knows 
that p iff (i) p is contingently true and (ii) God could not have brought it about 
that p is false. 
 Molina’s theory gets its ‚bite‛ from the sorts of propositions that fall within 
the scope of God’s middle knowledge, among which are propositions that 
specify, for every possible person and each possible circumstance in which that 
person may be situated, how that person would act were he or she placed in that 
circumstance. 
Finally, the third type [of knowledge in God] is middle knowledge, by 
which, in virtue of the most profound and inscrutable comprehension of 
each faculty of free choice, He saw in His own essence what each such 
faculty would do with its innate freedom were it to be place in this or that 
or, indeed, in infinitely many orders of things—even though it would 
really be able, if it so willed, to do the opposite (Molina, 1988, p. 168). 
143 
In terms of the ontology of individual creaturely essences, if E is the essence of a 
creature endowed with free will, then middle knowledge allows God to know, 
for every possible circumstance C in which the unique instance x of E might find 
itself, what x would do were x to find itself in C, even though x could, if it so 
willed, do something else in that very same circumstance. Hence, God knows via 
middle knowledge what x would freely do were x in C. 
 In the current literature such items of God’s middle knowledge are usually 
referred to as ‚counterfactuals of freedom,‛ in spite of the fact that, while 
subjunctive in form and expressing what an agent would freely do in a given 
circumstance, they are not necessarily contrary to fact. For example, according to 
Molina, God knew by means of middle knowledge that Adam would freely eat 
of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil if he were tempted to do so, 
which (so the story goes) he in fact was. Nevertheless, despite the slightly 
misleading (and somewhat clunky) nature of the expression, I will follow the 
current practice of referring to these objects of God’s middle knowledge as 
‚counterfactuals of freedom‛ (hereafter: CFs). 
 God’s foreknowledge, therefore, ends up being a function of his prevolitional 
middle knowledge of the CFs and his postvolitional free knowledge of his own 
causal contribution to the created order. For example, in the case of Smith, God 
knows by means of middle knowledge that if Smith were to end up in the 
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circumstances described, then Smith would freely kill Jones. It could have been 
the case that he would not kill Jones were he in those same circumstances, but as 
a matter of contingent fact, Smith would indeed do so. God knows this fact about 
Smith prior to and independently of any act of God’s creative will. In other 
words, even if God chose not to create at all, it would still have been true of 
Smith (or, equivalently, of the unique instance of Smithity) that he would have 
killed Jones had he ended up in the relevant circumstances. 
 Furthermore, God also knows what he himself wills to causally bring about in 
the created order. To simplify, let’s assume that God’s act of creative will 
involves his causally bringing it about that Smith will be in the circumstances 
described at the outset. Therefore, God knows that this will be the case because it 
is a result of his own freely willed causal contribution to the created world. In 
other words, God knows that Smith will be in such-and-such circumstances 
because God himself causes him to be in those circumstances. 
 As a result, God knows what Smith will in fact do in the circumstances in 
which he will find himself: for given that Smith would kill Jones were he in such-
and-such circumstances (while having the ability to refrain from doing so in 
those same circumstances), and given that Smith will be in such-and-such 
circumstances, it follows that Smith will, as a matter of contingent fact, kill Jones. 
The crucial feature of this theory is that God’s knowledge that Smith will kill 
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Jones is not a result of God’s causally bringing about that state of affairs; rather 
such knowledge is a by-product of God’s free knowledge that Smith will be in 
such-and-such circumstances (which is a result of God’s causal activity) along 
with his middle knowledge of what Smith would do were he in those 
circumstances. Consequently, Molina need not, unlike Scotus, posit a causal link 
between God’s will and human action in order to explain God’s foreknowledge 
of that action. Freddoso nicely summarizes Molina’s theory as follows: 
On Molina’s view, then, the source of God’s foreknowledge of absolute 
future contingents is threefold: (i) His prevolitional natural knowledge of 
metaphysically necessary states of affairs, (ii) His prevolitional middle 
knowledge of conditional future contingents, and (iii) His free knowledge 
of the total causal contribution He himself wills to make to the created 
world. By (i) He knows which spatio-temporal arrangements of secondary 
causes are possible and which contingent effects might emanate from any 
such arrangement. By (ii) He knows which contingent effects would in fact 
emanate from any possible spatio-temporal arrangement of secondary 
causes. By (iii) He knows which secondary causes He wills to create and 
conserve and how he wills to cooperate with them via His intrinsically 
neutral general concurrence. So given His natural knowledge, His middle 
knowledge, and His free knowledge of His own causal contribution to the 
created world, He has free knowledge of all absolute future contingents 
(Freddoso, 1988, pp. 23-24) . 
 
‘Conditional future contingents’ is Freddoso’s expression referring to CFs. 
 As a result, the concerns expressed both at the end of the last chapter and in 
the last section are overcome on Molina’s theory. It’s not the case that if Smith 
were to refrain from killing Jones, then some causal state of affairs involving a 
cause other than Smith himself that obtained either prior to or simultaneous with 
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his doing so would not have obtained, which is to say that Smith is able to act in 
a causally indeterministic way, or with libertarian freedom, in such 
circumstances. Should Smith decide to refrain from killing Jones, the causal 
history of the world up to the time of his doing so can be identical to the causal 
history of the world up to the time of his actually killing Jones, for each such 
history includes merely God’s bringing it about that Smith is in the relevant 
circumstances. God’s knowledge of what Smith will actually do is not part of 
that causal history and therefore is not part of the ‚hard‛, causally closed past. It 
is instead ‚counterfactually sensitive‛ to what Smith decides to do. In other 
words, Smith can do something such that were he to do it, then God would not 
have known what he in fact knew, even though Smith cannot do something such 
that were he to do it, then he would not have been in the circumstances in which, 
in fact, he was. But the latter is hardly a limitation on Smith’s freedom to act in 
one way or another in the circumstances in which he finds himself. 
 We should also keep in mind (contrary to my illustration) that God’s causal 
contribution need not consist of his causing a particular agent to find itself in a 
particular circumstance. That is, we need not think that God causes Smith to be 
in the circumstance involving his choice of whether or not to kill Jones. Rather, 
the circumstances in which free agents end up could themselves be the result 
either of their own free decisions and actions or the free decisions and actions of 
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other agents, who themselves were acting in circumstances brought about by the 
free decisions and actions of still other agents, and so on. Therefore, God’s own 
causal contribution to the created order could, on Molina’s theory, merely consist 
of his creating what Linda Zagzebski calls a ‚world-germ‛ (Zagzebski, 1991, p. 
129) or a set of initial conditions in which the initial stock of secondary causes act 
so as to bring about further circumstances in which to act yet again, and so on. If 
those secondary causes are deterministic (such as inanimate substances or non-
rational animals), acting out of a necessity of nature, then God knows how they 
would act in those initial conditions simply by means of his natural knowledge. 
But if they are indeterministic secondary causes (such as free human beings or 
even, as Freddoso suggests (1988, p. 29), indeterministic non-rational causal 
agents such as sub-atomic particles and the like), then God knows how these 
would act in the initial conditions by means of his middle knowledge, since as 
indeterministic agents2 they can do otherwise than what they actually do in the 
very same circumstances. 
 Upon willing to create those initial conditions, God would then know how 
these secondary causes will act, and therefore in what circumstances they will 
subsequently find themselves as a result of their actions, and again, since by 
means of his middle knowledge God knows how they would act in those 
subsequent circumstances, he knows how they will in fact act given that they will 
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in fact be in those circumstances, and so on for the entire history of the created 
world. So Molina’s theory results in an exceptionally powerful and 
comprehensive doctrine of divine providence yet with God’s own causal activity 
(miracles aside) consisting entirely of the acts of creation and conservation. 
 However, I would follow Freddoso in emphasizing that CFs need not be the 
only objects of God’s middle knowledge. It is very often assumed in the literature 
that middle knowledge just is the theory that God knows CFs, but this is 
mistaken. As I mentioned above, the necessary and sufficient conditions for p to 
be an object of middle knowledge are that p be contingent and that p is true 
prevolitionally or independently of God’s creative will. Again, as Freddoso 
suggests (1988, p. 29), a plausible candidate for such a proposition could be one 
that describes, e.g., the indeterministic behavior of a sub-atomic particle. So 
although we might have only probabalistic knowledge that a given particle will 
decay under certain laboratory conditions, a Molinist might hold that God knows 
by means of middle knowledge that the same particle would decay under such 
conditions (independently of God’s willing or not willing that such be the case), 
although its doing so is contingent and it might have been that it would not 
decay under such conditions. While this point is not of direct concern to the issue 
of reconciling God’s foreknowledge with human freedom, it is nonetheless of 
great importance vis-à-vis the doctrine of providence in a world of 
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indeterministic physical laws. Thus, as Lynne R. Baker has pointed out (personal 
communication, October 15, 2008), even a compatibilist who might be inclined to 
reject Molinism on the assumption that it is designed to reconcile libertarian 
freedom with divine providence, may nevertheless have an interest in embracing 
the theory insofar as it would, if successful, reconcile such providence with the 
indeterministic behavior of matter at the sub-atomic level. That is to say, one 
need not be a libertarian to be a Molinist, although I do think that one needs to be 
a Molinist if one is to be a libertarian and a classical theist. 
 Furthermore, it is not only those in the Molinist camp who hold that God 
knows CFs. Again as Freddoso (1988, p. 23) makes clear, the 16th century 
Dominican theologians Bañez and Alvarez, the most well-known adversaries of 
middle knowledge, also held that God knows, for every possible free creature, 
what that creature would freely do in any possible circumstance in which it 
might find itself. What distinguishes the Jesuit Molinists from the Dominican 
anti-Molinists is that the former hold that the CFs are true independently of God’s 
will, while the latter hold that they obtain as a result of God’s willing them to 
obtain. As far as I can tell, this is identical to the view of Duns Scotus previously 
outlined. Thus, Linda Zagzebski is mistaken in saying that ‘both Molinists and 
Bañezians accepted the fact of middle knowledge’ (Zagzebski, 1991, p. 127). 
Since, for Bañez, the CFs obtain by virtue of God’s decreeing that they do so, they 
150 
would be instead objects of God’s postvolitional free knowledge, not of his 
prevolitional middle knowledge. For Bañez, there is no such thing as the latter; 
all contingent truths depend on God’s decree. 
 In this regard, Freddoso introduces the concept of a ‚creation situation‛ 
(Freddoso, 1988, pp. 47f.), which is the set of propositions that are true prior to 
and independently of God’s creative act of will (i.e, in the first Scotistic ‚instant 
of nature‛). Formally, for each world w, there is a creation situation CS(w), the set 
whose members include all and only those states of affairs that God knows 
prevolitionally in w. Thus, a creation situation defines a set of possible worlds 
(what is often called a ‚galaxy‛ of worlds), viz. those worlds that are consistent 
with every state of affairs p that God knows prevolitionally. 
 For Bañez and Alvarez, there is exactly one creation situation in which God 
could find himself, call it ‘N,’ which is the set of all metaphysically necessary 
states of affairs. Thus, God does not find himself in any particular ‚galaxy‛ of 
worlds but he instead has access to the entire universe of (broadly) logical space 
itself, for all such worlds are consistent with the set of metaphysically necessary 
states of affairs. Thus, for any world w, God knows whatever is contingently true 
in w postvolitionally. There are no contingent truths that fall outside of God’s 
control. Which is to say that, for Bañez (as for Scotus), God has it within his 
power to bring about any metaphysically possible world whatsoever. 
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 For Molina, on the other hand, there are many distinct creation situations in 
which God may find himself. Since God has middle knowledge, for any possible 
world w, CS(w) includes N, to be sure, but it also includes the set of CFs that are 
true in w. Since CFs are contingently true, then which creation situation God in 
fact finds himself in depends on which CFs are in fact true. In other words, the 
galaxy of worlds to which God has access includes all and only those worlds that 
are consistent with the union of N and the set of true CFs. 
 Thus, for example, since it was true from all eternity that Adam would sin if 
he were tempted in the garden, then, even though it was possible for him not to 
sin in those circumstances (since he was free)—i.e., even though there are 
possible worlds in which it’s false that Adam would sin if he were tempted in the 
garden—God could not bring about such a world. God could have created a 
world in which Adam didn’t exist, or a world in which Adam was never tempted 
in the garden, or even a world in which Adam is tempted in the garden and is 
preserved from sinning by a special act of divine grace, but God could not have 
created a world in which Adam is tempted in the garden and yet freely refrains 
from sinning, given that the CF ‘If Adam were tempted in the garden, he would 
freely sin’ was in fact true. That CF was part of God’s creation situation, and so 
no world in which it is false was within the galaxy of worlds that God could have 
brought about. 
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 To recapitulate, God’s having always known (or having known from eternity) 
that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow comes about as a result of his middle 
knowledge of what Smith would do were he in such-and-such circumstances and 
his free knowledge that Smith will in fact be in those circumstances. 
   (1)  If Smith were in circumstance C, he would freely kill Jones. 
   (2)  Smith will be in circumstance C. 
       
   (3)  Smith will freely kill Jones. 
Even though Smith finds himself in C as a result, ultimately, of God’s willing that 
he be in C (but keep in mind what was said above about C itself possibly being 
the result of Smith’s or some other agent’s free actions), with the result that (2) is 
not something that Smith can do anything about—there are no worlds accessible 
to Smith in which he does not end up in C—nevertheless (1) is, on Molina’s 
theory, contingently true. Consequently, there is no basis on which to infer that 
Smith’s action is in any way necessitated or determined. He can freely refrain 
from killing Jones, and if he were to do so, then it would have been false that 
were he in C, then he would have killed Jones; the opposite would have been 
true instead.  
 Again, God knows (1) by means of middle knowledge and as such it is simply 
given to God as a parameter delimiting the class of possible worlds that he can 
see to being actual. Given that (1) is true, there is nothing God can do such that, 
were he to do it, then Smith would not freely kill Jones were Smith to find 
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himself in C (even though there’s something Smith can do in that regard, namely 
freely refrain from killing Jones in C). Of course, given God’s essential goodness 
he wants Smith to refrain from killing Jones, and indeed given his omnipotence  
can compel Smith to refrain from killing Jones in C, but he cannot compel Smith to 
freely refrain from killing Jones, since that implies a contradiction. 
 Yet again, God knows (2) by means of free knowledge, that is, by knowing 
that he himself will causally bring it about that Smith is in C (or will causally 
bring about the initial conditions which, given what else God knows through his 
natural and middle knowledge, will eventuate in Smith’s being in C). As a result, 
God knows (3), with infallible certitude, not because he brings it about causally 
(as on Scotus’s view) but because he causally brings about the circumstances in 
which Smith kills Jones (and thereby counterfactually brings about the truth that 
he was going to kill Jones), with God knowing that Smith would indeed do just 
that were he in those circumstances. 
 
4.4. The Reconciliation Question Revisited 
 Having outlined Molina’s answer to the source question, it is worthwhile to 
take a look at his answer to the reconciliation question, if only to dispel what I 
think are some confusions on the matter, confusions into which Molina himself 
seems to have fallen.  
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 So how exactly does middle knowledge bear on the reconciliation question? 
In terms of our discussion thus far, how does middle knowledge serve to 
undermine ATD? The manner in which I have presented the theory is as a way of 
severing the causal connection between God’s knowing that p and p’s being true 
in order to allow that God’s past beliefs might not belong to the ‚hard‛ causally 
closed past, thus paving the way for an Ockhamistic solution to the reconciliation 
question. Stripped down to its bare bones, ATD looks like this: 
     (If God knew that p, then p) 
    t God knew that p 
     
    t p 
 
The Ockhamistic solution advanced in the previous chapter denies the second 
premise: God’s foreknowledge that p, although a logically sufficient condition for 
p, is not a causally sufficient condition for p, and so were the agent referred to in p 
to bring it about at t* > t that ~p (as she can if she is free), then it would not have 
been the case that God knew (at t) that p. Again, my argument is that Molina’s 
theory of middle knowledge is what makes such a move possible. By severing 
the causal connection between p and God’s knowing that p, Molina makes it 
possible to say that God’s knowledge is not part of the hard (i.e., counterfactually 
inviolate) past relative to the time at which p obtains, so that the agent need not 
be seen as having the sort of counterfactual power that is illegitimate from the 
libertarian point of view. 
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 Molina himself, however, insists that this very move is illicit, insisting that 
God’s foreknowledge is indeed part of the causally closed past and hence ‚fixed‛ 
for all future times. Consequently, Molina thinks, the Ockhamistic solution 
involves the kind of power over the past that is intuitively understood to be 
impossible. He says,  
We must now examine the thesis by means of which a good many 
thinkers reconcile our freedom of choice with divine foreknowledge and 
predestination, and by virtue of which they think that these things cohere 
well with one another. For they maintain that if, for instance, Peter, who, 
let us assume, is going to sin at some future time, did not sin at that time 
(which he is capable of because of his freedom), then God would bring it 
about [emphasis mine] that He had never known that Peter was going to 
sin, but that instead He had always known from eternity that Peter was 
not going to sin.< Thus, they maintain that the proposition ‘Peter’s sin, 
which is foreknown by God, is able not to occur’ is true in the divided 
sense, not only because (i) if Peter were in fact not going to sin, as is 
entirely possible, then God would never have foreknown his sin, but also 
because (ii) if he does not sin, as is possible, God will at that moment bring 
it about that from eternity He foreknew nothing other than that Peter was 
not going to sin (Molina, 1988, p. 145). 
 
Molina thus ascribes to the Ockhamist the belief not only in counterfactual power 
over the past but also causal power over the past, at least in regard to divine 
power. God is supposed to have the power to bring it about at the time of Peter’s 
act that he always knew beforehand what Peter’s act was going to be. 
 Molina’s own response to ATD is to deny the logical principle according to 
which the inference is drawn, viz. the so-called ‚Transfer Principle‛ (If  (   ) 
and t , then t ). Molina argues as follows: 
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For in such a case, even if (i) the conditional is necessary (because in the 
composed sense these two things cannot both obtain, namely, that God 
foreknows something to be future and that the thing does not turn out 
that way), and even if (ii) the antecedent is necessary in the sense in 
question (because it is past-tense and because no shadow of alteration can 
befall God), nonetheless the consequent can be purely contingent (Molina, 
1988, p. 189). 
 
Now, as I said in the first chapter when outlining ATD, if we interpret ‘t’ as I 
have, viz. as ‘true in all possible worlds accessible as of t’, then (assuming the 
primitive notion of ‚accessibility‛ that I’ve invoked is a coherent one) there is 
just no denying the Transfer Principle. One might as well deny modus ponens. As 
Edward Wierenga notes (1991, pp. 428-29), if ‘t’ is a ‚well-behaved‛ modal 
operator, then it will yield a valid thesis according to Kripke’s ‚K‛ axiom 
schema, as does any other modal operator. It will, in other words, be closed 
under entailment. 
 Of course, Molina wouldn’t have had in mind any such notion as ‘true in all 
accessible worlds.’ He instead worked with the notion of ‘accidental necessity’, 
which, Freddoso tells us, is that modality which ‘has to do < with the mere 
passage of time. For some metaphysically contingent states of affairs become 
necessary simply by virtue of being fixed unalterably as part of the history of the 
world’ (Freddoso, 1988, p. 13). So, given that God’s knowing (or infallibly 
believing) that p will obtain at t is past relative to t, Molina insists that it must be 
construed as accidentally necessary relative to t. Now, if ‘p’ concerns an agent’s 
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free action or decision, then ‘p’ cannot be accidentally necessary, and since God’s 
infallibly believing that p will obtain at t entails that p will obtain at t, it follows 
(argues Molina) that accidental necessity must not be closed under entailment.  
 It turns out, I think, that the dispute between Molinists and Ockhamists on 
this issue is merely a verbal one without any real substantive disagreement. 
Freddoso says, 
In opposition to the Ockhamists, Molina holds that God’s past beliefs are 
just as necessary in the sense in question [i.e., accidentally necessary] as 
are any other truths about the past. And, of course, there is no possible 
world in which God once believed that Peter would sin at T and in which 
Peter does not in fact sin at T. Yet if this alleged condition on freedom is 
meant to capture the sense in which free action is indeterministic, then 
Molina himself has what seems to be a wholly adequate alternative 
condition. For he can distinguish what is accidentally necessary at a given 
time from what belongs, strictly speaking, to the causal history of the 
world at that time, where the world’s causal history includes only past 
exercises of causal power (Freddoso, 1988, pp. 58-59). 
 
In a key footnote to that passage, Freddoso goes on to say, 
The notion of the causal history of the world may well be equivalent to the 
conjunction of what Ockhamists are wont to call ‘hard’ facts about the 
past. In this sense, Molina is not rejecting the claim that there is some 
distinction to be drawn between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ facts about the past. 
What he rejects is instead the claim that agents can have causal power 
over the soft facts about the past (Freddoso, 1988, p. 59, n. 79). 
 
The difference, therefore, between Ockhamists and Molinists is supposed to be 
that Ockhamists think we have causal power over (at least some) soft facts about 
the pasts, while Molinists admit no such causal power but only counterfactual  
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power. But this is emphatically not the case. Ockhamists do not subscribe to any 
kind of causal power either over the hard past or over the soft past. 
 This is easily seen in how Ockhamists deal with Diodorus Cronus’s ‚Master 
Argument‛ for Logical Determinism, discussed in the previous chapter. Suppose 
I finish this dissertation in August of 2009. Suppose further that in August of 
2007 you said to me, ‘You’ll finish your dissertation in two years.’ Thus, your 
prediction was correct, and so we have a fact about the past: you correctly 
predicted in August 2007 that I would finish my dissertation in two years. Does 
that mean that I’m not free not to finish my dissertation this coming August? Of 
course not. I could easily decide to put it off for another month. If I were to do so, 
then your prediction would have been incorrect, but I wouldn’t thereby have 
caused your prediction to have been incorrect. The correctness of your prediction 
is a logical consequence of my finishing in August 2009, but it is surely not a 
causal consequence of my doing so. Causes, whatever else they may be, must 
precede (or at most be simultaneous with) their effects in time. Therefore, there’s 
nothing I can do in August 2009 that would cause anything to have been true 
prior to 2009, even though if I were to refrain from finishing my dissertation in 
August 2009, then your prediction that I would finish in August 2009 would 
have been false. The correctness of your prediction is counterfactually dependent 
on my finishing, not causally dependent. 
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 In this respect, the Ockhamist and the Molinist are in agreement: if by 
‘accidentally necessary’ Molina means something like the following: 
p is accidentally necessary as of t =df. p is metaphysically contingent and 
no one can, as of t, causally bring it about that ~p, 
 
then the Ockhamist would have no difficulty is saying that such accidental 
necessity is not closed under entailment. For the following entailment is certainty 
true: your having correctly predicted in August 2007 that I will finish my 
dissertation in August 2009 entails that I finish my dissertation in August 2009. 
And as I just argued, neither I nor anyone else can, as of August 2007 or anytime 
thereafter, causally bring it about that you didn’t correctly predict in August 2007 
that I will finish my dissertation in August 2009. But it does not follow that no 
one can, as of August 2007 or anytime thereafter, causally bring it about that I do 
not finish my dissertation in August 2009. I certainly can. 
 What the Ockhamist would insist is that ‚hard-facthood‛ is closed under 
entailment. Recall that a hard fact is one over which there is no counterfactual 
power. If I have no counterfactual power over p, and p entails q, then I have no 
counterfactual power over q (and since counterfactual power is weaker than 
causal power, it follows a fortiori that I have no causal power over q). But Molina 
insists that we do have counterfactual power over God’s past beliefs, as clause (i) 
from the passage quoted earlier makes clear, and on this point too the Ockhamist 
concurs. Thus, I see no real disagreement between Molinists and Ockhamists on 
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this crucial point of the reconciliation question. Both would agree that God’s past 
beliefs are ‚accidentally necessary‛ when that notion is understood in Molina’s sense 
(a sense which, I think, is different from how the Ockhamist would understand 
it), and both would agree that God’s past beliefs are ‚soft‛ facts about the past 
over which free agents do indeed have counterfactual power. 
 Consequently, I do not see Ockhamism and Molinism as competing theories, 
as they are generally presented among discussants in the foreknowledge debate. 
To the contrary, I see them as complementary, insofar as Molinism, as an answer to 
the source question, is what allows for a viable Ockhamistic answer to the 
reconciliation question. 
 
4.5. Objections to Molinism 
 Numerous objections have been advanced against Molina’s theory, too many 
to be addressed in a single treatise. I will therefore discuss the three that I 
consider to be the strongest, these being (i) the argument based on David Lewis’s 
semantical analysis of counterfactual conditionals, (ii) the so-called ‚grounding 
objection,‛ and (iii) William Hasker’s argument that Molinism is incompatible 
with libertarian free will. I will try to show that none succeed in undercutting the 
theory of middle knowledge. 
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4.5.1. ‚Not True Soon Enough‛ 
 This objection arises from David Lewis’s possible worlds analysis of the 
truth-conditions of subjunctive conditionals (cf. Lewis, 1973). According to 
Lewis, the conditional If  were the case, then  would be the case is non-vacuously 
true in the actual world just in case either (i)  and  are true in the actual world, 
or (ii) if  is false in the actual world, then  is true in all the ‚closest‛ -worlds, 
i.e., those worlds that are most similar to the actual world and in which  is true.  
 The intuitive idea is that a counterfactual claim is true just in case it requires 
less of a departure from the way the world actually is for both the antecedent 
and consequent to be true than in does to have a true antecedent and false 
consequent. For example, the claim If this sugar cube were dropped in this cup of 
boiling water, then it would dissolve is true, even if the sugar cube isn’t dropped in 
the cup of boiling water. For it requires less of a change to the way things 
actually are to verify both antecedent and consequent—a mere change in the 
spatial location of the sugar cube—than it does to verify the antecedent and 
falsify the consequent; that would require both moving the sugar cube and 
changing the laws of nature. 
 This is supposed to raise a problem for Molinism because, on that theory, 
God is supposed to use his knowledge of certain counterfactual conditionals, viz. 
the CFs, in deciding which world will be the actual world, i.e., in deciding which 
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world to create. In other words, it is supposed to be the relations of comparative 
similarity among possible worlds relative to the actual world that determines 
which counterfactuals are true in the actual world, so that it must already 
determined which world is the actual world before it can be determined which 
counterfactuals are true in the actual world. But what determines which world is 
actual is God’s creative act of will, his decision to create this world rather than 
any other world. As a result, it would seem that CFs can play no role as pre-
volitional guides to God’s creative decision making; they can’t be evaluated as 
true or false in the actual world until there is an actual world against which to 
measure the comparative similarity among possible worlds, and there’s no actual 
world until God decides which world to create. Anthony Kenny states the 
objection forcefully as follows: 
Prior to God’s decision to actualize a particular world those 
counterfactuals cannot yet be known: for their truth-value depends ... on 
which world is the actual world. It is not simply that God’s knowledge of 
these counterfactuals cannot be based on a decision which has to be taken 
subsequent to knowledge of them.< The problem is that what makes the 
counterfactuals true is not yet there at any stage at which it is undecided 
which world is the actual world.< The difficulty is simply that if it is to be 
possible for God to know which world he is actualizing, then his middle 
knowledge must be logically prior to his decision to actualize; whereas, if 
middle knowledge is to have an object, the actualization must already 
have taken place. As long as it is undetermined which action an 
individual human being will take it is undetermined which possible world 
is the actual world—undetermined not just epistemologically but 
metaphysically (Kenny, 1979, pp. 68-71, as quoted in Kvanvig, 1986, pp. 
139-40).  
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 I think there are two responses to be offered to this argument. First of all, the 
‚picture‛ of God’s relation to logical space presented here is a most implausible 
one, indeed an impossible one. It is assumed that, prior to creation, God is 
somehow entirely outside of logical space surveying the array of possible worlds 
in order to select which one will be the actual world. The upshot being that there 
is no actual world until God decides which one from among the set of all possible 
worlds it will be. But this simply cannot be so. There is, indeed there must be, an 
actual world even prior to the moment of creation. Had God chosen not to create, 
then the actual world (construed as a set of propositions) would have consisted 
only of the set of metaphysically necessary propositions and (assuming Molinism 
is true) of the set of contingently true CFs and other prevolitionally-yet- 
contingently true propositions. Since he did create, the actual world consists 
further of all other contingently true propositions. The point being, however, that 
some world must have been actual even prior to God’s decision to create. Thus, 
creation is not so much the complete actualization of an entire world but of a 
further determination as to how the already existing actual world will unfold. 
Kvanvig (1986) makes the same point as follows: 
Kenny’s objection rests on a simple confusion. He claims that what an 
account like mine [viz. a Molinist account] must posit is that there are true 
subjunctives of freedom before the actualization of any world by God. The 
confusion is that it is simply not possible that there is no actual world; 
though it is possible that the actual world is one in which God has not 
(yet) created anything. But that is quite a different matter from there being 
164 
no world at all. Kenny wishes to claim that subjunctives in question lack a 
truth value until some world is actual. That can be granted; without an 
actual world, there would be no truths at all. All that shows, however, is 
that it is not possible that there fails to be an actual world, for it is simply 
not possible that there fails to be some true propositions (Kvanvig, 1986, p. 
140). 
 
 Second, and more fundamentally, the assumption that the Lewisian analysis 
of counterfactual conditionals is adequate for CFs seems to me highly dubious. 
As far as I can tell, Lewis’s motivation for developing his possible worlds 
analysis of counterfactuals was to offer, within a nominalistic metaphysics, truth-
conditions for the kinds of counterfactuals involved in the expression of laws of 
nature. Whereas Hume tried to analyze laws as supervening on the earlier-
than/later-than relations that hold among concrete events (or ‚local matters of 
particular fact‛), Lewis sees them as supervening on the similarity relations that 
hold among the concrete individuals that exist in logical space, i.e. possible 
worlds.  
 However powerful his analysis may be in that regard (and it has indeed 
proven extremely powerful), I see it as having nothing to offer in terms of the 
truth conditions of counterfactuals of freedom. For one thing, Lewis was himself a 
compatibilist and therefore would have seen no need to construct an analysis 
that could have accommodated the sort of indeterministic freedom to which 
libertarians subscribe. 
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 This is not to say, however, that Lewisian semantics cannot give truth-
conditions for counterfactual claims about indeterministic events. It just cannot 
give truth-conditions for indeterministic events that would happen. For if an 
event e happening in situation h is truly indeterministic, then there are some h-
worlds in which e happens and some equally close h-worlds in which e does not 
happen. As a result, it’s not the case that e happens in all the closest h-worlds, 
and so the counterfactual ‘If it were that h, then it would be that e’ comes out 
false. What is true is ‘If it were that h, then it might be that e.’ Thus, we see that for 
Lewis, ‘would’ imports a kind of necessity into the logic of counterfactuals: if it’s 
true that e would happen on h, then e happens in all the closest h-worlds, and so, 
effectively, e is what would have to happen on h. This stands to reason, as in 
standard modal logic, necessarily is treated as a kind of universal quantifier 
ranging over possible worlds. 
 But a counterfactual of freedom describes what an agent would do freely (i.e., 
indeterministically) in a given situation, not what she would have to do in that 
situation. Thus, if S does A freely in C, then there are some worlds, equally close 
to the real world with respect to C, in which S refrains from doing A. In other 
words, there are some C-worlds that are A-worlds (viz., the real world) and some 
equally close C-worlds that are not A-worlds. Nevertheless, the Molinist will insist 
that ‘If it were that C, then it would be that A’ was still true as a matter of 
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contingent fact. Thus, for the Molinist, it makes perfect sense to say that S would 
do A in C, even though S might not do A in C. For the Lewisian, on the other 
hand, this is a flat-out contradiction, since ‘would’ and ‘might’ are interdefined  
in much the same way as ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’ are interdefined in standard 
modal logic (Gaskin, 1993, p. 421). 
 Peter Van Inwagen (1997) thinks the foregoing considerations amount to a 
refutation of the theory of middle knowledge. His argument may be summarized 
as follows: 
(1)  If Lewisian semantics cannot accommodate CFs, then middle 
knowledge is impossible. 
   (2)  Lewisian semantics cannot accommodate CFs. 
       
   (3)  Middle knowledge is impossible. 
 
But there are two possible responses to this argument. The minor premise is 
supported by the considerations outlined above, but are they conclusive? 
 Plantinga (1974b) has given us reason to think not. It was said that ‘If it were 
that C, then it would be that A’ comes out false on Lewisian semantics because if 
A is done freely, then there must be an equally close ‘C & not-A’ world. But as 
Plantinga suggests, ‘one feature determining the similarity of worlds is whether 
they share their counterfactuals’ (Plantinga, 1974b, p. 178). For example, we can 
imagine a world w that has physical laws that are vastly different from those of 
the actual world and yet, perhaps due to constant divine intervention, is made to 
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be identical to the actual world with respect to all ‚local matters of particular 
fact.‛ Is w more or less similar to the actual world that another world w*, which 
has all the same physical laws as the actual world but different initial conditions, 
resulting in vastly different ‚local matters of particular fact‛? I’m inclined to say 
that w is less similar to the actual world than w*, in which case counterfactuals do 
count in the similarity metric, for physical laws are expressed in terms of 
counterfactuals. Thus, it’s possible that all the closest worlds are worlds in which 
S freely does A in C, not because S would have to do A in C but because all such 
worlds share the actually true CF, ‘If S were in C, S would freely do A’. 
 Whether Plantinga’s response is plausible or not as an attempt to ‚fit‛ CFs 
within the framework of Lewisian semantics is open to debate. The usual charge 
is that it is somehow a ‚circular‛ move (Wyma, 2001, p. 6), insofar as he wants to 
maintain the valuation of counterfactuals in terms of comparative similarity 
among worlds while also holding that comparative similarity must be measured 
in terms of the truth of shared counterfactuals. What I think has been overlooked 
is that Plantinga’s argument actually reveals a systematic commitment to 
Humeanism built into Lewisian semantics, insofar as physical laws (which, 
again, are expressed as counterfactuals) are understood not to be fundamental 
features of the actual world and its constituents but to supervene on the more 
fundamental ‚matters of particular fact‛ concerning the constituents of logical 
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space. Why is it a physical law that sugar dissolves in water? Not because of any 
necessary connection between the essential nature of sugar and the essential 
nature of water, but merely because all the closest ‚sugar-in-water‛ worlds are 
also ‚dissolved sugar‛ worlds (just as, for Hume, it’s a law because there’s a 
constant conjunction between ‚sugar-placed-in-water‛ events and ‚sugar 
dissolved‛ events). Therefore, those philosophers who take a realist stance in 
regard to physical laws should think twice about the assumption that Lewisian 
semantics is the ‚only game in town‛ when it comes to the evaluation of 
counterfactual conditionals. If I am right, it may be a game that only Humeans 
can play.  
 On the other hand, if I am wrong about the implicit Humeanism of Lewisian 
semantics, I don’t think it follows that the theory of middle knowledge stands or 
falls depending on whether or not CFs can be accommodated within the 
Lewisian framework. In other words, I reject the major premise of Van Inwagen’s 
argument. Explanatory scope is indeed a virtue and it would be very nice if all 
instances of subjunctive reasoning could be accommodated within a single, 
unified semantic theory. But surely the behavior in a given situation of a rational 
agent endowed with libertarian free will is something radically different from 
the behavior, say, of a sugar cube dropped in water, and so the truth-conditions 
for the counterfactuals underlying the laws that govern the behavior of non-
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rational, ‚material‛ causes ought not, it seems to me, be seen as adequate for 
those describing the behavior of free, personal, ‚agent‛ causes. The phenomena 
are just too different to be subsumed under a single account. Thus, it is only to be 
expected that the peculiar sorts of conditionals that are postulated by the theory 
of middle knowledge will be found intractable from the standpoint of a semantic 
theory designed for altogether different purposes. 
 
4.5.2. The Grounding Objection 
 One persistent complaint against Molinism is the Grounding Objection, 
which has it that CFs, the purported objects of God’s middle knowledge, are 
without ‚adequate metaphysical grounds.‛ Since a proposition’s having such 
grounds is taken by the objector to be a necessary condition for its truth, it 
follows that the propositions God is supposed to know via middle knowledge are 
not true—indeed, cannot be true—and hence God cannot have middle 
knowledge. This objection was first voiced in the contemporary debate by Robert 
Adams (1977) and, according to Thomas Flint, is seen by many as the major 
stumbling block in the way of adopting Molinism (Flint, 1998, p. 123). 
 What exactly is the grounding objection? Robert Adams puts it in the form of 
a question: ‘Counterfactuals of freedom < are supposed to be contingent truths 
that are not caused to be true by God. Who or what does cause them to be true?’ 
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(Adams, 1985, p. 232) I think we can restate Adams’ question in the form of an 
argument: 
   (1)  Contingent propositions are, if true, caused to be true. 
   (2)  CFs are contingent propositions that are not caused to be true. 
       
   (3)  CFs are not true. 
 
Recall that, as Duns Scotus put it, contingent propositions ‘carry no mark of their 
actuality.’ For this reason, Freddoso, one of Molina’s ablest defenders, seems to 
agree with the major premise of this argument, saying, ‘[M]etaphysically 
contingent propositions < require causal grounding in order to be true. That is, 
they must be caused to be true by some agent or agents, since it is not of their 
nature to be true’ (Freddoso, 1988, p. 70).  
 Several possibilities have been suggested as to what might constitute 
adequate causal grounding for a CF, but each is to be wanting. First, it might be 
that the agent himself causes those CFs about him that are true to be true. For 
example, perhaps it is Adam himself who causes the CF ‘If Adam were tempted 
in the garden, he would freely sin’ to be true by actually sinning upon finding 
himself tempted in the garden. But this approach fails for three reasons. First, it 
would require backward causation, for God makes use of his middle knowledge 
in deciding which world to create. God knows the CF ‘If Adam were tempted in 
the garden, he would freely sin’ long before Adam finds himself in that 
circumstance. Thus, if Adam causes that CF to be true by virtue of his sinning at 
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t, then at t he causally brings about an effect before t. Second, Adam might never 
have been tempted; God might have wanted a world in which Adam never 
sinned in those circumstances and so brought it about that Adam was never 
tempted in the garden. Yet, on Molina’s theory, it still would have been true that 
if Adam were tempted, he would have sinned. That fact is part of the ‚creation 
situation‛ in which God finds himself, even though Adam might never do 
anything to cause it to be true, since he might never find himself in the relevant 
circumstances. Third, Molinism must allow that there are true CFs concerning 
agents who could have existed but in fact do not exist. Surely God could have 
created Schmadam instead of Adam. If Molinism is true, then God must know 
what Schmadam would have done if he were tempted in the garden, but such a 
truth cannot be grounded in Schmadam’s causal activity since Schmadam 
doesn’t exist and therefore can’t cause anything. 
 Might CFs be grounded in an agent’s character, his or her behavioral 
dispositions or inclinations toward acting this way or that? No, argues Adams 
(1977), for if the agent is free in the libertarian sense, then it must be possible for 
her to do A and refrain from doing A in identical causal circumstances. Even if 
her character inclines or disposes her to do A, it must nevertheless be possible for 
her to act out of character and refrain from doing A. Unless libertarianism is false 
and our actions are determined by our character, by our beliefs and desires, then 
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an agent’s character can at best provide causal grounding for what we are likely 
to do or what we would probably do in such-and-such circumstances. Molinism, 
however, requires that God know what each and every agent would definitely do 
in such-and-such circumstances. As Adams puts it, ‘It is part of their *the 
Molinists’+ theory that God knows infallibly what definitely would happen, and 
not just what would probably happen or what free creatures would be likely to 
do’ (Adams, 1977, p. 111). 
 As a result, absent any further possibilities as to what might provide causal 
grounding for the truth of CFs, it seems that the minor premise of Adams’ 
argument is also true, and indeed I would concur. However, I am not convinced 
that the major premise is true. I see no good reason to think that contingent 
propositions must be caused to be true, for I don’t at all know what it even means 
for a proposition to be caused to be true. Propositions, being abstract entities, are 
just not the sorts of things that can stand as terms in causal relations. Since the 
time of Hume, causation has generally been understood to be a relation between 
events, while for Aristotelians it’s construed as a relation between primary 
substances, and propositions fall into neither category. 
 It’s possible, of course, that I’m being too wooden and literal in my 
understanding of what Adams et al. mean by ‘cause’. Perhaps they are thinking 
in terms of truth-maker theory (Craig, 2003, pp. 339f.), according to which every 
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contingent truth p has its truth-maker, some entity by virtue of which p is true. 
But it just doesn’t seem to be the case that all contingent propositions have such 
truth-makers, at least when they are taken to be concrete objects. For example, 
consider the proposition ‘The Great Pumpkin does not exist.’ Surely there could 
be such a being that appears in the pumpkin patch on Halloween each year, 
although in fact there is no such being. So then what is the truth-maker for the 
contingent proposition ‘The Great Pumpkin does not exist’? It can’t be the Great 
Pumpkin, of course, since it does not exist. But what other object could it be? I 
can think of no other plausible candidate. 
 Now, we could allow that a truth-maker need not be a concrete object but 
instead be a fact or state of affairs. Thus, the proposition that the Great Pumpkin 
does not exist could have as its truth-maker the fact of the Great Pumpkin’s non-
existence or the state of affairs the Great Pumpkin’s being non-existent. But once we 
admit that possibility, then there’s no reason to think that CFs lack such truth-
makers. For we could then say that the proposition that S would do A if S were 
in C has as its truth-maker the state of affairs S’s being such that she would do A 
were she in C. As William Lane Craig puts it, ‘I should say that if true 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom have truth-makers, then the most obvious 
and plausible candidates are the facts or states of affairs disclosed by the 
disquotation principle’ (Craig, 2001b, p. 346). 
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 This latter approach, I think, constitutes an adequate response to Steven 
Cowan’s recently advanced version of the grounding objection, which he thinks 
‘provides a powerful refutation of middle knowledge’ (Cowan, 2003, p. 94). To 
set the stage for his argument, let us recall that a CF of the form ‘If S were in C, 
then S would freely do A,’ where ‘freely’ is understood in the libertarian sense, 
implies that S, upon ending up in C, would do something for which there are no 
sufficient antecedent casual conditions. S’s action is radically indeterministic, as 
the world could be identical in all causal respects up to the time of the action 
regardless of whether S does A or refrains from doing A. Again, according to 
Molinism, God knows what S would do in such circumstances. 
 It is this last claim that Cowan finds untenable. As Cowan sees it, it is the 
Molinist’s commitment to libertarianism that leads to the grounding objection: 
The grounding objection just is the view that there simply is no fact of the 
matter as to what an agent with libertarian freedom would do in a given 
hypothetical (or even actual) circumstance.< [T]he problem revolves 
around the nature of agents who have libertarian freedom. It is because 
middle knowledge requires that God knows counterfactuals of freedom < 
that gives rise to the grounding objection (Cowan, 2003, p. 96). 
 
He argues that given the kind of freedom previously mentioned, there can be no 
‚fact of the matter‛ as to what an agent would freely do in a given circumstance. 
Since what an agent does freely (in the libertarian sense) must be undetermined, 
it must also be undetermined what an agent would do freely, and hence there are 
no ‚grounds‛ for truths about what an agent would do freely in a given 
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circumstance. ‘For,’ as he puts it, ‘if S is free to do x or refrain from doing x in C,  
there simply is no fact of the matter to what S would do.< [A]ny claim as to what 
S would (counterfactually) do is neither true nor false’ (Cowan, 2003, p. 94). 
 Cowan sets out his argument by first stating what he calls the Molinist’s 
libertarian assumption: ‘Given any set of circumstances C, S is free in C with 
respect to an action x if and only if S is not determined to do either x or ~x in C.’2 
He then proceeds to offer his generic grounding objection to the theory of middle 
knowledge: ‘If S is not determined to do x or ~x in C, then there is no fact of the 
matter to what S would do in C.’ Cowan thus concludes, ‘The truth-value of any 
and every counterfactual of freedom, then, is indeterminate. And since they are 
indeterminate, God cannot know them’ (Cowan, 2003, p. 94), in which case God 
cannot have middle knowledge. 
 Clearly enough, the key player in Cowan’s argument is the generic grounding 
objection (hereafter: GGO), the claim that an agent’s being undetermined with 
respect to an action in a given circumstance rules out the possibility of saying 
(truly) that the agent would or would not do that action in that circumstance, there 
being no ‚fact of the matter‛ in that regard. It seems to me, however, that Cowan 
has given us no good reason to accept GGO. It strikes me more as an assertion 
than an argument, in the absence of which the Molinist can simply assert the 
contrary. Some such argument may proceed along the following lines: 
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(1)  If it is undetermined prior to t whether p obtains at t, then there is no 
fact of the matter prior to t as to whether p will obtain at t. 
   (2)  What S would freely do in C is, prior to the time of C, undetermined. 
       
(3)  There is no fact of the matter prior to the time of C as to what S  
   would do in C. 
 
 The characteristic Molinist response to this argument is to deny (1) and 
would proceed in some such way as follows. Assume that S will freely do X at 
some future time t. If S is free in the libertarian sense with respect to doing X, 
then S is not determined either to do X or not to do X. That is. S’s being such that 
he will do X at t is, prior to t, an undetermined states of affairs, insofar as there are 
no antecedent causal conditions sufficient for that state of affairs. But that gives 
us no good reason to say that there is no fact of the matter as to whether S will or 
will not freely do X. Even if there are no causally sufficient antecedent conditions 
for S’s doing X, it is nevertheless true that S will in fact do X; unless, that is, one 
is an anti-realist about the future. But if one can be both a realist in regard to the 
absolute future as well as a libertarian, then one is free to maintain that there is a 
fact of the matter as to whether S will do X despite S’s being undetermined with 
respect to X. Therefore, absolute future contingent states of affairs are 
counterexamples to (1)—the general principle that there can be no fact of the 
matter as to undetermined states of affairs—and so the argument is unsound. If 
one can be a realist in regard to the absolute future, then there’s no good reason 
why one cannot be a realist in regard to the conditional future as well, so that ‘S 
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would do X were S in C’ can be true despite S’s being undetermined with respect 
to doing X. 
 However, Cowan is not impressed by this response. According to him, ‘The 
parallel between anti-realism about counterfactuals of freedom and anti-realism 
about future-tense contingents is only superficial’ (Cowan, 2003, p. 96). The 
difference between them, it seems, is that absolute future contingents are (or can 
be) ‚grounded‛ in a way that counterfactuals of freedom cannot be. Now, as I 
indicated earlier, it’s not at all clear to me what it means for a proposition to be 
grounded or have grounds, nor does Cowan, unfortunately, provide an explicit 
criterion for a propositions having grounds. He does, however, say that in the 
case of counterfactuals of freedom ‘there are no actual states of affairs to which 
such propositions correspond in order to provide truth conditions for their truth 
or falsity’ (Cowan, 2003, p. 93). So perhaps we can use this as an implicit criterion 
for a proposition’s having adequate metaphysical grounds, and say that a 
proposition p has grounds if and only if there is some actual state of affairs Z to 
which p corresponds. Presumably, by ‘actual state of affairs’ we are to 
understand a state of affairs that actually obtains (as opposed to a state of affairs 
that actually exists, for according to the actualist ontology that I accept, all states 
of affairs actually exist; only some, however, actually obtain, the maximal 
consistent set of which constitutes the actual world). We therefore have the 
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following criterion for a proposition’s having adequate metaphysical grounds: 
   (AMG) p has adequate metaphysical grounds as of t iff for some state of 
affairs Z, Z obtains at t and p corresponds to Z. 
 
 Interestingly, Cowan allows that a categorical future-tensed proposition such 
as ‘S will do X’ can be true, and hence grounded.3 But to what actual state of 
affairs does such a proposition correspond? Cowan has this to say: 
   The truth-value of a future-tense statement such as 
     (B)  Jesus will return bodily in 2010 
is grounded here and now because, assuming that it is true, there will 
obtain, in 2010, the categorical state of affairs Jesus returns bodily in 2010 
(Cowan, 2003, p. 95). 
 
It seems, therefore, that for Cowan a proposition can be grounded now by a state 
of affairs that does not yet actually obtain. For if (B) is true, it is true now, but the 
state of affairs Jesus’ returning bodily in 2010 does not actually obtain now but, if it 
obtains at all, will obtain (or will be actual) in 2010. On the other hand, as we 
have seen, Cowan asserts that for propositions to be grounded, there must be 
some ‘actual state of affairs to which such propositions correspond in order to 
provide truth conditions for their truth or falsity,’ from whence I have derived 
(AMG). So to what actual state of affairs does (B) correspond? Again, it can’t be 
Jesus’ returning bodily in 2010, for that state of affairs is not yet actual. As Cowan 
says, it will (let us assume) obtain in 2010, but it does not now obtain, in which 
case, according to (AMG), (B) cannot now be true. Unless, that is, we allow that 
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(B) can be true by corresponding to the now actual state of affairs Jesus’ being such 
that he will return bodily in 2010. But if that’s unproblematic, then there’s no good 
reason why we shouldn’t allow that a proposition like ‘If S were in C, then S 
would freely do X’ is true by corresponding to the now actual state of affairs of S’s 
being such that he would freely do X were he in C. 
 Put slightly differently, Cowan says that (B) is now grounded because there 
will obtain, in 2010, the categorical state of affairs Jesus’ returning bodily in 2010. 
But to say that there will obtain the state of affairs Jesus’ returning bodily in 2010 is 
to say (albeit in a very stilted way) nothing more than that Jesus will return 
bodily in 2010, so that ‘Jesus will return bodily in 2010’ is now grounded simply 
because it is now the case that Jesus will return bodily in 2010. So by Cowan’s 
own thinking, it seems that to discover what grounds a proposition we need 
apply nothing more than simple disquotation (cf. Craig, 2001b, p. 346). Therefore, 
‘If S were in C, then S would freely do X’ is now grounded because there would 
obtain the state of affairs S’s freely doing X were there to obtain the state of affairs 
S’s being in C, which is to say that ‘If S were in C, then S would freely do X’ is 
now grounded because it is now the case that if S were in C, then S would freely 
do X. 
 What Cowan would say in response to this maneuver is that the state of 
affairs S’s being such that he would freely do X were he in C is a hypothetical or 
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conditional state of affairs, whereas he thinks that a proposition can only be 
grounded by a categorical state of affairs. He quotes William Hasker’s statement 
on the issue with approval. 
William Hasker puts it this way: ‘In order for a (contingent) conditional 
state of affairs to obtain, its obtaining must be grounded in some 
categorical state of affairs. More colloquially, truths about ‚what would be 
the case … if‛ must be grounded in truths about what is in fact the case’ 
(Cowan, 2003, p. 93). 
 
However, Cowan fails to mention that Hasker is here expressing what he himself 
considers an intuition. The closest thing Hasker gives to an argument on behalf of 
this intuition is as follows: 
This requirement seems clearly to be satisfied for the more familiar types 
of conditionals. The truth of a material conditional is grounded either in 
the truth of its consequent, or the falsity of its antecedent, or both. More 
interestingly, the truth of causal conditionals, and their associated 
counterfactuals, are grounded in the natures, causal powers, inherent 
tendencies, and the like, of the natural entities described in them. The lack 
of anything like this as a basis for the counterfactuals of freedom seems to 
me to be a serious problem for the theory (Hasker, 1989, pp. 30-31). 
 
The claim seems to be that because CFs are not grounded in the way that 
material conditionals and causal conditionals are grounded, they are therefore 
ungrounded and hence untrue. Interestingly, in a footnote to his remark about 
material conditionals, Hasker observes, ‘Some would deny that these are 
genuinely conditionals, in the interesting sense of that term’ (Hasker, 1989, p. 30, 
n. 21). But if there’s a question about whether material conditionals really are 
conditionals, then it can’t count for very much against CFs if they’re not 
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grounded in the way that material conditionals are. So the argument boils down 
to the claim that there’s something wrong with CFs because they’re not 
grounded in the way causal conditionals are grounded. But what else ought we 
to expect? If there is such a thing as libertarian freedom (as both Hasker and 
myself think there is), then it works in a way that is radically different from the 
active and passive potencies of inherent natures. It should come as no surprise 
that statements concerning what an agent with libertarian freedom would freely 
do in such-and-such circumstances are ‚grounded‛ (if at all) in a way that differs 
radically from the way in which statements about what would happen, say, to a 
piece of salt were it placed in water. 
 Nor does it seem to me that the criterion that conditional states of affairs be 
grounded in categorical states of affairs is satisfied even in cases other than CFs. 
Consider the future-oriented indicative conditional 
   (a)  If you go to the movies, I will go with you. 
Let’s suppose that you end up not going to the movies, and so neither do I. 
Presumably (a) could nevertheless have been true (assuming I wasn’t lying). But 
what categorical state of affairs would then have grounded the truth of (a)? It 
surely can’t just be, as the truth-table for the material conditional would have it, 
the fact that you didn’t go to the movies. (a) is just not a material conditional.4 
Nor is it plausible to think that, as with causal conditionals, there is any kind of 
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necessary connection between antecedent and consequent which grounds (a). If 
you go to the movies, I remain perfectly free (metaphysically, if not morally) to 
go or not to go. Furthermore, it is not my intentions that provide grounds for (a). 
As we already noted in discussing Adams’ objection, my intentions can at best 
ground a claim about what I might do or what I would probably do. But (a) does 
not say that I’ll probably go to the movies if you go; it says that I will definitely go 
if you go. Rather, it seems to be that (a) would have been grounded simply in the 
conditional fact that I will go to the movies if you go. Therefore, the general claim 
that conditional statements must be grounded in categorical states of affairs 
seems false. 
 Consequently, if (a) can be grounded in conditional states of affairs, it seems 
plausible to think that a statement like 
   (b)  If you were to go to the movies, then I would go with you 
not only can but must be similarly grounded in a conditional state of affairs, 
namely the fact that I would go to the movies were you to go. Semantically, (a) and 
(b) seem indistinguishable (Gaskin, 1993, p. 415). So if (a) can be true without 
being grounded in any categorical state of affairs, then so too can (b). More 
pointedly, I would say that if (b) cannot be true, then neither can (a). Now, 
opponents of middle knowledge may say, ‘So much the worse for (a),’ and 
simply consign all future-oriented indicative conditionals involving free actions 
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to the same fate as CFs. But this comes at a high price, for if statements like (a) 
cannot be true, then we cannot make true conditional promises. I cannot 
successfully make the promise to someone, ‘I will do X if such-and-such is the 
case,’ if my statement is automatically false. 
 Determinists may nonetheless say that the real crux of the issue here is 
libertarian freedom. They may insist that if I am free in the libertarian sense to go 
to the movies, then all I have a right to say is 
   (c)  If you go to the movies, I might go with you, 
which hardly allows you to make very definite plans for the evening. Only if 
your going to the movies is (together with other conditions) somehow causally 
sufficient for my accompanying you (perhaps by causing me to have the 
appropriate desires, upon which I act of necessity, can (a) be genuinely 
grounded. Compatibilists will maintain that my going to the movies can still be 
free, just not in the libertarian sense. The claim, therefore, would be that if (a) 
(and [b]) can be true, and hence grounded, then libertarianism must be false. 
 At this point I think we reach a fundamental clash of intuitions that no 
amount of argument will ever adjudicate. The compatibilist’s intuitions favor (a) 
as not being grounded in the libertarian sense, and so since (a) can be true, then 
libertarianism must be false. My intuitions against the compatibility of free 
choice with determinism strongly outweigh any hesitation I might have over (a) 
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and (b) lacking adequate grounds if construed in accordance with libertarianism. 
Therefore, since I think that compatibilism is false and that (a) can be true, I 
accordingly think that (a) is sufficiently grounded in the conditional state of 
affairs My being such that I will accompany you if you go to the movies. I just don’t see 
it as needing any more basic grounding. Likewise, I think that (b) is adequately 
grounded in the conditional state of affairs My being such that I would accompany 
you, were you to go to the movies. 
 In light of the foregoing considerations, I think that the grounding objection 
has little if any probative merit. Depending on how the ‚grounding‛ criterion is 
understood, either propositions that are obviously true end up being without 
adequate grounds or CFs have just as adequate grounds as any other adequately 
grounded proposition. In short, the grounding objection to middle knowledge is, 
so to speak, groundless. 
 
4.5.3. Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument 
 In its original historical setting, the theory of middle knowledge was subject 
to vehement criticism for granting too much in the way of freedom and 
independence to human beings (insofar as CFs are contingently true propositions 
that are nonetheless independent of the divine decree), thereby compromising 
God’s sovereignty. In the current debate, however, the pendulum has swung to 
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the other extreme, and now Molinism is accused of depriving human beings of 
their freedom of choice, at least from the standpoint of libertarianism. This is the 
view of William Hasker (1986, 1989, 1995, 1999a), who has surely been one of the 
most consistent and formidable opponents of the theory of middle knowledge. In 
this last section, I want to consider his most developed argument that Molinism 
is inconsistent with libertarian human freedom. 
 Hasker’s argument has seen several incarnations, the first few of which 
involved crucial assumptions and concepts that proved to be their undoing. With 
his latest effort, however, he puts forth an argument that, he says, ‘is concise and 
comparatively easy to grasp, and it avoids employing some of the difficult 
primitive terms and contestable premises of those earlier efforts’ (Hasker, 1999a, 
p. 291). In what I will henceforth call ‚Hasker’s Anti-Molinist‛ argument (HAM), 
the crucial notion of ‚bringing something about‛ is once again involved, for 
which Hasker provides his own stipulative definition (Hasker, 1999a, p. 291): 
   (BA)  A brings it about that Y iff: For some X, A causes it to be the case 
that X, and (X & H)  Y, and ~(H  Y), where ‘H’ represents the 
history of the world prior to its coming to be the case that X, 
 
where ‘ ’ symbolizes metaphysical entailment. So Smith brings about the death 
of Jones iff Smith causes something to be the case (say, that a bullet fired from his 
30-06 rifle hits Jones in the head) and the bullet hitting Jones in the head together 
with the history of the world prior to the bullet hitting Jones in the head 
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metaphysically entails the death of Jones, and that same history of the world 
alone does not entail the death of Jones. This seems to me an acceptable 
understanding of the concept of ‚bringing something about.‛ 
 With (BA) in hand, and assuming that 
   (1)  Agent A is in circumstances c, the counterfactual of freedom ‘C  Z’ 
is true of her, and she freely chooses to do z 
 
(where ‘ ’ expresses counterfactual implication), HAM amounts to a reductio ad 
absurdum, insofar as Hasker attempts to derive a contradiction from some 
assumptions that are essential to Molinism, the contradiction being that 
   (2)  It is in agent A’s power to bring it about that (C  ~Z) 
and 
   (3)  It is not in A’s power to bring it about that (C  ~Z). 
As it turns out, Thomas Flint has shown in his rejoinder to Hasker’s article that 
Hasker’s argument can be considerably simplified (Flint, 1999, pp. 299-300), and 
so it is Flint’s helpful reconstruction that I will present here. 
 To show that (2) is true, it needs to be shown (given *BA+) that there’s some X 
such that: 
   (2.1)  A has the power to cause it to be the case that X, 
   (2.2)  [(X & H)  (C  ~Z)] 
 
   and 
 
   (2.3)  ~[H  (C  ~Z)]. 
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As libertarians, Molinists would certainly assume that, although A does z in c, 
she has the power to do ~z, and so (2.1) is satisfied by 
   (2.1a) A has the power to cause it to be the case that ~Z. 
Furthermore, Molinists typically assume that the circumstances specified in the 
antecedent of a CF are complete circumstances, involving the entire causal history 
of the world up to the time of the action specified in the consequent (we’ll return 
to this point in the next chapter). Hasker also exploits this assumption, saying 
that ‘The full specification of the circumstances may best be thought of as 
including the entire previous history of the actual world; in effect, then, C = H’ 
(Hasker, 1999, p. 293). That being the case, (2.2) will be satisfied by 
   (2.2a) (~Z & H)  (C  ~Z) 
As Flint says, ‘If H = C, then no Molinist would doubt that (~Z & H) entails (C  
~Z)’ (Flint, 1999, p. 300) since, on the hypothesis that ~z is performed in c, 
Molinists will naturally infer that ~z is what would have been performed were 
the agent in c. 
 Finally, again on the assumption that H = C, the Molinist cannot think that a 
given circumstance would entail a particular action, for that would be 
inconsistent with the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, viz. that in the very 
same causal circumstances, the agent may either perform the action or not 
perform the action, if the action is to be performed freely. As such, the Molinist 
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would embrace 
   (2.3a) ~[H  (C  ~Z)] 
as well. Again, Flint says, ‘*N+o Molinist worth her salt would think that H 
entails (C  ~Z)’ (Flint, 1999, p. 300). Thus, given (1) and (BA), the Molinist will 
accept (2) without hesitation, and so the first part of HAM seems a success. 
 On the other hand, the derivation of (3) is an entirely different matter. Hasker 
gives only one premise in support of (3), viz. 
   (4)  It is not in an agent’s power to bring about the truth of the 
counterfactuals of freedom about her, 
 
and it is not clear how (3) follows validly from (4). For one thing, (4) is 
ambiguous and can be understood in one of two ways. For one, it may mean 
   (4.1)  If ˹(   )˺ is true of A, then A cannot bring it about that (   ). 
But (3) does not follow from (4.1), for (1) effectively tells us that ‘C  ~Z’ is not 
true of A by explicitly telling us that ‘C  Z’ is. On the other hand, (4) may mean 
   (4.2)  If ˹(   )˺ is not true of A, then A cannot bring it about that  
       (   ). 
 
But the argument for (2) shows precisely the opposite: ‘C  ~Z’ is assumed not 
to be true of A, and it is then shown that A can bring it about that (C  ~Z). 
 On the face of it, therefore, HAM lacks the savor of a compelling argument. 
However, it seems to me that (4.2) can provide the basis for another argument 
that Molinism is inconsistent, one that captures the spirit of Hasker’s thinking, if 
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it does not match up exactly with its letter. What Hasker really intends to argue, I 
think, is that the argument for  
   (2)  It is in agent A’s power to bring it about that (C  ~Z) 
is unsound, as it relies crucially on the claim that the truth of a given CF is not 
entailed by the past history of the world. In other words, Hasker wants to deny 
   (2.3)  ~[H  (C  ~Z)], 
for even though (again to quote Flint), ‘*N+o Molinist worth her salt would think 
that H entails (C  ~Z),’ Hasker insists that the Molinist must think that H 
entails (C  ~Z), which is to say that Molinists cannot consistently think that 
(2.3) is true. What Hasker seems to want to say is that the Molinist is really 
committed to the following: 
   (5)  (C  Z)  [H  (C  Z)], 
which is to say that if a given CF is true, then its truth is entailed by the past 
history of the world; indeed by the past causal history of the world. For if it is 
true, then the theory of middle knowledge has it that God made use of his 
knowledge of that truth in his decision to create the world as it is; in other words, 
the truth of ‘C  Z’ had causal consequences in the past history of the world, 
namely at the moment of creation when God made use of it in his creative 
decree. Hasker puts it as follows: 
But divine middle knowledge, unlike foreknowledge, is not causally 
impotent. On the contrary, God’s middle knowledge is part of the 
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‘prevolitional’ knowledge by which, prior to deciding upon his act of 
creative will, God knows what the full consequences of any particular 
decision on his own part would be.< Our point is simply that middle 
knowledge, unlike divine foreknowledge of the actual future, is an 
integral part of the causal process that has made the world what it is 
today.< Contrary to the Molinist claims considered above, ‘H’ does entail 
‘(C  Z)’, where ‘(C  Z)’ is a true counterfactual of freedom. But if this is 
so, then we created free agents do not bring about the truth of 
counterfactuals of freedom about us; there is no possible world in which we 
do this (Hasker, 1999a, p. 296). 
 
What HAM really amounts to, it seems to me, is something very much like ATD, 
only this time it is not what God foreknows that is supposed to, as Hasker puts 
it, ‘partake of the necessity of the past, or ‘accidental necessity’’ (Hasker, 1999a, p. 
295), it is what God knows by way of middle knowledge. Beginning once again 
with Hasker’s (1), I think the argument can be formulated as follows (let us call it 
‚Hasker’s Anti-Molinist argument Revised,‛ or ‚HAMR‛ for short): 
[HAMR] (1) Agent A is in circumstances c, the counterfactual of freedom  
       ‘C  Z’ is true of her, and she freely chooses to do z 
 
     (6) If A freely chooses to do z, then A can bring it about that ~Z. 
 
     (7) If A can bring it about that ~Z, then A can bring it about that  
       (C  ~Z) 
 
     (8) Therefore, A can bring it about that (C  ~Z). 
 
     (9) ‘C  ~Z’ is not true of A. 
 
    (4.2) If ˹(   )˺ is not true of A, then A cannot bring it about that  
       (   ). 
 
     (10) Therefore, A cannot bring it about that (C  ~Z). 
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Since (8) and (10) are an explicit contradiction, Molinism will have been shown to 
be incoherent if HAMR is a sound argument. Is it? (6) is a libertarian assumption, 
while (7) is a crucial Molinist assumption. Since (9) follows from (1), it follows 
that the only premise that can be questioned is (4.2), and it is the argument for 
(4.2) that amounts to a revised ATD, as follows: 
    (11) If ˹(   )˺ is not true of A, then ˹(   ~ )˺ is true of A. 
    (12) (   ~ )  (   ~ ) 
    (13) t (   ~ ) 
    (14) Therefore, t (   ~ ) 
    (15) Therefore, t ~(  & ) 
    (16) If t ~(  & ), then A cannot bring it about that (   ). 
     (4.2) Therefore, if ˹(   )˺ is not true of A, then A cannot bring it about 
that (   ). 
 
We can see the crucial ‚transfer of accidental necessity through entailment‛ 
move, characteristic of ATD, in the inference from (12) and (13) to (14). (11) 
follows from the Principle of Conditional Excluded Middle, which Molinists 
accept, while (12) is a logical truth. The truth of (16) should also be evident: if all 
worlds accessible to A are worlds in which it’s not the case that (  & ), then A 
cannot bring it about that  counterfactually implies , since the only way in 
which she can do so is by being in the circumstances described in  and then 
bringing it about that . The success of Hasker’s argument thus hangs on (13). 
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 Why should we think that (13) is true? Precisely because of (5), i.e., because if 
˹(   ~ )˺ is true, then God would have made use of his knowledge of that truth 
in deciding which world to create, and so its being true that (   ~ ) would 
have had causal consequences as a result of the divine causal activity itself, the 
act of creation. For this reason, we can give a fairly precise value for the time 
index t in (13), which would be the ‚t=0‛ of modern cosmology, the moment of 
God’s ‚fiat‛ bringing into existence the created order. 
 This may very well be the most powerful anti-Molinist argument, one that 
seems to suggest that Molinists must simply give up on any pretense of being 
libertarians and admit to being closet compatibilists. While I think this 
conclusion is unwarranted, the reason why it is unwarranted does force the 
Molinist to adopt a slightly different understanding of libertarian freedom than 
the one hitherto expressed as (LF). 
 But before I deal with the latter issue, I shall follow Thomas Flint in pointing 
out why Hasker has not given adequate justification for (13). For as Flint reminds 
us, if Molinism is true, then there are good reasons to think that something’s 
being a part of the past causal history of the world—i.e., something’s having had 
past causal consequences—does not thereby render it a ‚hard fact‛ about the 
past, one over which there can be no counterfactual power. Framed in the 
language of accessibility, if a state of affairs p obtained in the past and thereby 
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had causal consequences, it does not follow—given the truth of Molinism—that 
there are no accessible worlds thereafter in which p does not obtain. As Flint 
says, ‘For it also seems extremely plausible to suppose that if something which is 
a fact about the past would not have been a fact about the past had I exercised 
my power to act in a certain way, then that something is not a hard, fixed settled 
fact about the past’ (Flint, 1999, pp. 302-03). He recalls Alvin Plantinga’s famous 
story of Paul and the ants to illustrate this point: 
Suppose that Paul freely refrains from mowing his lawn today. 
Unbeknownst to Paul, his garden has recently been graced by a colony of 
ants, a colony whose continued existence is (for some reason) important to 
God. Had God known that Paul would mow today, God would have 
prevented any harm from coming to the ants by seeing to it that they 
moved onto the land of some less industrious gardener. But, being free, 
Paul genuinely has the power to mow. So he has the power to do 
something (mow) such that, were he to do it, the ants would not have 
moved into his garden last week. Hence ... it follows that their having 
moved in is not a fixed fact about the past. But clearly, the fact that the 
ants moved in has had lots of causal consequences; mounds of dirt, blades 
of grass, other insects, and the like have all been causally affected by the 
arrival of the ants (Flint, 1999, p. 303). 
 
Clearly, Plantinga’s story is possible only if God possesses middle knowledge, 
i.e., only if he knows what Paul would freely do in those circumstances. Given 
that he knew what Paul would do (namely, not mow), God allowed the ants to 
proceed with their colonization of Paul’s garden. But since Paul is free, he could 
have mowed; had he done so, then God would have known that he would mow,  
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and so God would have prevented that past fact about the ants (which again, as 
Flint emphasizes, had numerous causal consequences) from being a fact. 
 Thus, both Hasker and the Molinist will agree with the following implication: 
   (17) If Molinism is true, then it’s possible that we have counterfactual  
      power over past facts that have had causal consequences. 
  
Where they will differ is on how to complete the inference. Hasker denies the 
consequent, and so infers that Molinism isn’t true. But, to vary a traditional quip 
only slightly, one philosopher’s modus tollens is another philosopher’s modus 
ponens, and the Molinist will affirm the antecedent to infer that, perhaps 
surprisingly, we may very well have such counterfactual power over facts which, 
at first glance, may have been thought to be counterfactually inviolable. 
 But far from being a thorn in the side of Molinism, this implication is 
precisely what allows it to deal with one of the thorniest problems related to the 
issue of foreknowledge, namely the problem of divine prophecy. Alfred 
Freddoso (1988) has shown that it is this feature of Molinism that enables us to 
say that Peter freely denied Christ even though Christ infallibly prophesied that 
he was going to do so (cf. Mark 14.30) . That prophecy, being a vocal utterance, 
had causal consequences, e.g., on the hearers (Peter and the other disciples), on 
Christ’s vocal chords and central nervous system, on the surrounding air, etc. 
Given that God has middle knowledge, God knew that Peter would deny Christ, 
but had God known that Peter would not deny Christ (as was possible, given 
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Peter’s freedom), then he would have not allowed Christ to utter that prophecy, 
and so the Molinist can say that Peter had the power to do something (namely, 
refrain from denying Christ) such that, had he done it, then Christ would not 
have made the prophecy that he in fact made. So both the infallibility of Christ’s 
prophecy as well as Peter’s freedom are preserved on the Molinist account 
(Freddoso, 1988, pp. 60-61). 
 Flint has also shown that the implication expressed in (17) allows Molinists to 
give a coherent account of retrospective prayer (i.e., praying for something to 
have happened) (Flint, 1997) and papal infallibility (Flint, 1998, p. 179f.), while I 
will show in the appendix that (17) also undergirds a Molinist way of dealing 
with a dilemma concerning Christ’s atonement. Therefore, we may conclude 
with Flint, 
Molinists seem to have powerful reasons for rejecting [(13)], and with it 
Hasker’s new anti-Molinist argument. Indeed, I think that even those who 
are genuinely undecided concerning the Molinist controversy should have 
their doubts about [(13)]. If they are both well-informed and honestly 
uncommitted, then presumably they will see the force and to some extent 
feel the attraction of the Molinist arguments concerning ants, prophecy, 
and retrospective prayer; hence they should realize that Molinism 
precludes its knowledgeable adherents from accepting [(13)]. Given their 
own neutrality in the debate, one would think they could hardly be left 
with any firm convictions concerning the status of [(13)] (Flint, 1999, p. 
304). 
 
 Once again, the issue seem to boil down to one’s intuitions. Do all these 
instances of putative counterfactual power over past facts that have had causal 
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consequences make Molinism a more or less attractive theory? Are these cases 
consistent with one’s prior theoretical commitments, or are they too taxing on 
what one is willing to grant in terms of an agent’s power to act? Hasker would, 
I’m sure, argue the latter, and so insist that his is the more intuitively plausible 
view, but unless he’s speaking to those who already share his intuitions, then I 
cannot see how he can further argue his case on behalf of (13) without already 
assuming that Molinism is false, and thus begging the question against the 
Molinist. 
 Nevertheless, Hasker has succeeded in showing that the Molinist still has 
some fancy footwork left to perform. For if we are to maintain, say, that Peter 
acted freely in denying Christ, even though had he not done so, then Christ 
would not have made the prophecy—and thus that a fact that has had causal 
consequences would not have been a fact—we must then give up on the 
formulation of libertarian freedom assumed thus far and propose an alternative. 
For that formulation went as follows: 
   (LF*) An agent S freely does A at t in w only if (i) S does A at t in w, and 
(ii) for some world w*, w* shares the same causal history as w up to 
t, and (iii) the causal activity of everything other than S at t in w* is 
the same as the causal activity of everything other than S at t in w, 
and (iv) S refrains from doing A at t in w*. 
 
According to (LF*), Peter does not freely deny Christ, for there is no possible 
world that shares the same causal history as the actual world in which he refrains 
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from denying Christ, for any world that shares the same causal history is one in  
which Christ infallibly prophesies that Peter would deny him (assuming that 
Christ is essentially infallible). 
 The Molinist, however, is not without a plausible way around this problem. 
For there is no direct causal connection between Christ’s prophecy and Peter’s 
denial. It’s not as if Christ’s prophecy initiates a causal sequence of events that 
issues in Peter’s denial. Rather, Christ’s prophecy and Peter’s denial are, as it 
were, ‚triangulated‛ through God’s middle knowledge of the relevant CF 
concerning Peter. Consequently, we should be able to stipulate a suitable 
reformulation of (LF*) that adequately maintains the core intuition of 
libertarianism—viz. that our actions, if they are free, cannot be the causal 
consequences of states of affairs that are ultimately not under our control—while 
also making room for the kind of counterfactual power that Molinists suppose 
Peter to have vis-à-vis Christ’s prophecy. (LF**) represents my attempt at such a 
reformulation: 
   (LF**) An agent S freely does A at t in w only if (i) S does A at t in w, and 
(ii) there is no time t* before t such that the total state of w at t* is a 
causally sufficient condition for S’s doing A at t in w, and (iii) the 
causal activity of everything other than S at t in w is consistent both 
with S’s doing A at t in w and with S’s not doing A at t in w. 
 
On (LF**), Peter’s denial at t satisfies the necessary conditions for being a free 
action, for although Christ’s infallible prophecy at t* is a logically sufficient 
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condition for Peter’s denial at t (recall, too, that the mere truth that he was going 
to deny Christ is also a logically sufficient condition for his doing so), it is not a 
causally sufficient condition for Peter’s denial. Nor is there any reason to think 
(assuming, of course, that causal determinism is false) that the state of the world 
at any time before t is causally sufficient for Peter’s denial. Clause (ii) thus 
captures the core insight of libertarianism as an ‚anti-determinist‛ view while 
also allowing for the kind of counterfactual power over past events that have had 
causal consequences discussed earlier. Clause (iii) is meant to rule out the 
Scotistic (and Bañezian, as we’ll see in the next chapter) idea that a free action 
can ultimately be the result of God’s synchronic causal activity at the time of the 
action. 
 If we apply (LF**) to the case involved in HAMR, I think we get a similar 
result. The issue in that case was that agent A is supposed, on Molinist 
assumptions, to have the power to bring it about that (C  ~Z), which is in fact 
false. (13) implies that A has no such power since the falsity of ‘(C  ~Z)’ is 
embedded in the causal past. But given that there is no causal connection 
between the fact that (C  Z), even when conjoined with God’s will to create 
partly on the basis of his knowledge that (C  Z), and A’s doing z in c, then the 
latter satisfies clause (ii) of (LF**), and so A’s doing z in c may be considered free 
from the libertarian standpoint after all. In other words, as there is no ‚line of 
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causation‛ tracing backward from A’s doing z in c to the fact that God created 
partly on the basis of his knowledge that (C  Z), then we need not countenance 
any sort of ‚backward causation‛ in order to maintain A’s ability to bring it 
about that (C  ~Z). Molinists, therefore, are securely within the parameters of 
the libertarian view of freedom. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE MYSTERY OF MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE 
 Mention has already been made several times of what Alfred Freddoso calls 
the ‚source question‛ regarding God’s providential knowledge of the contingent 
future. How does God come to know what will happen in the world when what 
will happen is, at least in part, characterized by the sort of indeterministic 
contingency that libertarians take to be essential to human free choice? Pace Eef 
Dekker,1 I take Molina’s theory of middle knowledge to be an attempt at 
answering this question. 
 According to Molina, God’s knowledge that (say) Adam will sin freely (in the 
libertarian sense) is explained by the fact that God knows, as a matter of 
contingent fact, that Adam would sin if he were to be tempted in the garden. 
Because this fact about Adam (viz. that if he were tempted in the garden he 
would freely sin) is both metaphysically contingent (Adam could have been such 
that he would not sin were he in such circumstances) and pre-volitional (i.e., its 
truth is not explained by God’s willing it to be so but is antecedent to and 
independent of God’s will), it falls within the scope of God’s middle knowledge, 
as being ‚mid-way‛ between God’s natural knowledge of all metaphysically 
necessary states of affairs and his free knowledge of those states that will actually 
obtain as a result of his choice to create this or that order of things. In short, the 
201 
source of God’s providential foreknowledge is his middle knowledge coupled 
with his knowledge of which set of creatures he chooses to create in which 
circumstances. 
 Although Molina’s theory is an answer to the source question, it is admittedly 
only a partial answer. The question that must then be faced by the theorist of 
middle knowledge is obvious: how does God come to know that Adam would 
freely sin if he were placed in the garden? What, in other words, is the source of 
God’s middle knowledge? Even granting the theory’s assumption that there are 
such ‚middle facts‛ (Van Inwagen, 1997, p. 226) about free creatures, how does 
God’s knowledge of such facts come about? In his review of Thomas Flint’s 
masterful defense of Molinism, Divine Providence (Flint, 1998), William Hasker 
notes that Flint fails to address precisely this question (Hasker, 1999b, p. 249), 
which can only be seen as a conspicuous lacuna still in need of being dealt with if 
the theory is to be considered viable.  
 In this chapter I will offer my own way of handling the question regarding 
the source of God’s middle knowledge. To anticipate my answer, I will argue 
that an adequate characterization of the ontological relation in which creatures 
stand to God as their Creator provides an explanation, not for why God has 
middle knowledge, but for why we cannot possibly understand how his middle 
knowledge comes about. In other words, we cannot answer the source question 
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regarding middle knowledge, and that is what should be expected given the 
Creator-creature relationship. 
 
5.1. Middle Knowledge and Individual Essences 
 The problem of the source of middle knowledge is made more acute by the 
crucial Molinist claim that God knows not only know what his actually existing 
creatures would do in the various circumstances in which they might find 
themselves, but he also knows the middle facts about those creatures that might 
have existed but never in fact do. As I said in the previous chapter, God could 
have created Schmadam instead of Adam, and if Molinism is true, then God 
must know what Schmadam would have done if he were tempted in the garden. 
But how can there be true CFs concerning non-existent entities? 
 Fortunately, there is a convenient solution to this part of the problem. We 
need only commit to an actualist ontology of individual creaturely essences or 
haeccaeities, as outlined by Alvin Plantinga in The Nature of Necessity (Plantinga, 
1974b, pp. 70f.), which was already employed in the previous chapter. Since 
Plantinga gives independent reasons for adopting such an ontology (basically as 
a way to avoid ontological commitment to possible but non-existent entities) it is 
no ad hoc maneuver to adopt it here, and so I will eschew an extended defense of 
it. Accordingly, the Molinist can provide an ontological basis for God’s 
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knowledge of what a non-existent Schmadam would have done if he were 
tempted in the garden without having to maintain that non-existent objects can 
have properties, even the property of non-existence. Rather, it is Schmadam’s 
actually existing but unexemplified haeccaeity or essence (‚Schmadamitas,‛ 
perhaps, or the property of being identical to Schmadam) that has the property 
of being such that its necessarily unique exemplification would do such-and- 
such were he to be tempted in the garden. 
 In general, we can say that God, by means of his natural knowledge, knows all 
the infinite ways in which his essence, which is Infinite Being, can be imitated or 
‚participated in‛ by finite creatures.2 Hence, for every finite creaturely essence E, 
God knows through his natural knowledge that E can be exemplified. If E is the 
essence of a creature endowed with free will, then middle knowledge allows God to 
know, for every possible circumstance C in which the unique instance x of E 
might find itself, what x would do were x to find itself in C. If C is a situation 
which calls for a free decision, then God knows via middle knowledge what x 
would freely do were x in C. 
 This is the approach advocated by Jonathan Kvanvig, who writes: 
*W+hen God creates he makes individuals that exemplify essences.< *I+t 
must be claimed that essences are such that, even before they are 
instantiated, they reveal what an instantiation of them would be like.<  
*E+ach free individual’s essence includes a maximal subjunctive of 
freedom (Kvanvig, 1986, pp. 122, 124). 
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A ‚maximal subjunctive of freedom‛ amounts to the set of all and only true CFs 
concerning the particular creature in question. Now, if such an approach is 
viable, it would a fortiori provide a basis for God’s knowledge not only of how 
non-existent agents would have behaved had they existed, but also of how 
actually existing agents would have behaved in circumstances in which they 
never in fact end up. For example, because God is immediately acquainted with 
Adamitas, he not only knows what Adam would do were he tempted in the 
garden (what Robert Adams calls a ‚semi-factual‛ (Adams, 1977, p. 115) because 
Adam does in fact find himself in those circumstances), but also what Adam 
would have done were he were the one tempted first by the serpent instead of 
Eve (a literal ‚counterfactual‛ of freedom, since Adam was never in such 
circumstances). 
 The classical theist, however, will insist that such individual creaturely 
essences do not exist separately from or independently of the divine essence. 
They are not, as it were, ‚Platonic Forms‛ of individual creatures that subsist in 
their own right. Rather, the classical theist will posit them as ideas within the 
divine mind, the content of which represent finite, imperfect ‚reflections‛ or 
‚imitations‛ of God’s infinite being. St. Thomas speaks of such ideas as likenesses 
(the technical Latin term that he uses is species).3 As such, Molina would seem to 
agree with the view that God knows the middle facts about creatures by way of 
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his acquaintance with their (as we are calling them) individual essences or (as the 
medieval calls them) the ideas of such creatures. Indeed, he says as much: 
It is absolutely true that the ideas (or, the divine essence known as the 
primary object) are the firm and certain explanation for the fact that God, 
who comprehends in the deepest way both Himself and the things that He 
contains eminently, knows future contingents. Thus, besides St. Thomas 
< it is also the case that St. Bonaventure and, in general, as many as 
adopted this way of speaking held this very position, even if they did not 
explicate the matter satisfactorily (Molina, 1988, p. 142). 
 
The reason why Molina finds their explications unsatisfactory is that they failed 
to mention the role of middle knowledge in God’s knowledge of future 
contingents, which Molina points out also has its source in God’s seeing in his 
own essence (i.e., in the ideas of creatures) what such creatures would do in any 
given circumstances. 
 But this only returns us to the question of how God ‚sees‛ this. What explains 
the fact that God knows, prior to the exemplification of a given creaturely 
essence E, that the unique instantiation x of E would freely do A in circumstance 
C if x were to be found in C? It is all well and good to insist, as Kvanvig puts it, 
that essences ‚reveal‛ the middle facts about a particular possible creature, but it 
is not easy to see how they can do so without eliminating the very contingency of 
these middle facts. 
 Let me restate the question in order to show just how perplexing a problem 
this really is. We have to imagine (to the extent that we're able) God alone in his 
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own self-sufficient glory prior to the fiat of creation (whatever sense it makes to 
speak of anything "prior to" the creation of the temporal order) contemplating 
what world he wants to create. Suppose he wants to create a world in which (for 
whatever inscrutable reason) his incarnate Son is thrice denied, and freely so, by 
his best friend, Peter. Peter does not yet exist but his individual essence does, as 
contained within the divine Essence, and so God scrutinizes the individual 
essence that would be uniquely exemplified by Peter if God were to create him 
(let's call that individual essence P*, so that: necessarily, x exemplifies P* iff 
x=Peter), in order to see what Peter would freely do in those circumstances. The 
question is, what is there in P* that allows God to know, infallibly, that Peter 
would freely deny Christ if he were in the relevant circumstances? 
 Keep in mind that it cannot be something essential to P* since the objects of 
middle knowledge are supposed to be contingently true. Unlike, say, the 
property being human, with which P* must be co-exemplified (necessarily: if x 
exemplifies P* then x exemplifies being human), it's not the case that the property 
being an x such that if x were in C, then x would thrice deny Christ is necessarily co-
exemplified with P*. If it were essential to Peter that he deny Christ in the 
relevant circumstances, then he cannot be said to do so freely. So, given only 
Peter's individual essence, how does God come to know something about Peter 
that is contingent, something that could have been otherwise? 
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 The answer to this question offered by Domingo Bañez, a 16th century 
Dominican and one of the most well-known critics of Molina’s theory, is that 
God knows it because God wills it (Zagzebski, 1991, p. 127); it is thus a piece of 
free knowledge and not middle knowledge at all. God knows that if x were in C, 
then the causal contribution that God would make toward x's doing A would be 
not only necessary but sufficient for x's doing A. As Freddoso (1988) points out in 
his excellent discussion of the 16th century controversy, God's causal contribution 
(his ‚general concurrence‛) is, according to Bañez and his ilk, intrinsically 
efficacious. Again, if it were the case that x would not do A if x were to be found in 
C, God would know that because his general concurrence with x's not doing A 
would be intrinsically inefficacious; it would not only be a necessary condition of 
x's not doing A but a sufficient condition as well. Ultimately, the source of God's 
knowledge of what an agent would do in a given circumstance is his knowledge 
of what causal contribution he wills to make toward what the agent does in that 
circumstance (Freddoso, 1988, pp. 17-19).4 
 Clearly, the Bañezian answer—which is essentially a compatibilist answer—is 
not acceptable to those who take the libertarian view of human free choice and 
hence would be (and was) rejected by Molina and his school. For an action to be 
free in the libertarian sense, there can be no antecedent (or even simultaneous) 
causal factors outside of the agent that are sufficient for that action. The agent 
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must be able both to do and refrain from doing that action given the same 
antecedent causal conditions. If God's general concurrence were, as the 
Bañezians have it, intrinsically efficacious or inefficacious, then given that God 
wills to make such-and-such a causal contribution toward a given action, the 
agent must act in that manner. 
 Molina therefore rejects the notion that God's general concurrence is either 
intrinsically efficacious or inefficacious, claiming instead that it is intrinsically 
neutral (Freddoso, 1988, p. 18). It is indeed a necessary condition for a given action 
to be performed (God is, after all, the First Cause and nothing is altogether 
independent of his causal influence), but it is not a sufficient condition for such an 
action. It also requires the agent's own free causal contribution. Once again, 
Molina's theory is that God knows what that free causal contribution would be if 
the agent were to be found in the relevant circumstances, but once more, how 
does God know this? 
 
5.2. Molina’s Problematic Approach 
 Molina's own answer to this question is, at least on the face of it, not 
altogether satisfying. Molina suggests that we look not to Peter's individual 
essence for something that might explain the appropriate ‚middle fact‛ about 
Peter (viz. that he would freely deny Christ were he in the relevant 
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circumstances), but rather that we look to God himself. What accounts for God’s 
middle knowledge is nothing other than God’s absolute and utter perfection, in 
particular the perfection of his epistemic faculties. Because God has such a 
marvelous and incomprehensibly keen and penetrating insight into each of his 
rational creatures (not only those he does create but even those he can create but 
doesn’t), he is able to know how each such creature would freely act in any given 
circumstance in which it might be found. This marvelous and keen insight into 
each creaturely essence is what has come to be called God's supercomprehension (a 
term that Molina himself never uses). It is not mere comprehension, which 
would be impressive enough as affording God a complete understanding of a 
creature’s essential properties. But because God infinitely surpasses in perfection 
each of his finite creatures, his knowledge of each creature somehow surpasses 
what is contained in the essential being (esse essentiae) of each creature and 
includes even those things about it that are contingent (esse existentiae). Molina 
puts it this way: 
Middle knowledge [is that] by which, in virtue of the most profound and 
inscrutable comprehension of each faculty of free choice, [God] saw in His 
own essence what each such faculty would do with its innate freedom 
were it to be placed in this or that or, indeed, in infinitely many orders of 
things—even though it would really be able, if it so willed, to do the 
opposite.< But this sort of knowledge concerning created things is 
attributed to God < because He is God and for this reason comprehends 
each created faculty of choice in a certain absolutely profound manner.<  
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[W]hat is required is an absolutely profound and absolutely preeminent 
comprehension, such as is found only in God with respect to creatures 
(Molina, 1988, pp. 168, 170-71). 
 
And again: 
 
It is by reason of *God’s+ perfection that just as it falls under God’s 
omnipotence to be able to bring into existence creatures who are endowed 
with free choice and who have control over their acts (as we discern by 
experience in our very own selves), so too it falls under His immense and 
altogether unlimited knowledge, by which He comprehends in the deepest 
and most eminent way whatever falls under His omnipotence, to penetrate 
created free choice in such a way as to discern and intuit with certainty 
which part it is going to turn itself to by its own innate freedom (Molina, 
1988, p 141). 
 
In short, it is God’s unlimited cognitive perfection that accounts for his 
possession of middle knowledge. 
 In spite of the rhetorical impact of the foregoing, involving as it does such 
expressions as ‚most profound,‛ ‚inscrutable‛ and ‚absolutely preeminent,‛ the 
explanatory power of Molina's notion of supercomprehension is questionable. 
Does it really amount to anything more than saying, ‘God just knows such 
things,’ together with a little bit of hand-waving?  
 However, Molina’s way of handling the question is even more problematic 
than mere mystification and seems to veer into incoherence. I noted above that 
God’s supercomprehension of a creature affords him knowledge not only of the 
essential properties of that creature but even of those things about it that are 
contingent. But Molina goes even further and says that supercomprehension 
211 
allows God to know things about a creature that are, in and of themselves, 
uncertain. As Freddoso describes it, ‘More precisely, one who supercomprehends 
must be able to have epistemic certitude regarding states of affairs that do not (at 
least as yet) have metaphysical certitude’ (Freddoso, 1988, p. 52). Indeed, contra 
my own efforts in the previous chapter urging that CFs can and do have definite 
truth-values (that they are, in medieval parlance, ‚determinately true‛ or 
‚determinately false‛), Molina seems to deny this! Consider the following 
reiteration of the notion of supercomprehension: 
We claim that the certitude of this middle knowledge has its source, in 
turn, in the depth and unlimited perfection of the divine intellect, a 
perfection by which God knows with certainty what is in itself uncertain 
[emphasis mine], and this because of an absolutely eminent 
comprehension, in His divine essence, of every faculty of choice that He is 
able to create by His omnipotence (Molina, 1988, p. 248). 
 
The phrase that I have italicized seems to indicate that Molina thinks of CFs as 
neither true nor false but indeterminate. What else could it mean for a CF to be ‘in 
itself uncertain’? But isn’t this to cut the legs right out from under the theory of 
middle knowledge? How can Molina assert on the one hand that God knows 
what Adam would do were he tempted in the garden and then on the other hand 
insist that what Adam would do were he tempted in the garden is indeterminate 
and uncertain? Molina’s answer is supercomprehension. Even though, prior to 
his being tempted in the garden, what Adam would do in that situation is 
indeterminate (because Adam is free and can either sin or not sin), the power of 
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God’s intellect is so vast and the depth of his cognitive perfection so profound 
that he is nevertheless able to know what Adam would do in that situation. 
 Insofar as Molina’s approach involves abandoning the extremely plausible 
epistemic principle that S knows that p only if p is true, it is clearly defective, and 
Robert Adams is surely correct to insist on its incoherence. As Adams writes, 
[T]o comprehend something is already to understand about it everything 
that is there to be understood, and it is absurd to suppose that anyone, 
even God, could understand more than that. Molina seems to want to say 
that what free creatures would do under various possible conditions is not 
there, objectively, to be known, but that God’s mind is so perfect that He 
knows it anyway. But that’s impossible (Adams, 1977, p. 111). 
 
I concur with Adams here. Molina’s notion of supercomprehension as God’s 
ability to know what is in and of itself uncertain and indeterminate proves fatal 
to the theory of middle knowledge and must be rejected. Molina is quite correct 
to say that ‘our *human+ knowledge and cognition do not have more certitude 
than there is certitude in the object considered in its own right,’ but I fail to see 
how the same cannot be said of God as well. If a proposition is in itself uncertain, 
then no knower, no matter how perfect, can know it. 
 It could be, of course, that I am misinterpreting Molina. After all, to saddle 
him with so obviously an incoherent view on the basis of a single passage seems 
less than charitable. It may be that when he speaks of the objects of God’s middle 
knowledge as things which God knows with certainty despite their being in  
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themselves uncertain, he could mean merely that they are metaphysically 
contingent rather than uncertain or indeterminate.  
 Indeed, this would be similar to the manner in which Freddoso handles 
Molina’s way of talking about future contingent statements, which he also says 
are neither determinately true nor determinately false. On Freddoso’s 
interpretation, for a future contingent statement to be ‚determinately true‛ 
according to Molina’s usage is for it to be not only true but unpreventable or 
‚present in its causes,‛ which is to say, accidentally necessary (Freddoso, 1988, p. 
165, n. 4). Thus the asymmetry between God’s knowledge of the future and ours: 
we can know a future state of affairs only if present causes are so arranged as to 
issue in that future state, and therefore we cannot know future contingent (non-
deterministic) states of affairs. God, on the other hand, can know the future not 
by inferring it from the operation of prior deterministic causes but via the 
mechanisms of middle knowledge. Hence, God’s knowing that p will be the case, 
while entailing that ‘p will be’ is true, does not entail that ‘p will be’ is 
determinately (i.e., unpreventably) true, whereas if we know that p will be the case, 
that can only be because ‘p will be’ is determinately true, i.e., accidentally 
necessary. 
 However, Richard Gaskin has argued convincingly that this interpretation of 
Molina is mistaken. When Molina denies that future contingent statements are 
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determinately true (or determinately false), he means to say nothing less than 
that they are neither true nor false simpliciter. In other words, he is adopting the 
view of future contingents put forth by Aristotle in De Interpretatione, discussed 
in chapter two, where Aristotle (as the standard interpretation has it) avoids 
fatalism by restricting the principle of bivalence as not applying to future 
contingent statements. Thus Gaskin summarizes his case: 
Repeatedly in this part of his commentary [on De Interpretatione], Molina 
has Aristotle endorse the fatalist’s case, expressed in terms of an inference 
from determinate truth to necessity. And of course Molina himself 
endorses (what he takes to be) Aristotle’s endorsement of that case. So 
whether or not Molina has understood Aristotle correctly, he (Molina) 
must be equating determinate truth with simple truth, not necessity 
(Gaskin, 1994b, p. 559). 
 
In other words, because Molina agrees with Aristotle that the accidental 
necessity of p can be inferred from the determinate truth of p, it just makes no 
sense to think that Molina equates something’s being accidentally necessary with 
its being determinately true. Instead, as Gaskin maintains, when Molina uses the 
expression ‘determinately true’, he means nothing more than what contemporary 
philosophers mean by ‘true’ simpliciter.  
 As a result, the claim that I am committing a hermeneutical howler in 
interpreting Molina as denying that CFs have definite truth-values despite the 
fact that God knows them with certainty loses a good deal of its bite. If Gaskin is 
correct, then Molina is committed to a similar inconsistency in regard to future 
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contingent statements. For unlike Aquinas, whose doctrine is that God knows the 
future as eternally present and hence can deny that future contingents are either 
true or false (à la Aristotle), Molina emphatically asserts that God knows the 
future as such. As Freddoso says, 
Molina’s strong adherence to the doctrine that God is eternal does not 
deter him from using tensed language when speaking of God’s 
knowledge of and causal influence on temporal creatures.... So, it seems, 
according to Molina it is perfectly correct to assert, pace St. Thomas, that 
God knows future contingents with certainty as future (Freddoso, 1988, pp. 
33-34). 
 
So, again, I think I am on good grounds in maintaining that Molina holds an 
incoherent view, insofar as he thinks that CFs are not determinately true (i.e., 
true simpliciter) even though they are known by God by way of middle 
knowledge. 
 Nevertheless, even if a Freddoso-like interpretation of Molina is the correct 
one, so that his actual view is that there are genuine ‚middle facts‛ about free 
creatures (i.e., determinately true CFs) that can therefore be known by God with 
certainty because they are in themselves either true or false, albeit not 
‚determinately‛ (i.e., necessarily) so, that returns us to the problem of how a 
creature’s individual essence can ‚reveal‛ such contingent facts, even to a 
cognitively perfect being. 
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5.3. Idea-Models 
 A novel approach has been recently proposed and defended by Keith Wyma, 
following a suggestion of Calvin Normore as to how God might ‚model‛ the 
behavior of a given creature, prior to its creation, by means of a kind of ideal 
simulacrum of that creature. Normore writes: 
Imagine that God’s mind contains a perfect model of each possible thing–-
a complete divine idea of a particular or, if you like, an individual 
concept. Imagine that God simulates possible histories by thinking about 
how the being which is A would behave under circumstances C—i.e., he 
simulates C and ‘sees’ how A behaves. Now if there is a way in which A 
would behave in C, a perfect model should reflect it (Normore, 1985, p. 15). 
 
Picking up on Normore’s suggestion, Wyma develops this approach as follows: 
   Suppose God forms ideas of free creatures and then puts these ideas 
through their paces in various experiential scenarios, as if running a 
simulation on a model—like, for instance, testing a model plane in a wind 
tunnel. God could know what an idea-model does, and that could 
constitute the hypothetical middle knowledge, prior to (or without ever) 
creating and watching the creaturely agent.< 
  I argue that not only could God know counterfactuals of freedom 
through such modeling, the very modeling process itself provides the 
actually occurring states of affairs needed to make those counterfactuals 
true in the first place. If anyone could create an accurate model of a free 
creature, it would be God; God would know every relevant detail, 
including the content of the agent’s character, dispositions, quirks, odd 
impulses, and so on.< Suppose further that God puts this model through 
an ideal scenario, this ideal situation being accurate in every 
corresponding phenomenological detail to physical-world experience.< 
  Further, if God’s model really is accurate, what it does in its ideal-
scenario state of affairs should correspond exactly to what the real agent 
does do—or even would do—in its physical world state of affairs. The 
truth of what the model does can be prior to what the creature does 
without the former entailing or determining the latter, because what 
makes the actions correspond is not some relation spreading from 
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whomever acted ‚first,‛ but rather the essential similarity between the 
two doers. The model, if accurate, would not perform a given action 
unless the creature would, and vice versa (Wyma, 2001, pp. 8-9). 
 
Thus, Wyma sees himself as having provided answers both to the grounding 
objection, discussed in the previous chapter, and to the question regarding the 
source of middle knowledge. What ‚grounds‛ the truth of CFs is the behavior of 
the idea-models: if the idea-model of A is situated in circumstances that are 
phenomenologically indistinguishable from circumstance C and it then does X, 
then that grounds the truth of the CF, If A were in C, then A would do X. 
Furthermore, God’s knowledge of this middle fact about A arises from his 
observation of the experimental scenario. 
 I think there are a number of problems with Wyma’s suggested approach. 
First of all, it’s not clear that such ‚idea-models‛ of free creatures are possible, 
even for God. Wyma says that such an idea-model is to exhibit ‘every relevant 
detail’ of a given creature, ‘including the content of the agent’s character, 
dispositions, quirks, odd impulses, and so on.’ But on the traditional (i.e., 
Aristotelian) understanding of how character traits like virtues and vices are 
acquired, it’s not possible for a person simply to be created ex nihilo with this or 
that virtue or vice; it must be acquired through a period (however long) of 
habituation. Thus, God cannot simply create an idea-model with a whole array of 
virtues or vices ‚built in‛ and then see how that idea-model behaves in a given 
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scenario. Those virtues or vices can only be acquired through the performance of 
virtuous or vicious actions, which eventually form stable, settled dispositions of 
character. Therefore, in observing the behavior of the idea-models, God would 
not be able to infer what a person with (say) the virtue of courage would do in a 
given situation, for the idea-model itself cannot have the virtue of courage. It 
exists, as Wyma says, ‘not as a true person perduring from one event to the next, 
but as a person-slice covering one action-event’ (Wyma, 2001, p. 10) and therefore 
cannot possibly have been habituated in such a way as to acquire the virtue of 
courage. 
 Secondly, if there is no necessary connection between the actual behavior of an 
idea-model and what the creature being modeled would do if it were created, 
then I cannot see how such modeling could afford God infallible knowledge of 
the appropriate middle facts concerning that creature. Wyma’s suggestion is that 
the qualitative indiscernability between an agent and his or her idea-model as 
well as the phenomenological indiscernability between the situations in which 
the idea-model is actually placed and in which the agent might be place ensures 
that what the idea-model actually does in that situation is what the agent would 
do in that situation. But how can the connection between the two be anything 
more than probabalistic? After all, given a libertarian understanding of free will, 
it is possible for numerically the same agent in numerically the same circumstances to 
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perform different actions, i.e., if A is free with respect to doing X in C, then 
there’s a possible world in which A is in C and does X and a possible world in 
which A is in C and refrains from doing X. Thus, the fact that the idea-model of A 
does X in a situation phenomenologically indistinguishable from C can at best 
make it likely that A would do X in C, but it cannot guarantee it. 
 In fairness, Wyma is aware of this criticism, but insists that despite the fact 
that there is no necessary connection between the action of the idea-model and 
the action of the agent, the former nonetheless affords God knowledge of what 
the latter would be. He says, 
[W]e do not ground the counterfactual of freedom merely on 
psychological and character traits present in the agent—all of which the 
model shares—but we can also appeal to the fact that from those traits, in 
the specified situation the model does do the action counterfactually 
ascribed to the agent. Moreover, I want to stress again that the similarity 
between model and agent must reside in their exact, essential similarity, as 
determined by God. That is, God—who makes both agent and model—
ensures their similarity to such a degree that the model’s actions, for all 
relevant considerations, exactly represent the agent’s actions. Upon 
observing the model freely doing x in situation y, we can justifiably regard 
that as effectively observing the agent freely doing x in situation y (Wyma, 
2001, pp. 13-14). 
 
But this strikes me as, at best, a completely circular explanation. It seems that 
God would already have to know what the agent would do in a given situation in 
order to construct a model that behaves in exactly the same way. At worst, it’s an 
impossible explanation for, once again, if the model is free, then God cannot 
ensure that it will behave in any particular way (unless God has middle 
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knowledge of how the model would behave, but that lands us in an infinite 
regress) and if the agent is free, God cannot ensure that the agent would behave 
in exactly the same way as the model behaves. That’s simply the nature of 
libertarian freedom. 
 Lastly, assuming the ontology of individual essences as mentioned earlier, 
not even God can make a model that bears and exact, essential similarity to an 
actual agent, for the agent exemplifies an essential property—viz. its haecceity—
that the model cannot possibly exemplify. Ultimately, if an agent possesses 
libertarian freedom, then nothing other than the agent himself or herself—no 
matter how qualitatively indistinguishable—can provide the metaphysical ratio 
for what that agent would do in a given situation. 
 
5.4. The Suarezian Solution 
 Perhaps we should simply dispense with trying to answer the question 
concerning the source of God’s middle knowledge and instead see it simply as a 
consequence of his general omniscience. This seems to be the approach of 
Molina’s fellow Jesuit Francisco Suarez, who asserts, ‘*T+he whole controversy 
comes back to this, that we should see whether those conditionals [i.e., CFs] have 
a knowable determinate truth’ (quoted in Adams, 1977, p. 110). So long as they 
do, then a fortiori they would be known by an omniscient being. Suarez goes on 
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to assert that they must have a truth-value by virtue of what is known as the 
principle of Conditional Excluded Middle (either: if it were that , then it would 
be that , or: if it were that , then it would be that ~ ), which he takes to be 
valid, and so God would know which of the two disjuncts is true as a result of 
his knowing all truths. 
 But this approach was criticized both in Suarez’s own day and in more recent 
times by Robert Adams (1977), who argues that the contradictory opposite of If it 
were that , then it would be that  is not If it were that , then it would be that ~ , but 
is instead It’s not the case that if it were that , then it would be that , which is 
equivalent to If it were that , then it might be that  and it might be that ~ . The 
latter, of course, does not afford God the requisite certainty for complete 
providential control over creation (Adams, 1977, p. 110). 
 Counter-examples to Conditional Excluded Middle have been put forward in 
the recent literature—most notably by David Lewis (1973, pp. 79f.)—supporting 
Adams’s contention. Thus, neither of the following seem to be true: 
   (a)  If Reagan and Chernenko had been compatriots, then Reagan would  
      have been a Russian, 
 
   (b)  If Reagan and Chernenko had been compatriots, then Reagan would  
      not have been a Russian.5 
 
Rather, the most that can be said is that if Reagan and Chernenko had been 
compatriots, then Reagan might have been a Russian. Then again, Chernenko 
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might have been an American, or both might have been Venezuelan, or what 
have you. It all depends on how the vagueness regarding the similarity relations 
among possible worlds relative to the actual world is resolved. Is a world in 
which Reagan and Chernenko are both Russians more or less similar to the 
actual world then a world in which both are Americans?  Consequently, given 
that Lewisian semantics evaluates the truth of all counterfactuals on the basis of 
comparative similarity among possible worlds, the same sort of vagueness will 
seem to infect any such pair of counterfactuals If it were that , then it would be that 
 and If it were that , then it would be that ~ . 
 However, when it comes to CFs, the objects of middle knowledge, the 
situation is crucially different. Molinists stipulate that the circumstances 
described by the antecedent of a CF involve not simply the immediate conditions 
in which the agent acts but also the entire causal history of the world up to and 
including the time of the action. As a result, it is difficult to see why the law of 
Conditional Excluded Middle wouldn’t be valid for these special kinds of 
counterfactual claims. As William Lane Craig puts it, 
Molinists need not and should not endorse [the Law of Conditional 
Excluded Middle+ unqualifiedly.< But it is plausible that counterfactuals 
of the very specialized sort we are considering must be either true or false. 
For since the circumstances C in which the free agent is placed are fully 
specified in the counterfactual’s antecedent, it seems that if the agent were 
placed in C and left free with respect to action A, then he must either do A 
or not do A. For what other alternative is there? (Craig, 2001b, p. 338). 
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We can use Lewis’s putative counterexample to illustrate this point. If the 
antecedent of (a) were suitably strengthened by conjoining a proposition ‘H’ fully 
describing a possible history of the world, then that antecedent would have to 
specify Reagan’s birthplace, in which case (a) would have to be either true or 
false and, if false, (b) would then have to be true. So it must be that one or the 
other of the following is true: 
   (a*)  If Reagan and Chernenko had been compatriots & H, then Reagan  
       would have been a Russian, 
 
   (b*)  If Reagan and Chernenko had been compatriots & H, then Reagan  
       would not have been a Russian. 
 
Thus, it seems that Suarez is on good grounds in holding that God’s having 
middle knowledge with respect to free created agents follows from his being 
omniscient.  
 Unfortunately, the Suarezian approach raises another problem of which 
Molina himself seems to have been well aware, viz. why then doesn’t God then 
have middle knowledge with respect to himself? In other words, if middle 
knowledge simply follows from God’s essential omniscience, then why doesn’t 
he have middle knowledge of what he would do were he to find himself in a 
given situation? It is, after all, part of the Molinist picture that God can indeed 
‚find himself‛ in this or that situation, namely creation situations, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, and there seems no reason why there wouldn’t be truths 
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about what God would do (i.e., what world God would create) in this or that 
creation situation. If God, by virtue of his essential omniscience, has middle 
knowledge of what his creatures would do in any given situations in which they 
might find themselves, then ought he not, by the same token, have middle 
knowledge of what he would do in any given situation in which he might find 
himself? The Suarezian approach would seem to be committed to saying he does 
indeed have such knowledge. 
 However, as Molina himself argued, this would seem to threaten God’s own 
freedom of action. For middle knowledge is prevolitional knowledge or 
knowledge of states that obtain independently of God’s will. What God knows by 
means of middle knowledge is not up to him. If it is true of a particular agent A 
that if A were in C, then A would do X, it would be impossible for God to bring it 
about that A is in C and A doesn’t do X. But if the particular agent in question is 
God himself, then it would be impossible for God to bring it about that God is in 
C and God doesn’t do X, i.e., that God is unfree with respect to doing X in C. 
 Thus, Molinists have a clear-cut reason for maintaining that, although God 
has comprehensive middle knowledge of what free creatures would do in any 
possible circumstances in which they might find themselves, God does not have 
such middle knowledge of what he would do in the various creation situations in 
which he might find himself, as such prevolitional knowledge would fatally 
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compromise the divine freedom. Such knowledge must instead be considered 
free knowledge that follows upon God’s deciding what he would do in the various 
possible (as well as the actual) creation situations. 
 Unfortunately, the Suarezian approach to dealing with the source of God’s 
middle knowledge provides us with no explanation as to why there should be 
any such distinction between God’s having middle knowledge regarding 
creatures and his not having middle knowledge regarding himself. If the mere 
truth of a given CF is sufficient for God to know it by means of middle 
knowledge, as the Suarezian approach has it, then the mere truth of something 
like If God were in the actual creation situation, he would choose to create the present 
world would be sufficient for him to know that by means of middle knowledge as 
well. But as we just saw, that would mean he was unfree in creating the present 
world. Some explanation must therefore be given for why God has middle 
knowledge of creatures but not of himself. 
 
5.5. The Metaphysics of Participation 
 In spite of my earlier criticisms of Molina’s approach to the present question 
by way of ‚supercomprehension,‛ I think it ultimately points us in an interesting 
direction—not of an understanding as to how God's middle knowledge comes 
about, but as to why we cannot possibly understand how it comes about. 
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Molina’s discussion recalls us to a consideration of one of the fundamental issues 
of natural theology, that concerning the relationship between the Creator and his 
creation. In an already quoted passage, Molina notes, first, that middle 
knowledge ‘is found only in God with respect to creatures,’ and second, that it 
arises from a ‘comprehension in His essence of each created faculty of free 
choice.’  But what is it about the Creator-creature relation that could provide a 
basis for such knowledge? How is a created faculty of free choice related to God 
so that God could know anything about it through his own essence? As we saw, 
there is little promise for understanding this by virtue of the fact that God is 
more perfect—even infinitely more so—than creatures. Rather, I suggest that such 
a basis may be found in the fundamental ontological relationship between God 
and creatures, i.e., in terms of their being, and I believe that the metaphysics of St. 
Thomas Aquinas is probably the most sophisticated articulation of the Creator-
creature relationship—one that, in turn, is helpful in regard to middle knowledge 
as well. 
 It is all too easy to fall into the trap of talking about God as if he were one 
being (albeit ‚supreme‛) among all other beings, one ‚element‛ or ‚object‛ in the 
domain of quantification, one ‚value of a variable,‛ as Quine might have put it. 
Nevertheless, even though this is an easy temptation to give into, it is one that 
must be resisted and has been resisted by theologians from both classical and 
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medieval times as well as our own. Thus, instead of talking about God as a being, 
Paul Tillich refers to him as the ground of all being (Tillich, 1967), while Karl 
Rahner speaks of God as the horizon of being (Rahner, 1994). St. Thomas himself 
considers Exodus 3:14, where God reveals himself as He who is, to be the key to 
understanding the principle name of God, viz. Being Itself (esse), or the very act of 
existing (ST IaIæ, 13, 11; SCG I, 22). 
 St. Thomas was adamant in holding that there is no univocal sense in which 
being may be predicated of God and creatures. The concept of being as used in 
‘God is’ or ‘God exists’ is only analogous to the way it is used in ‘creatures exist’ 
(ST IaIæ, 13, 5). The reason is that, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, God 
is ipsum esse subsistens or ‚subsistent being itself‛ (ST IaIæ, 4, 2). God does not 
simply exist but rather, as a supremely simple being, he is identical to his 
existence; God’s essence is to exist (ST IaIæ, 3, 4). Creatures, on the other hand, 
have their being (habens esse) ‚from outside,‛ as it were. The creature’s act of 
existing is thus something ‚added on‛ to its essence (Owens, 1963, pp. 103f.). 
 This is Aquinas’s doctrine of the real distinction between essence and 
existence: in creatures, essence and existence are distinct metaphysical principles 
that are related as potency to act, entering into composition to constitute a 
substance of a certain kind, depending on how its act of existence (actus essendi) 
is ‚contracted‛ or limited by the degree of potency of its essence. But since God 
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is pure actuality, his act of existence is altogether unlimited, and thus does not 
enter into composition with his essence but is identical to it (SCG I, 22). Thus, to 
say that God exists is to say that God is his being while to say that a creature 
exists is to say that it has its being. 
 What, then, is the relationship between divine being and creaturely being? 
Toward answering this question, I would first point out just how similar the 
foregoing account of St. Thomas’s metaphysics of being is to certain aspects of 
the metaphysics of Plato. Recall that for Plato it is the Forms that are the true 
ousiai, ‚beings‛ in the strictest sense, while individual objects of sense-experience 
are not genuinely ‚beings‛ but instead ‚come to be‛ and ‚pass away‛ and are 
thus derivative beings. For example, the Form of the Good is perfect goodness 
while individual good things are good only imperfectly and for a time, deriving 
their limited goodness by way of their relationship to the Form of the Good. 
 That relationship, crucially, is what Plato called participation (Gk. methexis). 
This-worldly things participate or ‚share‛ in the true being of the Forms. An x 
that is F is so only to the extent that it participates in the Form of F-ness. But since 
they are finite, imperfect and temporal, particular objects do not exhaust the 
being of the Forms, whether individually or taken altogether, and therefore F-
ness cannot simply be identified with the set of all things which are F. 
Nonetheless, for any particular F, its own being or substance (ousia) is the Form 
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of F-ness. As Gyula Klima puts it, a Form is supposed to ‘constitute the substance 
of its particulars’ (Klima, 2008). 
 In a similar manner, St. Thomas sees the being (actus essendi) of individual 
beings (entia) as somehow participating in the infinite, self-subsistent Being of 
God, the divine esse. To be a creature is simply to have some finite ‚share‛ in the 
Being of God. God himself is his own being, indeed he is Being Itself (ipsum esse 
subsistens)—just as the Platonic Form of the Good is Goodness Itself—while 
creatures have their being (habens esse) from God—just as, for Plato, individual 
good things derive their goodness by way of participation in the Form of the 
Good. Thus Aquinas says, ‘God is essential being, whereas other things are 
beings by participation’ (ST IaIæ, 4, 3, ad. 3). Here are some further passages that 
reiterate the same points: 
God is being itself, of itself subsistent. Consequently, He must contain 
within Himself the whole perfection of being.< Since therefore God is 
subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to 
Him. Now all the perfections of all things pertain to the perfection of all 
being; for things are perfect precisely so far as they have being after some 
fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no thing is wanting to 
God. This line of argument, too, is touched upon by Dionysus when he 
says that God exists not in any single mode, but embraces all being within 
Himself, absolutely, without limitation, uniformly; and afterwards he adds 
that He is very being to subsisting things (ST IaIæ, 4, 2). 
 
And again: 
That which has being, but is not being, is a being by participation. But 
God is His own essence.< If, therefore, He is not His own being, He will  
 
230 
be not essential, but participated, being. He will not therefore be the first 
being—which is absurd. Therefore, God is His own being (ST IaIæ, 3, 4). 
 
And again: 
 
< it is absolutely true that there is something first which is essentially 
being and essentially good, which we call God.< Hence from the first 
being, essentially being and good, everything can be called good and a 
being inasmuch as it participates in the first being by way of a certain 
assimilation, although distantly and defectively (ST IaIæ, 6, 4). 
 
 It is to some extent ironic that St. Thomas, who is often thought to be the 
consummate ‚medieval Aristotelian,‛ has at the very heart of his doctrine of 
being the undeniably Platonic notion of participation. As Leo Elders puts it, ‘The 
question of participation is of great importance in Aquinas’ metaphysics. We 
may even say that, to a certain extent, his doctrine of the participation of being 
determines the character of his philosophy’ (Elders, 1993, p. 218). While it is only 
speculation on my part, it is plausible to think that it offered Aquinas a way of 
maintaining both God’s transcendence vis-à-vis the created world as well as his 
immanence within it. For it has been pointed out that Plato too saw the Forms, 
insofar as they are eternal, immutable and perfect, as belonging to a transcendent 
order, yet they are nevertheless ‚within‛ the realm of becoming insofar as they 
provide for whatever intelligible stability there is within the domain of temporal 
flux. Again, Elders puts it this way, 
The Ideas [Forms] are separated from the world of becoming but 
nonetheless present in it. The concrete thing has something of the Eidos 
(Idea) in itself. Plato describes this relationship to the Ideas as a presence 
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of the latter in the concrete things and in this way he acknowledges a 
certain immanence of the Ideas. But he also frequently points out that the 
Ideas are outside things and belong to a sphere of being of their own (the 
world of Ideas) (Elders, 1993, p. 219). 
 
Likewise for Aquinas, God is the being who is ‚wholly other‛ (totaliter aliter), 
altogether sovereign and independent of anything outside of himself, and yet 
present to everything within creation, as he puts it, by his power, presence and 
essence. That is, the being of God is present everywhere within creation while also 
transcending creation. As such, the Platonic notion of participation seems to be a 
way of accounting for these apparently conflicting desiderata, insofar as God’s 
otherness vis-à-vis creation is affirmed by way of the identification of God with 
his being (i.e., God alone is essential being whereas in creatures there is a real 
distinction between being and essence), while God’s immanence is affirmed 
insofar as the very being of creatures is had by way of a ‚sharing‛ or 
participation in the nature of Being Itself, which for Aquinas is the most 
adequate name for God. As Aquinas himself puts it, 
God fills every place, not indeed as a body, for a body is said to fill place 
in so far as it excludes the presence of another body; but by God being in a 
place, others are not thereby excluded from it; rather indeed He Himself 
fills every place by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill 
that place (ST IaIæ, 8, 1). 
 
Note well the inference that because God gives being to created things it follows 
that God himself is present wherever there are created things. It seems that this  
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can be so only if the being of created things is in some way a sharing or 
participation in the being of God. 
 It must be stressed, however, that St. Thomas in no way means to imply that 
creatures somehow possess a ‚part‛ of God, nor does God’s being enter into 
creatures as a formal constitutive principle. Instead, St. Thomas’s notion of 
participation in this context is entirely on the level of efficient causality—i.e., God 
gives being to creatures or makes them be—and thus it’s a relation between two 
substantial entities and not a relation between an entity and one of its 
metaphysical principles, as with formal or material causality. Nonetheless, it is a 
sort of efficient causality to which that found amongst natural kind substances is 
only analogous. For whereas the latter involves the introduction of form into an 
already existing subject (i.e., into something that already has an act of being), the 
divine efficient causality that is creation (and conservation) involves a direct 
communication of being, an actualizing of an essence and conserving it in 
actuality.  
 I realize that at this point analytic philosophers would have a difficult time 
avoiding becoming glassy-eyed and finding nothing but incoherence in such 
vague, speculative and metaphorical language. While Etienne Gilson considers 
Aquinas’ metaphysics of esse as his most profound contribution to philosophy 
(Gilson, 1993), Anthony Kenny struggles to find any sense in it (Kenny, 1969). 
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But I must insist that something like Aquinas’ approach to the Creator-creature 
relation cannot be avoided. Classical theism is not deism, with God conceived as a 
being altogether distinct from and outside of creation (the Watchmaker God of 
17th and 18th century mechanism), nor is it pantheism, according to which God is 
altogether identical with creation (Spinoza's deus sive natura). Classical theism 
maintains that God is both transcendent to creation, which exists solely because 
God freely wills it to exist, while also holding that God is present within creation, 
indeed within each and every created thing at the very core of its being.  
 There is ample support for this view from both the biblical and mystical 
traditions. Thus we read in the Acts of the Apostles that God is the one ‘in whom 
we live, move and have our being’ (Acts 17:28). Our very existence, therefore, is 
something ‚in‛ God, something contained within God’s own being. The great 
mystics of the Western tradition are also, to the best of my knowledge, almost 
unanimous in asserting the ‚oneness‛ of God and creation, yet without their 
being strictly identical. The height of the mystical experience is often described as 
an intuitive awareness of the all-pervading presence of the Divine throughout 
creation, or conversely of the unity of all things with the Divine. As far as I can 
see, the only way to maintain this view without falling into a pantheistic 
identification of God with creation is to adopt something like the Thomistic view 
outlined above, viz. that the Creator-creature relation is what we might call 
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‚entitative participation,‛ or the participation of creatures in the being of the 
Creator.6 
 
5.6. Entitative Participation and Supercomprehension 
 Returning now to the issue of middle knowledge, what does the Thomistic 
metaphysics of participation have to offer to the Molinist? Well, there are two 
things that can be said about metaphysical participation that I think are relevant 
to the discussion.  
 First of all, as creatures we cannot possibly understand or even begin to 
conceive of what it is like for another entity to participate in our own being; nor, 
therefore, can we possibly understand what it’s like to cognize things as would a 
being in which those things participate. As was famously pointed out by Thomas 
Nagel,36 we can’t even understand what it’s like to know the world in the way 
some our fellow creatures do, like bats. How much less, therefore, can we know 
what it’s like to know things in the way God knows them, given that the way in 
which things are related to God is a relation with which we have, and can have, 
no experience whatsoever? Is it implausible to think that God’s middle 
knowledge of creatures might arise due to that unique relation in which 
creatures stand to their creator, namely as beings that participate in the very 
substance of God? More pointedly, can we say that God cannot know what a 
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given creaturely agent would freely do in a given situation without that creature 
standing in the same relation to us as it does to God? 
 I would go even further and insist that I might not even be able to know what 
I would freely do in any given situation. Contra the examples of Plantinga,7 
Gaskin8 and Wyma,9 which are supposed to be instances of true counterfactuals 
of freedom that we can know to be true, I’m not sure that we don’t ultimately 
know them on the basis of our character. For example, I do know with certainty 
that I would not kill my best friend were I to be offered any sum of money. 
However, I know this to be true because of the kind of person I am, and hence I 
would not consider myself to be acting freely in refusing to kill my friend in such 
a situation. I must act that way given the kind of person I am. On the other hand, 
there are all sorts of situations which, were I to end up in them, I just don’t know 
what I would freely do. Moreover, I’m not convinced that I can ever know what I 
would freely do in any given situation. I just don’t have the epistemic resources 
available to make such a judgment about what I would freely do, only what I 
might or might not freely do.10 
 However, just because I cannot know any ‚middle facts‛ about myself, it 
does not follow that God cannot know such facts, for I do not stand in the same 
relation to myself as I do toward God: I do not participate in my own being, I 
have my being from God by way of participation in his being. Thus, we can 
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explain the traditional religious dictum that ‘God knows us better than we know 
ourselves’11 because of the metaphysical relation of participation in which we 
stand to God but not to ourselves. My argument, therefore, can be summarized 
as follows: 
(1)  If creatures are related to God by way of participation, then we 
cannot know that God does not have middle knowledge. 
   (2)  Creatures are related to God by way of participation. 
       
   (3)  We cannot know that God does not have middle knowledge. 
 
 With respect to premise (2), admittedly it involves commitment to an entire 
metaphysical scheme that is, to say the least, not obviously true or even 
obviously coherent. I am not in a position to offer an extended study of the 
Thomistic metaphysics of participation that I am here advocating; I must leave 
that as an exercise for the reader. But for an objector who takes exception to that 
metaphysics, some other metaphysics must be offered to replace it that doesn’t 
risk collapsing the Creator-creature relation into either deism or pantheism. That 
being so, I am confident that any such alternative will have to articulate a 
Creator-creature relation such that, were that relation to hold, then again we as 
creatures would not be in a position to deny to the Creator the sort of knowledge 
posited by Molinism, for the simple reason that we as creatures could not 
possibly stand in that relation to anything whatsoever. 
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 With respect to premise (1), the general assumption underlying it would be 
something like, ‘If x stands in R to y, and z cannot possibly stand in anything like 
R to anything whatsoever, then z cannot know x’s epistemic situation with 
respect to y.’ Thus, since God stands in the relation of being participated in to 
creatures, and human beings cannot possibly stand in anything like the relation 
of being participated in to anything whatsoever, then human beings cannot know 
what God’s epistemic situation is with regard to creatures, in particular, we 
cannot know that God lacks middle knowledge concerning free creatures. 
 Now, if middle knowledge is in itself impossible (i.e., if it involves some kind 
of contradiction), then of course God couldn’t possibly have middle knowledge, 
and we could know that whether or not we can understand the ‚God’s eye‛ view 
of the world. But that then shifts the burden of proof onto the anti-Molinist.  
Unless she can show that middle knowledge is incoherent, then for all we know, 
God could have middle knowledge, despite the fact that we cannot explain how 
he has it. Since in the previous chapter I already responded to the most serious 
objections to middle knowledge, viz. the grounding objection and Hasker’s 
argument, then there’s prima facie reason to think that middle knowledge is not 
an incoherent theory. Other arguments may be put forward that have not yet 
come to light, but again, the burden is on the objector to put forth such an 
argument; the burden is not on the Molinist to explain how God’s middle 
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knowledge comes about, given that it may, for all we know, result from that 
unique relation of metaphysical participation in which creatures stand to God 
and which we cannot possibly understand. 
 The second way in which the metaphysics of participation is relevant to the 
theory of middle knowledge is in regard to the issue of why God does not have 
middle knowledge concerning himself. Even though the relation of participation 
is not a very well defined one, we can specify at least some of its formal 
properties. Whatever else the relation amounts to, it is one that is asymmetrical (if 
x participates in the being of y, then y does not participate in the being of x) as 
well as irreflexive (x does not participate in the being of x). 
 As such, if God’s middle knowledge of creatures is, as I am suggesting, 
somehow attributable to the fact that creatures participate in the being of God, 
i.e., if middle knowledge is a consequence of entitative participation, then God 
cannot have middle knowledge regarding himself. God does not participate in 
his being, since nothing ‚self-participates;‛ rather, he is his being. As St. Thomas 
says, ‘Therefore it is impossible that in God His being should differ from His 
essence’ (ST IaIæ 3, 4). Consequently, God does not stand in the proper sort of 
relation to himself that would give rise—with respect to himself—to that 
‚absolutely profound and preeminent comprehension‛ known as middle 
knowledge. Thus, the argument may be summarized in the following way: 
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   (1)  x has middle knowledge concerning y only if y participates in the 
being of x. 
   (2)  God does not participate in his own being. 
       
   (3)  Therefore, God does not have middle knowledge concerning himself. 
 
Premise (1) echoes Molina’s own claim that middle knowledge ‘is found only in 
God with respect to creatures,’ and I am speculating that the crucial aspect of the 
Creator-creature relation in that regard is the participation of being.  
 Thus, unlike the Suarezian approach, which eschews any inquiry into the 
source of God’s middle knowledge and so leaves open the question of why God 
does not have middle knowledge concerning himself (which, if he did, would 
threaten God’s own freedom), my approach—to wit, that God’s middle 
knowledge concerning creatures somehow arises due to the fact that creatures 
have their being by way of participation in the divine essence—at least explains 
why God cannot have middle knowledge concerning himself. 
 
5.7. Objections and Replies 
 I believe I have already touched upon one possible objection to my approach 
to dealing with the source of God’s middle knowledge, viz. that the metaphysical 
theory I’m deploying is so speculative and not easily formulated in a clear and 
coherent way. I grant that the Thomistic metaphysics of esse and the correlative 
notion of the participation of being are not on the face of it tractable within an 
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analytic framework, in which the concept of being is generally expressed through 
the device of existential quantification. As Anthony Kenny once quipped, St. 
Thomas’ doctrine of God as ‚subsistent being itself‛ could only be expressed by 
means of an existentially quantified variable not followed by a predicate 
parameter, which, far from being a profound metaphysical insight, isn’t even 
intelligible (Kenny, 1969, pp. 82, 95). But this could just as well be taken to 
indicate the lack of expressive flexibility within a philosophical tradition that 
limits itself to a logical language designed originally for investigating the 
foundations of arithmetic. 
 There is a strong line of tradition going back to Plato that would see the most 
important philosophical truths as expressible only by way of analogy and 
metaphor. Plato himself, when it came to his most central doctrine, the theory of 
Forms, gave us only analogies and metaphors—such as the Intelligible Sun, the 
Divided Line, and the Cave—in discussing that doctrine. Likewise, the Thomistic 
notion of participation is inherently metaphorical and I have no clear definition up 
my sleeve to precisify that notion. But when dealing with the fundamentally 
mysterious relationship between Creator and creature, nothing much more than 
metaphor can be realistically expected. 
 It may also be claimed that my argument is ultimately one from ignorance: 
because we’re unable to understand God’s ‚epistemic situation‛ with respect to 
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creatures, and therefore cannot know that God doesn’t possess middle 
knowledge concerning creatures, does it follow that he does possess such 
knowledge? For all we can tell, the relation of metaphysical participation might 
not afford God any such knowledge after all. 
 But this is to misunderstand the Molinist endeavor, which is not to put forth a 
positive argument that God does possess middle knowledge. Rather, it is to put 
forth a putative explanation for how God can have certain and infallible 
knowledge of the contingent future. As William Lane Craig insists, ‘The Molinist 
is under no obligation to provide warrant for that assumption [viz. that God has 
middle knowledge], since he is merely proposing a model which is intended as 
one possible solution to the alleged antinomy of divine sovereignty and human 
freedom’ (Craig, 2001b, p. 339). Again, the burden of proof lies on the objector to 
show that such knowledge is impossible, which I contended in the previous 
chapter has not been shown. Finally, if the objector should insist that the Molinist 
owes an explanation of how God comes to possess such knowledge, my 
argument is that even if no such explanation can be given, that can be accounted 
for in terms of the necessarily mysterious nature of the Creator-creature relation. 
 The situation is analogous to the introduction of a novel scientific theory. 
Such theories are never ‚proven;‛ they are proposed to explain various 
phenomena, usually anomalies for which previous theories could not adequately 
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account, and they are considered successful to the extent that the can provide a 
simpler, more economical, more aesthetically pleasing explanation than previous 
theories. Likewise, there are phenomena in the theistic framework—viz. free 
human actions under the guidance of divine providence—that previous theories 
(Boethian-Thomistic, Scotistic, Bañezian, etc.) cannot adequately explain and that 
Molinism can explain. 
 Furthermore, just as scientific theories must not only explain a given 
phenomenon but also receive experimental confirmation, so too Molinism can be 
seen as ‚confirmed‛ inasmuch as it has been successfully applied to a whole 
array of theological issues that heretofore have proven intractable. Thus, Alvin 
Plantinga gave a Molinist ‚Free Will Defense‛ to the problem of evil (Plantinga, 
1974b, pp. 164f.), Alfred Freddoso showed how Molinism successfully deals with 
the problem of predictive prophecy (Freddoso, 1988, pp. 60-61), Thomas Flint 
deployed Molinism in giving an account of petitionary prayer (Flint, 1997) and 
papal infallibility (Flint, 1998, pp. 179f.), and William Lane Craig has offered a 
Molinist account of Christian Exclusivism (Craig, 1989). Molina’s theory of 
middle knowledge must therefore be considered one of the most powerful and 
successful theories in the history of Western philosophical theology. 
 Lastly, any scientific theory will have its theoretical postulates that cannot be 
given any further explanation. For example, in the Special Theory of Relativity, 
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the speed of light is simply assumed to be constant; there is no theoretical 
explanation for why it must be so. Likewise, in Molinism, God is simply assumed 
to have middle knowledge, with no explanation as to why he has it or how such 
knowledge comes about. What I tried to do in this chapter is argue that the 
necessarily mysterious nature of the Creator-creature relationship, whatever 
metaphysics one uses to articulate that relationship, gives us good reason to 
think that we should not be able to explain why God has such middle knowledge. 
For a theological theory to end up with an ineliminable note of mystery is, it 
seems to me, no vice. 
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NOTES 
Preface 
1 A form of prayer for the visitation of prisoners (Episcopal Church, 1795, p. 234). 
2 All biblical citations are from Catholic Biblical Association of America (1970). 
3 While this essay will be predominantly Christian in ‚tone,‛ my intention is that my arguments 
should be amenable to any classical theistic scheme. I see no reason why, e.g., a Jew or Muslim 
could not be an advocate of the views for which I shall be arguing. 
4 E.g., as the New Testament has it: In all wisdom and insight, [God] has made known to us the mystery 
of his will in accord with his favor that he set forth in him as a plan for the fullness of times, to sum up all 
things in Christ, in heaven and on earth (Ephesians 1.8-10). 
5 ‘*God+ will pronounce the final word on all history.  We shall know the ultimate meaning of the 
whole work of creation and of the entire economy of salvation and understand the marvelous 
ways by which his Providence led everything towards its final end.  The Last Judgment will 
reveal that God’s justice triumphs over all the injustices committed by his creatures and that 
God’s love is stronger than death’ (Catechism of the Catholic Church [hereafter=CCC], §1040). All 
citations of CCC are from United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (1997). 
6 ‘God is the sovereign master of his plan.  But to carry it out he also makes use of his creatures’ 
cooperation.  This use is not a sign of weakness, but rather a token of almighty God’s greatness 
and goodness.  For God grants his creatures not only their existence, but also the dignity of acting 
on their own, of being causes and principles for each other, and thus of cooperating in the  
accomplishment of his plan’ (CCC, §306). 
7 ‘To human beings God even gives the power of freely sharing in his providence by entrusting 
them with the responsibility of ‚subduing‛ the earth and having dominion over it.  God thus 
enables men to be intelligent and free causes in order to complete the work of creation, to perfect 
its harmony for their own good and that of their neighbors’ (CCC, §307). 
8 ‘With creation, God does not abandon his creatures to themselves.  He not only gives them 
being and existence, but also, and at every moment, upholds them and sustains them in being, 
enables them to act and brings them to their final end. ... [T]he solicitude of divine providence is 
concrete and immediate; God cares for all, from the least things to the great events of the world and 
its history.  The sacred books powerfully affirm God’s absolute sovereignty over the course of 
events’ (CCC, §§301, 303). 
9 ‘*M+en, as intelligent and free creatures, have to journey toward their ultimate destinies by their 
free choice and preferential love’ (CCC, §311). 
10 Or, perhaps, the authority of divine revelation as recorded in either the Bible or the Koran. 
 
 Chapter 1 
1 In this essay I will not assume any particular ontology, and so I will make indiscriminate 
mention of such entities as ‚propositions,‛ ‚states of affairs,‛ ‚events,‛ ‚possible worlds,‛ etc. 
Where my arguments depend crucially upon certain metaphysical assumptions, I will address it 
in the text. 
2 In fact, I would argue that God's being maximally provident entails that God has foreknowledge 
only because it already entails that God has middle knowledge, which itself entails 
foreknowledge. Cf. chapters 4 and 5 for my full discussion of middle knowledge. 
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3 It must be at all times before t because it is impossible for God to acquire knowledge that he 
didn’t already possess. Such a change would involve the actualization of a potentiality, which is 
inconsistent with God’s being pure and complete actuality. 
4 ‘*T+he belief in divine foreknowledge < derives its lofty theological status from its intimate 
connection with the absolutely central doctrine that God is perfectly provident’ (Freddoso, 1988, 
p. 2). 
5 The ‘only hope of avoiding muddle is to stick to the simple formalities of omniscience, whereby 
God knows that p if and only if p’ (Geach, 1977, p. 43). 
6 ‘The human person participates in the light and power of the divine Spirit.  By his reason, he is 
capable of understanding the order of things established by the Creator.  By free will, he is 
capable of directing himself toward his true good.< By virtue of his soul and spiritual powers of 
intellect and will, man is endowed with freedom, and outstanding manifestation of the divine 
image’ (CCC, §§1704, 1705). 
7 I realize that I am here rather egregiously begging the question against those (notably in the 
Reformed tradition) who hold that one’s ‚alignment with God,‛ which is to say one’s 
justification, is sola gratia, by God’s choice alone.  This is not an issue I can enter into here, so I 
will let the Catholic tradition speak on its behalf: ‘*W+hile God touches the heart of man through 
the illumination of the Holy Ghost, man himself neither does absolutely nothing while receiving 
that inspiration, since he can reject it [my emphasis], nor yet is he able by his own free will and 
without the grace of God to move himself to justice in His sight.  Hence, when it is said in the 
sacred writings: Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you, we are reminded of our liberty; and when 
we reply: Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted, we confess that we need the 
grace of God’ (Council of Trent (1545-1563), session VI, chapter 5, Decree concerning Justification 
[Schroeder, 1978, p. 32]).  So according to the Catholic tradition, the grace of God is an absolutely 
necessary condition for one’s justification, but is not in and of itself sufficient, for the person must 
freely assent and accept that justifying grace, which he or she may also freely reject. 
8 I’m assuming here an ontological commitment to events as particular entities of some sort.  The 
argument can easily be rewritten to avoid such talk. 
9 An assumption we will have to revisit later on. 
10 All citations of ST are from Aquinas (1945). 
11 Van Inwagen refers to this principle as ‘( )’. The term ‘Transfer Principle’ comes from John 
Martin Fischer (Fischer, 1994, p. 8). 
12 An argument against the validity of the Transfer Principle: if it is valid then its converse is 
valid, so that if p entails q and someone has a choice about whether p is the case, then someone 
has a choice about whether q is the case. Counterexample: My making you laugh entails that you 
have the capacity to laugh. I have a choice about whether I make you laugh, but I do not have a 
choice about whether you have the capacity to laugh. But cast in terms of accessible worlds we 
end up with a true statement: my making you laugh entails that you have the capacity to laugh. I 
have access to a world in which I make you laugh, therefore I have access to a world in which 
you have the capacity to laugh. 
 
Chapter 2 
 
1 This too is an unacceptable definition of omnipotence, but I needn’t enter into that debate here. 
2 For an excellent discussion of action theory from the medieval point of view, see Donagan 
(1982). 
3 All citations of Aristotle are from Aristotle (1984). 
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4 This is Aristotle’s own reasoning, to which a compatibilist has a ready reply, namely that one’s 
deliberation may be a part of the causal nexus that would prevent a sea battle.  
5 Indeed, the claim that such-and-such a statement isn’t now true or false but will come to be true or 
false is itself a future contingent statement, and so the Aristotelian solution seems self-defeating. 
6 ‘Furthermore, since the being of what is eternal does not pass away, eternity is present in its 
presentiality to any time or instant of time. We may see an example of sorts in the case of a 
circle.< *T+he center of the circle, which is no part of the circumference, is directly opposed to 
any given determinate point on the circumference. Hence, whatever is found in any part of time 
co-exists with what is eternal as being present to it, although with respect to some other time it be 
past or future’ (Summa Contra Gentiles [=SCG] 1, 66). All citations of SCG are from Aquinas (1975). 
 
Chapter 3 
 
1 As is evident from the fact that Aquinas discusses this sort of response to ATD in ST IaIæ, 14, 13, 
ad. 2, well before Ockham was born. 
2 For Ockham’s own views, see Ockham (1969). 
 
Chapter 4 
 
1 I am here following the presentation of Scotus's views by Langston (1986). 
2 As providing both necessary and sufficient conditions for an action’s being performed freely, 
Cowan’s statement of the ‚libertarian assumption‛ is problematic. I may move my arm as the 
result of an indeterministic neuronal event, but that doesn’t seem sufficient for my having moved 
my arm freely. 
3 As a determinist, Cowan thinks ‘that agents always act on the basis of their desires, so that what 
grounds their future actions is quite literally present states of affairs’ (Cowan, 2003, p. 101, n. 8). 
But, at least for the sake of argument, he seems to grant that such future-tense statements can be 
grounded indeterministically. 
4 Unfortunately, I don’t have an argument for this intuition either, but Cowan seems to agree with 
me on this point. He says, 
 Take the conditional proposition 
(F) If the moon is made of green cheese, then the individual we take to be Alvin  
  Plantinga is really an android. 
Now, both the antecedent and the consequent of this conditional are false.< But as you 
know, on truth-functional logic, this proposition turns out to be true! Clearly, however, 
something has gone amiss (Cowan, 2003, p. 100). 
It seems equally clear to me that something has gone amiss if we consider (α) true simply because 
its antecedent is false. Your not going to the movies cannot be what ‚grounds‛ the truth of my 
statement that if you go to the movies, then I will accompany you. 
 
Chapter 5 
 
1 ‘*Molina+ must be interpreted as having worked on the reconciliation question, not on the source 
question’ (Dekker, 1998, p. 110). 
2 ‘Inasmuch as God knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in 
which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated 
in by creatures according to some kind of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, 
according to which it participates in some way in the likeness of the divine essence. Therefore, as  
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God knows His essence as so imitable by such a creature, He knows it as the particular model 
and idea of that creature: an in like manner as regards other creatures’ (ST IaIæ, 15, 2). 
3 ‘As ideas, according to Plato, were the principles of the knowledge of things and of their 
generation, an idea, as existing in the mind of God, has this twofold office. So far as the idea is the 
principle of the making of things, it may be called an exemplar, and belongs to practical 
knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a likeness, and may 
belong to a speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it is related to everything 
made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it is related to all things 
known by God, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows 
according to their proper likeness, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner’ 
(ST IaIæ, 15, 3). 
4 ‘Ita in præsentia dico, quod hæc propositio, Antichristus erit, simpliciter loquendo, contingens 
est, quoniam iste effectus ex natura sua et ex proximis suis causis, habet intrinsecam 
contingentiam. Est autem necessaria illa propositio secundum quid, id est, per respectum ad 
dispositionem divinæ scientiæ et determinationem divinæ voluntatis, quæ efficaciter, licet 
suaviter, ut explicui, determinat omnes causas secundas ad suos effectus. Itaque ille modus 
necessitatis, qui convenit effectui per ordinem ad primam causam, compatitur secum modum 
contingentiæ, qui convenit effectui ab intrinseco et ex proximis suis causis. Et quamvis non plene 
possimus a priori explicare, quo pacto concursus primæ causæ efficax sit et necessarius, et simul 
conformetur cum natura causæ contingentis et liberæ, id tamen a posteriori constat nobis esse 
certissimum. Quoniam si concursus primæ causæ non esset efficax ad determinandum omnes 
causas secundas, nulla secunda causa operaretur suum effectum: quia nulla secunda causa potest 
operari, nisi sit efficaciter a prima determinate’ (Bañez, 1964, p. 363). God’s general concurrence is 
thus supposed to be efficacious (efficaciter), but in such a ‚subtle‛ way (suaviter) as not to 
compromise the freedom of those choices for which it is a necessary and sufficient condition. I 
leave it to the reader to decide upon the coherence of this view. 
 5 These examples are taken from Kvanvig (1986, p. 132). 
6 Meister Eckhart, one of the great representatives of the Western mystical tradition, seems to 
hold something like the view of ‚entitative participation‛ that I am advocating: ‘I am as sure as I 
live that nothing is so near to me as God. God is nearer to me than I am to myself.< The whole 
Being of God is contained in God alone. The whole of humanity is not contained in one man, for 
one man is not all men. But in God the soul knows all humanity, and all things at their highest 
level of existence, since it knows them in their essence’ (Meister Eckhart, 2007, pp. 19, 23). 
7 ‘I believe, for example, that if Bob Adams were to offer to take me climbing at Tahquitz Rock the 
next time I come to California, I would gladly (and freely) accept’ (Plantinga, 1985, p. 373). 
8 ‘If you had asked me the way, I would have told you.< It seems to me that we use conditionals 
like *this+ all the time, and regard their < truth as quite unproblematic’ (Gaskin, 1993, p. 421). 
9 ‘It seems to me to be true, for example, that I would not, upon discovering that my address had 
been given to a junk-mailing list, write an angry letter to the list-making organization’ (Wyma, 
2001, p. 1). 
10 Note well that I am simply making the epistemological point that I cannot know the middle facts 
about myself, not that there are no such facts. To infer the latter on the basis of the former is, it 
seems to me, is the crucial fallacy that plagues the grounding objection. On the other hand, I’m 
not averse to saying that I can know some middle facts about myself after the fact. For example, I 
think it’s true that if I were given the chance to return to graduate studies at UMass to finish my 
dissertation, I would freely do so, simply because I was given that chance and did return. 
11 Cf. n. 6 above. 
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APPENDIX: 
MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE AND THE SUFFERING OF CHRIST 
 Orthodox Christian theology has it that Christ, by his suffering and death, 
atoned for the sins of humankind, thereby accomplishing the reconciliation of the 
human race with its Creator. Although there are many different theories as to the 
precise nature of the atonement, the most straightforward is that because human 
beings had offended God by means of their sins, they had incurred a debt of 
punishment. Since God is all-merciful, he desired to forgive mankind and 
reestablish the bond of friendship that once existed betwixt he and pre-lapsarian 
humanity. However, as God is also perfectly just, the sins of each person could 
not go unpunished. 
 To satisfy the desires of the divine mercy as well as the demands of the divine 
justice, Christians believe that Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ, freely took upon 
himself the guilt of all humankind and suffered the punishment that was due to 
each for his or her sins. As a result, God’s justice was indeed satisfied. 
Furthermore, since Christ is himself the second Person of the Trinity and thus 
‚true God of true God,‛ his passion was also an act, indeed the supreme act, of 
divine mercy, reconciling God and creation. 
 Unfortunately, it is also a part of orthodox belief that not all human beings 
will necessarily avail themselves of the mercy of God, choosing to remain in their 
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sins and thus separating themselves eternally from their supernatural end. 
Although there are those who espouse the view of ‚universal salvation,‛ holding 
that all people will eventually be reconciled to God, it is surely heterodox to 
think that universalism must be true. The possibility of eternal damnation is well 
entrenched in the tradition of orthodox belief, and so long as it is even possible 
that some persons will prove reprobate, that seems to raise a serious problem 
concerning the scope and efficacy of Christ’s atonement. 
 Imagine, for simplicity, that the sum total of moral evil due to human 
sinfulness in the actual world amounts to 1030 units of moral turpitude (or 
‚turps‛ for short). Let us further stipulate that for each turp, Christ had to suffer 
one ‚dolor‛ (unit of suffering). Thus, for Christ’s suffering to be sufficient for the 
salvation of all humankind, he had to have actually suffered 1030 dolors. 
 However, if (as is supposed to be possible) not all humans are saved, then if 
Christ suffered the full 1030 dolors, then some measure of his suffering will have 
been inefficacious and, as it were, ‚wasted;‛ he will have suffered for more sins 
than were actually forgiven, namely the sins of those who never repent and are 
thus never reconciled to God. It would seem, therefore, that if only some (or even 
most) but not all humans are saved, then justice would demand that Christ 
should have suffered only enough for those who actually are saved, for 
otherwise (again) some of his suffering will have been in vain. If, that is to say, 
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only 1020 turps are actually repented of and forgiven, then Christ ought not to 
have suffered more than 1020 dolors. 
 On the other hand, if Christ did not suffer the debt of punishment due to all 
humans because of their sins—i.e., if he did not suffer the full 1030 dolors—then it 
would seem that some human beings must be damned, as the following scenario 
suggests. Imagine that our old friend Smith is one of those unfortunate 
individuals who never repents of his sins and thus dies unreconciled to God. By 
the above reasoning, it should follow that Christ did not suffer for Smith’s 
specific sins, for had he done so, his suffering would have been in vain as Smith 
never availed himself of the fruits of that suffering. 
 Now, was it possible for Smith to have repented of his sins and receive 
forgiveness, or was he, in effect, fated to damnation? The latter would seem to be 
the case, for if we assume that Smith had the ability to repent, then he would 
have had the ability to bring it about that Christ suffered more than he actually 
did. But that would mean that Smith had the power to do something today 
(repent of his sins) such that, were he to have done it, then some past fact (that 
Christ suffered, say, 1020 dolors) would not have been a fact (he would have 
suffered more than 1020 dolors, perhaps due to an extra lash from the Praetorian 
guard’s whip, an additional hammer stroke to the nail in his feet, or what have  
 
251 
you). Since Smith is not supposed to have such counterfactual power, it would 
seem, then, that he had not the power to repent of his sins and be forgiven. 
 From the discussion in chapter four, it should be evident how a Molinist can 
respond to this argument. For if God has middle knowledge, then he knew from 
all eternity that Smith would not repent of his sins; indeed, he would know 
exactly who would repent of their sins and who would not. Since Smith freely 
remained in his sins and refused to repent, then he could have done otherwise; 
he could have repented. Were he to have done so, then God would have known 
the CF, ‘Were Smith in such-and-such circumstances (i.e., the circumstances in 
which he actually found himself), then he would repent of his sins.’ Were God to 
have known that, then Christ would have suffered more of a dolorous passion 
than the one he actually suffered, and thereby would have provided sufficient 
atonement for the sins of all who would have repented, but not more than would 
have been necessary in that counterfactual scenario. In the actual scenario, Christ 
did not suffer for Smith’s unrepented sins, for such suffering would have been in 
vain. But as the foregoing Molinist picture shows, that does not imply that Smith 
could not have repented and been forgiven. 
 To sum up, the theory of middle knowledge provides a promising means of 
navigating between the Scylla of necessary salvation for all and the Charybdis of 
necessary damnation for some. Salvation would seem to be necessary for all if 
252 
Christ suffered for the sins of all humankind; if not all were saved, then some of 
Christ’s suffering would have been in vain. On the other hand, if Christ only 
suffered for the sins of those who are actually saved, then those who are actually 
damned would seem to have been fated to damnation from the moment when 
Christ’s passion was completed. Molinism, as was argued above, allows us to 
maintain that Christ in fact suffered only for the sins of those who are actually 
saved—so that none of us suffering was in vain—while also maintaining that 
those who are actually damned could have been saved, had they freely chosen to 
repent of their sins. Had they done so, then (so the Molinist can insist) Christ 
would have suffered for their sins as well. 
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